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Abstract
Traditional images of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century American South are
of an inward-looking region characterized by economic stagnation, xenophobia, cultural
isolation, and reactionary politics. This dissertation contends that vibrant transnational links
connected the South to the wider world through an analysis of the political and economic
landscape of postbellum Louisiana, the 1884 New Orleans World’s Industrial and Cotton
Centennial, the Louisiana State Lottery Company, and Central America. An examination of
Edward Austin Burke demonstrates that the era’s New South creed comprised a seminal
transnational component.
This dissertation will explore how Burke became a central cog in Louisiana’s Democratic
political machine and a leading American capitalist in Central America. As owner-editor of the
New Orleans Times-Democrat and director general of the 1884 New Orleans world’s fair, Burke
enjoyed a marvelous platform from which to broadcast his vision of a transnational New South
that promoted Latin America as a market for southern-made exports and an investment
opportunity for southern businessmen. The New Orleans exposition displayed technologies and
products that shaped and at times threatened gender roles, racial hierarchies, class norms, local
political dynamics, and imperial visions. Burke was also a key partner in the alliance between
Louisiana’s Democratic government and the Louisiana lottery. The lottery, with its tentacles in
Latin America and nearly every state of the Union, insured that no other Gilded Age political
machine utilized national and transnational ties as successfully as Louisiana’s.
In the late 1880s, Burke began a near forty-year residency in Honduras, where he held
diversified interests in the country’s railroads and real estate along with substantial mineral
concessions. The major also actively supported numerous Honduran administrations, held five

different high-ranking positions in government-supported railroads, recruited other foreign
capitalists, served as intermediary when disputes arose between capitalists and Honduran leaders,
and informally advised several presidents on matters ranging from infrastructure projects to
American politics. Using American and Latino perspectives, this study demonstrates how the
interplay between the U.S. South and Latin America was a defining variable in their respective
developments.
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Introduction
Defining New Orleans is akin to mooring a ship to a floating dock, it is a place of
paradox and permeability. It is the main port in the stern of the Mississippi after its porous hull
meanders through the heartland of North America, but its municipal boundaries do not border the
Gulf of Mexico. Situated between Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi, as the river flows
west to east amid wetlands before looping north, the exact contours of the Crescent City fluctuate
with shifting sediments and waterways. It is one of the southernmost cities in North America
and the northernmost city in the circum-Caribbean, a gateway to the hinterland and a Caribbean
port. It has long been a city of migration, as people and goods inhabit the same space as
migratory birds and crawfish. With striking racial stratification, vibrant cultural mixing, and a
reputation for both licentiousness and cosmopolitanism, New Orleans has been decried as unsouthern while also heralded as the progenitor of southern cuisine and music.1
No southern city, therefore, is more suited to anchor an analysis of the reciprocal
transnational links between the American South and Latin America. Viewing Louisiana and
Latin America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through a transnational lens
allows for a more complete picture of both regions. An inherently murky term, transnational
history, at its essence, focuses on the interaction of people, goods, ideas, plants, animals, and
pathogens that form myriad webs of exchange across borders. Transnational scholarship,
therefore, must go beyond demonstrating that a region was influenced and connected to events in
an international context. It necessitates examining reciprocal relationships in an integrated way.

Rebecca Snedeker and Rebecca Solnit, “Sinking in and Reaching Out,” in Unfathomable City: A New Orleans
Atlas, editors Rebecca Solnit and Rebecca Snedeker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 1-4.
1

1

Following the lead of scholars of empire, the transatlantic slave trade, the colonial New
World, and the Age of Revolution, historians are increasingly embracing transnational history’s
applicability as a tool to study the American South during the nineteenth century. Douglas R.
Egerton, Don Doyle, and Moon-Ho Jung have demonstrated that the commercial, political, and
social ties between the South and the wider world persisted and evolved during the Civil War
era. Moreover, a transnational mode of analysis is a tonic to overcome the “mythical
exceptionalism” that has been prevalent among U.S. historians, particularly southern historians.
It also complicates the Eurocentric constraints of older international studies and reorients an
outward-looking South towards Latin America and the Caribbean. Besides exploring tangible
connections between the South and the wider world, transnational studies such as these
decisively counter the notion that southerners became increasingly parochial and inward-looking
as the nineteenth century progressed. Another primary benefit of transnational analysis is that it
enables historians to transcend traditional national and regional narratives while allowing for a
better understanding of both perspectives as a product of commercial, political, cultural, and
demographic exchanges. As Matthew Pratt Guterl argues, the South during this era was “a
messy, complicated borderland of sorts,” caught between North America, Latin America, and the
Caribbean.2

2

Alison Games, "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," American Historical Review 111
(June 2006): 744; Douglas R. Egerton, “Rethinking Atlantic Historiography in a Postcolonial Era: The Civil War in
a Global Perspective,” Journal of the Civil War Era 1, (March 2011): 80; Edward Bartlett Rugemer, The Problem of
Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the American Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2008), 12; Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 6-8; David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in
the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 297; Don H. Doyle, “Introduction: The Atlantic World
and the Crisis of the 1860s,” in American Civil Wars: The United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Crisis of
the 1860s, ed. Don H. Doyle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), ix; Brian Ward, “Carly
Phillips, David Armitage, and the Place of the American South in Atlantic and Other Worlds,” in The American
South and the Atlantic World, editors Brian Ward, Martyn Bone, and William A. Link (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 2013), 23; Matthew Pratt Guterl, American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of
Emancipation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 6-7, 17.
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Yet practitioners of transnational history must also be cognizant of its limitations. One of
its strengths, malleability, can result in “little coherence and no real unity.” An overriding
tendency to explain all aspects of change and continuity as a result of transnational forces can
cause scholars to miss other complexities. For example, how significant local issues,
institutions, groups, and personalities shaped the past. When used by historians of the United
States to study relations with Latin America, transnationalism can, in effect, become shorthand
for domineering corporations, exploitive foreign capitalists, or the subjugation of Latino
nationalism under the banner of globalization. By contrast, scholars of Latin America have
employed transnationalism to explore Marxism, liberation theology, feminism, and resistance to
neo-colonialism.3
On the whole, studies that incorporate a Central American country can only be fully
comprehended when using a transnational lens. The borders and constructs of Central American
nation-states were in constant flux during the nineteenth century. All five of the nations that
make up the modern region constituted a United Provinces of Central America from 1823 until
1840, and there were also numerous attempts to restore the national federation through either
diplomacy or conquest during the remainder of the century. Moreover, the ascent of the first
Central American Liberal, Justo Rufino Barrios of Guatemala, played a direct role in establishing
Honduran liberal leadership. The political rivalries within the liberal camp also had a
transnational bent, as most revolutionaries had the backing of key groups in one or more
neighboring countries.4
Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Greene, “Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History,” in Atlantic History: A
Critical Appraisal, editors Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5;
Richard White, The Republic for Which It Stands: The United States during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age,
1865-1896 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 6; Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J.T. Way,
“Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis,” American Quarterly 60 (September 2008): 625-628.
4
Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America: A Nation Divided, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 90, 148; Arturo Taracena Arriola, “Liberalismo y poder político en Centroamérica (1870-1929)” in
3

3

Despite seminal connections between the U.S. South and the wider world during the
nineteenth century, the traditional historical images of the era are of an inward-looking region
characterized by economic stagnation, xenophobia, cultural isolation, and reactionary politics.
When scholars of the postbellum South have explored ties to Latin America, the most common
arena of study has been that of Confederate exiles, who were primarily concentrated in Brazil,
Mexico, and British Honduras.5 Yet most southern expatriate communities failed because they
rejected significant exchanges within their new countries and stubbornly attempted to rebuild the
Old South in Latin America. No wonder that an estimated eighty-percent of these former
Confederates returned home to their native South by the early 1870s. One furtive emigrant
described the experience as a “leap into the dark,” only to “reach the bottom of an unfathomable
abyss.” Nonetheless, scholarship on these diehard rebels indicates that, whether planned or not,
they “pushed transnational social and economic relations in new directions” and vigorously
developed “circuits of economic development beyond and across borders.”6 This dissertation
contends that vibrant transnational links connected the South and Latin America long after the
majority of Confederate expatriates returned home. An analysis of the political and economic
landscape of postbellum Louisiana, the 1884 New Orleans World’s Industrial and Cotton

Historia general de Centroamérica, Tomo IV (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal Quinto Centenario, 1993), 190-192;
Games, "Atlantic History,” 744.
5
Sharon Hartman Strom and Frederick Stirton Weaver, Confederates in the Tropics: Charles Swett’s Travelogue
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 54; Todd W. Wahlstrom, The Southern Exodus to Mexico:
Migration across the Borderlands after the American Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), xxi;
Daniel E. Sutherland, The Confederate Carpetbaggers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 28;
Donald C. Simmons, Jr., Confederate Settlements in British Honduras (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company,
Inc., 2001), 38, 51; Daniel E. Sutherland, “Looking for a Home: Louisiana Emigrants during the Civil War and
Reconstruction,” Louisiana History 21 (Autumn 1980): 347; Andrew F. Rolle, The Lost Cause: The Confederate
Exodus to Mexico (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 3-5; William Clark Griggs, The Elusive Eden:
Frank McMullan’s Confederate Colony in Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 97; Cyrus B. Dawsey
and James M. Dawsey, eds, The Confederados: Old South Immigrants in Brazil (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 1995), 3; Michael Shane Powers, “From Confederate Expatriates to New South Neo-Filibusters: Major
Edward A. Burke and the Americas,” (M. A. thesis: Clemson University, 2012): 6-26.
6
As quoted in Strom and Weaver, Confederates in the Tropics, 54; Sutherland, The Confederate Carpetbaggers, 28;
Simmons, Jr., Confederate Settlements in British Honduras, 38, 51.
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Centennial, and the Louisiana State Lottery Company will demonstrate that the New South creed
contained a seminal transnational component.
A formative period of this transnational New South vision occurred after Reconstruction
and before the Populist insurgency and Jim Crow era of the late 1890s. The period, which was
distinct in southern history, is often divorced from the Gilded Age as a whole or seen as an
exception to it.7 This New South political culture, as it became known, reflected and furthered
Gilded Age concerns. It was among the many ambitious, but problematic, efforts at
development and nation-building in late nineteenth-century America. It was indicative not only
of the corruption and failures of the age, but also of the dislocating forces of technological
change, large wealth gaps, urbanization, immigration, government failures, and what Richard
White calls “the timeless human predicament of scaling even the most honorable hopes to the
unforgiving metrics of recalcitrant reality.” The South, like the rest of the nation, was
experiencing “a prolonged economic, political, and social crisis” marked by “dystopia and
utopian fantasies.” To confront it, the New South idea offered a way for Gilded Age Americans
to act collectively, rather than as individuals. The paradoxes of the New South and Gilded Age
also comprised a forward looking age nonetheless tethered to “the great gravitational pull of the
Civil War.” Perhaps most unfortunately, the New South vision was like the liberalism of Henry
Adams and other vaunted worldviews that were idealized versions of society rather than accurate
descriptions of the more complicated reality on the ground.8
With its urban cosmopolitanism, large immigrant communities, and powerful political
machine, an analysis of the economy, politics, and society of New Orleans, therefore, reveals

7

Michael R. Hyman, The Anti-Redeemers: Hill-Country Political Dissenters in the Lower South from Redemption to
Populism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 8.
8
White, The Republic for Which It Stands, xviii-xix, 7, 77, 8, 58.
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that it was both distinctly southern and characteristic of other American cities in the era. Indeed,
postbellum New Orleans was a city in flux. Having annexed Jefferson City, Algiers, and
Carrollton in the preceding decades, its population of roughly 250,000 occupied only one-tenth
of the nearly two-hundred square miles within the municipal boundary. Lakeside areas of the
Ninth Ward, for example, were a morass of wilderness and cypress swamps. Its three most
distinctive features were the riverfront levees, French Market, and Canal Street. One visitor,
Emil Deckert, remarked that portions of the city were “imposing and elegant,” complete with
well-cared-for sidewalks and electric lighting that illuminated a city that was both “decidedly
tropical” and reminiscent of Paris and Holland for its boulevards and gardens. However, noting
characteristics of most urban spaces in the era, Deckert also found in other parts “an
indescribable chaos” of filth and mud, where animals and vermin disturbed sleeping residents
with the “nocturnal caterwauling” of battle.9
Despite a lasting legacy in culture and aesthetics, Creoles based in the Vieux Carré no
longer vied for decisive political and economic power in late nineteenth-century New Orleans.
Native-born Americans anchored above Canal Street, strong Irish and German communities
established in the antebellum era, a small but significant group of Latino residents, and a
growing wave of Italian immigrants, added to a sizeable black population, comprised a vibrant,
polyglot city that resembled many northern cities of the era. These were the ethnic and racial
contours of the New Orleans encountered by Major Edward Austin Burke in 1869.10
Burke was acknowledged in his own time as a leading New South zealot, but he has been

9

Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress, 1880-1896, Second Edition (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 4-7; as quoted in Frederic Trautmann, "New Orleans, the
Mississippi, and the Delta through a German's Eyes: The Travels of Emil Deckert, 1885-1886," Louisiana History
25 (Winter 1984): 80, 82-84.
10
Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 9, 11.
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woefully understudied. A Confederate veteran who became a central cog in Louisiana’s
Democratic political machine and a leading American capitalist and politico in Central America,
Burke was the embodiment of a transnational New South vision that shaped the Americas. As
owner-editor of the New Orleans Times-Democrat, Burke enjoyed a marvelous platform from
which to broadcast his vision of a transnational New South that promoted Latin America as a
market for southern-made exports and an investment opportunity for southern businessmen.
Specifically, Burke conceptualized New Orleans as the metropole of the circumCaribbean, with prosperity for the entire Mississippi River valley arising from the extensive trade
of commercial, industrial, and manufactured goods with Latin America. This dissertation,
therefore, frames Burke as a leading advocate for a coterie of southerners that privileged such
expansion, rather than reliance on cotton, as the centerpiece of regional progress. The New
South’s emphasis on a diversified economy, based on industry and commerce, was presented as
an alternative to the region-wide economic shift towards sharecropping. This was especially
apparent in New Orleans, where the erosion of the antebellum plantation economy, the resulting
sharecropping system, and the spread of railroads undercut the Crescent City’s economic
standing while strengthening such regional rivals as St. Louis and Atlanta.11 As the leading
scholar on New Orleans in the Gilded Age, Joy Jackson has argued that two main problems
faced the city, and indeed the state as a whole, “the revival of commerce” and “the struggle for
political ascendancy between . . . Ring and reformer elements in the Democratic-Conservative
Party.”12
This in-depth study of Major Edward A. Burke’s political career seeks to carry out Brian

Michael Ross, “Resisting the New South: Commercial Crisis and Decline in New Orleans, 1865-85,” American
Nineteenth Century History 4 (Spring 2003): 60.
12
Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 16.
11
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Ward’s call for transnational approaches centered on a “granular” study of individuals, events, or
institutions in appropriate case studies. 13 In so doing, it will place the interconnected,
transnational forces present in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in a grounded and
discernable framework. A study of Burke is uniquely suited for the task. The major had
personal and formidable experiences in the Gulf South, on the eastern seaboard of the United
States, and in Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa. In addition, he oversaw the
first nationally-sponsored international exposition in the former Confederacy. The 1884 New
Orleans fair displayed technologies and products from scores of companies and nation-states
around the world that shaped and at times threatened gender roles, racial hierarchies, class
norms, local political dynamics, and imperial visions. Burke was also a key partner in the
alliance between Louisiana’s Democratic government and the Louisiana State Lottery Company.
The Louisiana lottery, with its tentacles in Latin America and nearly every state of the Union,
insured that no other Gilded Age political machine utilized national and transnational ties as
successfully as Louisiana’s Ring Democrats. Beginning in Louisiana in 1868 and ending in
Honduras in 1907, the Louisiana lottery as an institution demonstrated the fluidity of
Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, and the Progressive Era. As a state sponsored enterprise with an
international reach, it also became a formidable transnational force.
In no small part due to his partnership with the lottery, Burke helped other New Orleansbased politicians fashion a political machine with ties to immigrant communities, laborers, and
rank-and-file white southerners. While a key source of strength, the lottery was the focal point
of a successful campaign of Reform Democrats who defeated Burke and a slew of other Ring
candidates in the 1888 election. It is no surprise that Burke’s quick rise to power and equally

13

Ward, “Carly Phillips, David Armitage, and the Place of the American South in Atlantic and Other Worlds,” 32.
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dramatic fall in Louisiana earned him embittered enemies and rivals. Some questioned the
fidelity of his life’s story and even his service to the Confederacy. One acerbic Republican foe
who was not beneath fabricating colorful rumors about leading Louisiana Democrats claimed
that Burke was really “A.E. Burk,” a fugitive who had “absconded” from Illinois. Another bit of
gossip spun by the major’s enemies had it that Burke had been a Union spy who delivered “a
great deal of valuable information” to Admiral David Farragut in the capture of Mobile.14
A surprising number of historians have endorsed the notion that Burke was “an
adventurer of obscure origin,” “probably from Ohio or Illinois,” but who “appeared to have been
Northern.” At least one scholar has even questioned whether Burke served in the Civil War, for
either side. Numerous mentions of Burke as a Confederate in the Official Records, along with
his sworn oath on three passport applications, verify Burke’s background and settle the question
beyond all doubt. Other scholars have emphasized Burke’s skullduggery but discount his
genuine transnational New South policy goals. Rather, he has been presented as a “cool-headed
and daring gambler” with “splendid audacity,” the “most brazen thief in Bourbon annals,” a
“dealmaker par excellence,” and Louisiana’s New South “mythmaker-in-chief.” However, an indepth analysis demonstrates that in Burke chicanery and policy goals were not mutually
exclusive. Arranging jobs, manipulating the electoral process, and appealing to voters’ worst
instincts were assuredly in the toolbox of postbellum Democrats, but so were genuine economic
and social platforms.15

“The Louisiana Officials: Letter from Gov. Wells, A Reply to Democratic Falsehoods,” New York Times, Feb. 19,
1878; as quoted in William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877-1900 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 28.
15
Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 322-323; Hair, Bourbonism
and Agrarian Protest, 27; C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of
Reconstruction (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), 192; A.H. Cole to C.D. Hill, August 10, 1864, in War
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols.
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 2, 1052; C. Vann Woodward,
Origins of the New South: 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 71; Nystrom, New
14
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Following his defeat in 1888 and nineteen indictments after public revelations surfaced
that he had misappropriated over one-and-a-half-million dollars in state funds as state treasurer,
Burke exiled himself to Honduras, where he capitalized on a large government mineral
concession. Before the more widely studied dominance of banana companies at the turn of the
century, Honduran leaders courted foreign capitalists such as Burke to help modernize the
country through the mining industry. The adherents of what historian Richard Weiner terms
“developmental liberalism” extolled subsidies for industry, low business taxes, foreign capital,
immigration, infrastructure development, and measures to curtail the Catholic Church and landed
aristocracy within a republican form of government. They found eager allies in such
transnational New South disciples as Burke and his ilk. Marco Aurelio Soto, the first liberal
president of Honduras, moved the capital from Comayagua to a city more suitably located for
access to the mineral rich zones of the central highlands, Tegucigalpa, which appropriately
means “silver mountain” in Nahuatl. Luis Bográn, Policarpo Bonilla, and other liberal presidents
maintained generous stipulations for mining corporations, which paved the way for similar
concessions for later, and more exploitative, banana companies.16
During his near forty-year residency in Honduras, Burke held diversified interests in the
country’s railroads and real estate while maintaining his own mineral concessions, which
included “one of the largest tracts of mineral land ever conveyed to one individual.”17 Burke also
maintained strong ties to his allies in Louisiana, none more so than with the co-owner of the
Louisiana lottery and former Ring ally John A. Morris, who was a silent partner in Burke’s
Orleans after the Civil War, 182; Miki Pfeffer, Southern Ladies and Suffragists: Julia Ward Howe and Women’s
Rights at the 1884 New Orleans World’s Fair, (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2014), 3; Golway,
Machine Made, xxiv.
16
“History of Major Burke’s Frauds,” New York Times, Mar. 22, 1894; Richard Weiner, Race, Nation, and Market:
Economic Culture in Porfirian Mexico (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 2004), 22.
17
W. A. Thacher, “Mining in Honduras,” in American Institute of Mining Engineers, Transactions of the American
Institute of Mining Engineers, vol. 20 (Philadelphia: Sherman & Co. Printers, 1892), 405.
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Central American operations and provided access to networks of British capital. The major also
actively supported numerous Honduran administrations by defending the government in no less
than three revolutionary uprisings. He held five different high-ranking positions in governmentsupported railroads, recruited other foreign capitalists, served as intermediary when disputes
arose between capitalists and Honduran leaders, and informally advised several presidents on
matters ranging from infrastructure projects to American politics.
In addition to mining, links between Honduras and Louisiana were particularly vibrant
due to the relocation of the Louisiana lottery to Honduras, where it became La Compañía
Nacional de Lotería de Honduras (The Honduras National Lottery Company). Burke used his
ongoing partnership with Morris to facilitate an agreement between the gambling enterprise and
President Policarpo Bonilla. Burke had “fought and fell” with Bonilla’s rival during a grueling
civil war in 1894. Thus the deal between the lottery and Bonilla’s new government was a crucial
moment in allowing for Burke’s return into the country. The lottery, which maintained a
vigorous illicit business in the United States, and Burke’s various dealings were at the forefront
of transnational ties between Central America and the United States. Yet they were also among
the rising tide of dealings, especially in Latin America, that “blurred the line between legal and
illegal capital flows.”18
As historian William Schell Jr. demonstrates in his work on Mexico, American capitalists
at the dawn of U.S. imperialism did not possess unquestionable dominance over the politics and
economies of Latin American nations. Burke’s operation in Honduras was part of a “give-and-

18

E.A. Burke to George Hoadley [sic], April 8, 1897, Fondo Policarpo Bonilla, Marzo-Mayo, 1897, Archivo
Nacional de Honduras, Antigua Casa Presidencial de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, Honduras; Katherine Unterman, Uncle
Sam’s Policemen: The Pursuit of Fugitives Across Borders (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 105.
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take relationship” in a multi-national “trade diaspora of expatriate cross-cultural brokers.”19
While not operating on the same scale as the regime of Porfirio Díaz, Burke was part of a group
of foreigners and exiles living in Honduras that engaged in trade via personal connections or,
more aptly, concessions. Moreover, Hondurans acknowledged Burke’s New South vision as
distinctly regional. Burke’s associations with other Americans in Honduras also demonstrate
that, while eagerly partnering with northerners and Europeans for capital, southerners in Latin
America formed a tight-knit group and maintained their regional identity along with a broader
American patriotism. This was no doubt strengthened by their experience in the Civil War and
Reconstruction, but it was also akin to the ways in which immigrants to the United States
retained their ethnic identity while acting, and being received as, American citizens.20
Burke also typified most Americans in Latin America during the era by displaying mixed
motivations and goals stemming from his prolonged residency in Honduras as, what historian
Katherine Unterman terms, a “fugitive philanthropist.” He often expressed a devotion to the
interest and people of the country that Hondurans, or at least the Honduran press, perceived as
genuine. A Honduran publication in 1914, for example, described Burke as “an enterprising
businessman” and “cultivated gentleman,” one whom “public opinion consider[ed] . . . a helpful
foreigner and a loyal friend of the country.”21 Whenever Burke expressed an opinion concerning
relations with the United States that he knew was unpopular with Hondurans, he emphasized
that, with his business interests and life so inextricably bound to Honduras, his proposals were
always made in the country’s best interest. Burke was proud of his cosmopolitanism, his
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command of the Spanish language, and the array of social and political festivities that made him
part of the elite.22
As the first extensive analysis of Major Edward A. Burke, from his Confederate service
and Louisiana political career to Central American capitalist and politico, this study seeks to
expand our understanding of the American South and Latin America in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. By exploring social and political exchanges on the ground, it utilizes
American and Latino perspectives to demonstrate how the interplay between both regions was
the defining variable in their respective developments during a shared, if conflictual, history.
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Chapter One: Major Edward A. Burke and the Struggle for “Home Rule” in Louisiana
Burke’s ascending power within Louisiana during the last decades of the nineteenth
century was exceptionally rapid, even in the remarkably fluid milieu of postbellum New Orleans.
His grandfather reportedly immigrated to South Carolina in the first decades of the nineteenth
century as an Irish insurgent fleeing British authorities. Born Edward Austin Burk in Louisville,
Kentucky, in 1841, his father was a relatively prosperous architect and provided his son with a
stimulating life of education and travel. The exact details of Burke’s antebellum life are difficult
to determine. Once he achieved prominence, multiple people at various points, be they allies or
antagonists, or Burke himself, contributed to the confusion. Upon his death, the New York Times
ran an Associated Press story that stated that Burke worked at a railroad telegraph office at
thirteen years of age and was a division superintendent in charge of several hundred men by the
time he was seventeen.1 Nonetheless, the beginning of the Civil War found the nineteen-yearold working on the Texas Central Railroad, where he enlisted in the Confederate army. He
ultimately rose to the rank of major. The Civil War and its immediate aftermath were formative
experiences in shaping a fluid and transnational outlook for many of Burke’s generation.2 His
actions at this stage of life foreshadowed the defining characteristics of his transnational outlook:
an unbridled pursuit of power, gregarious personality, and keen wit that flourished in the ever
shifting world of permeable borders the Civil War and postbellum eras bequeathed the Gulf
South.
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By 1864, Burke was among those officers who oversaw the sale of Confederate cotton in
Mexico as a quartermaster and the chief inspector of field transportation in Texas.3 After the fall
of Vicksburg cut off areas west of the Mississippi from the Confederacy, Trans-Mississippi
Department commander Edmund Kirby Smith exercised authority as the leading regional official
for the Confederacy. In so doing, he established a Cotton Bureau to appropriate the region’s
cotton for military use. Smith appointed a prominent New Orleans cotton factor, William A.
Broadwell, to organize a two-pronged process of exchanging southern cotton for much needed
cash and supplies. First, Broadwell created a Confederate system of western wagon trails. As a
quartermaster and transportation officer, Burke was among those officers whose duties included
hauling cotton in wagon trains that stretched from the Ouachita River, into San Antonio, and
finally to Laredo or Matamoros on the Rio Grande. Confederate agents then negotiated with
assertive Mexican merchants. Merchants in areas along the Rio Grande capitalized on the
Confederacy’s dire straits and the increase of Mexico’s domestic cotton production to negotiate
deals favorable to Mexico. Such hard bargains resulted more often in bartering for weapons and
supplies rather than a cash exchange.4
The area between the Ouachita and Mississippi rivers fell into Broadwell’s second
scheme. Confederate agents in the Gulf South sold cotton to foreign merchants, predominantly
English companies, involving on at least one occasion the Baring Brothers, who guaranteed it
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would not go the United States. Buyers paid in specie, British sterling, U.S. currency, or New
York exchange notes. In turn, Confederates used the cash and notes to buy supplies across the
Rio Grande or in Mexican port cities like Tampico. Thus, Burke took active part in transnational
commercial links that provided the Gulf South with an essential, viable path to maintaining the
Confederacy in the trans-Mississippi during the last two years of the Civil War.5 Cited as an
exemplary organizer by his Confederate superiors, Burke would build on this formative
experience in dealing with the fluidity of borders, goods, and people to conceptualize a
transnational New South vision that, he hoped, would outpace the Old South.6
Once the Civil War concluded, Burke’s proximity to Mexico and the nature of his
Confederate service made exile there a viable option. According to his recollections a decade
later, Burke was initially fearful of hostile federal policies directed toward recent rebels and
strongly considered joining Kirby Smith and others as a Confederate expatriate in Mexico.
Smith’s emissary, General Simon B. Buckner, ventured to New Orleans, where he signed an
agreement with U.S. delegates headed by General Edward R.S. Canby on May 26 to arrange for
the surrender of the trans-Mississippi Department. Smith formally surrendered his command on
June 2, 1865, in Galveston, Texas. Former Confederates who had been stationed in the Lone
Star state were the most likely to cross the Rio Grande, eventually followed by thousands of
dispirited civilians, as “Mexico fever” swept across the defeated Confederacy.7 Yet southern
exiles were often disheartened and bitter, primarily motivated by resignation and fear. The
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young, ambitious, and pragmatic Burke, however, took the amnesty oath and chose a route that
held opportunities for prosperity and power.8
Ultimately, Burke landed in the port city of Galveston. He was among those who
increased the Island City’s population from 3,500 at the time of Smith’s surrender to over ten
thousand by 1867. Burke’s varied employments, including a stint as a telegraph operator,
reflected the vacillating nature of the early years of Reconstruction. His most notable occupation
was as a cotton factor for one of Galveston’s largest commercial firms, T.H. McMahan &
Gilbert, which grew after the war by fighting stay laws and actively pursuing foreclosures. With
his early ties to Thomas H. McMahan, the ambitious Burke displayed his penchant for grafting
himself to powerful figures. A leading socialite and businessman, McMahan headed the city’s
push for an opera house and was the cofounder, in September 1865, of the first nationwide
banking institution in Texas, the First National Bank of Galveston. Within a few years, Burke
had formed his own partnership, Stoddart & Burk, amid a steady revival of Galveston trade. His
firm no doubt utilized Burke’s association with McMahan, who likewise held ownership in one
of Galveston’s new cotton press companies. Stoddart & Burk were wholesalers in imports,
mostly liquor and cigars, and exported cotton, a business that again rested on the South’s
commercial trade with the wider world.9 Galveston’s value of exports were ten times greater
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than that of imports while the amount of tonnage entering the harbor within a year of the end of
hostilities, 375,000, doubled antebellum annual norms.
Burke also joined a Galveston fire brigade, the Washington Steam Fire Engine Company
No. 1, and was elected the city’s chief engineer, thus showing early signs of social and political
ambition while trying to find the prosperity that eluded so many southerners in the years
following Appomattox. Galveston was characteristic of cities in the era, with volunteer fire
companies that functioned more as social clubs than as groups of professional civil servants.10
His post as chief engineer included a role in Galveston’s municipal government, which was
Burke’s first taste of political office.
As the center of Texas commerce and a dynamic Gulf South hub, Galveston was likewise
a flashpoint for racial and political violence. The Island City was a base for both the Freedmen’s
Bureau and black army troops, both of which led to ubiquitous altercations that took place in
streets, saloons, and local courts. Conflicts between local white authorities hostile to Republican
control and the federally-supported armed forces from the Fifth Military District served as a
primer for Burke’s later experiences in New Orleans.
Burke’s time in Galveston also overlapped with a significant early moment of Lost Cause
ceremony. In the summer and fall of 1866 Galvestonians sent money collected from a benefit
concert to aid state appropriations to transport Albert Sidney Johnston’s remains from New
Orleans to a newly revived Texas State Cemetery in Austin. Whether as a fireman with the
city’s civic organizations that participated in the cortege from Galveston’s wharf to a train depot
bound for Austin or among the businesses that lined their shops with crepe, Burke likely took
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part in the city’s display of mourning when Johnston’s body passed through Galveston in
January 1867.11
When one of the worst yellow fever epidemics ever to hit Texas struck in late July 1867,
Burke decided to remain in Galveston. His decision to risk contracting the deadly disease was a
calculated gamble to further his business prospects. It also provided unexpected political
opportunities. The Galveston customs house collector was among the scores who either “died on
the island like sheep” or fled the city by mid-August. Finding the post empty, Burke took
temporary charge of the office. Despite describing himself as a “Johnny Reb” who was only
“twenty-five percent reconstructed,” Burke administered the post well enough to convince
Treasury Department officials in Washington to abandon plans to remove the Texas branch
beyond the reach of the epidemic. Burke’s willingness to gain knowledge of, and possibly favor
with, the Office of Internal Revenue likely also had a personal motivation, as Stoddart & Burk
was soon implicated in a tax scandal.12
In the spring of 1869, Burke’s business ambitions led him to New Orleans for a visit that
would shape the rest of his life. He specifically came to attend the New Orleans Chamber of
Commerce’s widely publicized Mississippi Valley Convention, held in late May 1869. Burke
arrived in New Orleans a week before the convention’s opening and applied for a passport to
travel from New Orleans to Cuba. The application gave his name as “Edward A. Burk”; in it, he
swore that he was a “native born and loyal citizen of the United States and about to travel abroad
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in Cuba.”13 Records do not indicate whether Burke made the journey or for how long he may
have been gone, but it is possible that he planned a trip to Cuba as a business venture to aid his
import-export firm. Nonetheless, Burke was assuredly back in New Orleans for the commercial
convention on May 24 and was among the scores of businessmen and politicians interested in
advancing the South’s economic interests.
The South during these years experienced a host of commercial meetings held in river
towns, port cities, and inland areas where delegates espoused southern progress with a
remarkable dearth of partisan quibbles, race-baiting, bickering over Reconstruction, or maligning
certain members as carpetbaggers. While public devotion to the South was a ubiquitous theme,
delegates tied their regional pride to assertions of national unity. Such occasions were also the
place for local boosters to emphasize a collective mentality and downplay municipal rivalries
more commonly expressed in city newspapers. Delegates centered on more efficient water
transportation and took the saying “a rising tide lifts all boats” to heart as their rhetoric argued
that advancements in one area of the South would increase prosperity throughout the region and
country as a whole. That such conventions were often held, perhaps intentionally, in nonelection years no doubt improved the inclusive atmosphere.14
The goal of the New Orleans convention Burke attended was to convene all those who
had a commercial interest in the Gulf South and Mississippi valley in order to devise strategies to
overcome competition from Chicago and the eastern seaboard that was increasingly diverting the
Mississippi trade. Proponents of the meeting sought commercial partnerships with states and
territories in the West. The convention’s motto, “The South extends a cordial greeting to the
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Northwest,” indicates that leaders from cities of the Mississippi valley and Gulf South hoped to
benefit from the western trade of grain and livestock. Convention organizers pledged to “confer
fully on all the matters touching the common interests of the South, West, and Northwest.” To
strengthen the postbellum bonds between the South and West, newspapers in New Orleans
stressed that any lingering animosity between the regions stemming from the Civil War was all
but gone. Organizers of the commercial convention, likewise, included Union veterans from
western states, such as Iowa’s General William Vandever, as speakers, while a Missourian
served as president of the convention. 15
Burke was among convention attendees that deliberated on a wide array of practical
proposals supported through government initiatives. Members overwhelmingly approved
government aid to improve navigation of southern and western rivers as well as to remove silt at
the Mississippi’s mouth that impeded ocean-going steamers seeking to dock at New Orleans.
Since blockages in the Mississippi and common shoals in other rivers were the fault of no one
state, delegates sought national government aid. Burke also approved of convention proposals to
boost foreign immigration, specifically in New Orleans, and to provide federal postal subsidies
between cities connected to the Mississippi and principal ports in Latin America and Europe.
Moreover, convention delegates supported federal subsidies for a southern transcontinental
railroad, with New Orleans as a major nexus, and for construction of an isthmus canal in Central
America. Delegates also hoped to tap the nation’s growing agrarian discontent with the
monopolistic tendencies of railroads and the exploitative methods of grain elevators to argue that
river commerce was inherently more equitable. Southern boosters often viewed various
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proposals as mutually supportive. Increasing the export of western grains to Europe through the
Mississippi and New Orleans, for instance, was meant to foster reciprocal links that would, in
turn, boost European immigration to the South.16
Burke wasted no time after the convention in making himself a talking point in the local
New Orleans scene. An 1895 History of the Fire Department of New Orleans recounts Burke’s
early days in New Orleans and demonstrates how his combination – however ostentatious - of
boldness, self-sacrifice, and flair for the dramatic produced a potent mixture for gaining respect
in the late nineteenth-century public sphere that prized masculinity. Two days after the
Mississippi Valley Convention closed, Burke was in the business district of Canal Street when
residents were alerted to a nearby fire. Burke hurried to the scene to find members of the
Firemen’s Charitable Association of New Orleans working the Mississippi No. 2 fire engine.
Drawing upon his experience as chief engineer of Galveston, the brave Burke grabbed a hose and
ran into the burning building with the rest of the local firemen. Following the engagement,
members of the local company called Burke a “bully fireman” and immediately invited him to
join the unit.
Around this same time, economic turmoil derailed Burke’s prospects in Texas. The
bubble of rapid revival and speculation that drew Burke to Galveston burst in the last years of the
decade, spurred by poor cotton crops in 1866 and 1867. In the details of paying import taxes, the
major’s firm became involved in a whiskey revenue scandal and resorted to bankruptcy. Judge
John Charles Watrous dismissed the government’s case against Burke’s company in federal
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district court in January 1869, but the affair undercut the company’s success. Before going
under, Burke’s firm paid the federal government more than twenty-five-hundred dollars. By the
end of 1869, a nearly impoverished Burke had resigned as Galveston’s fire chief and relocated to
New Orleans in search of a fresh start. Either in a semantic flourish to symbolize a new life in a
new city or just to help avoid past creditors – with Burke those distinctions are always hard to
make – he also added an “e” to his surname around this time.17
Despite the impression given from such ordered and non-partisan commercial
conventions as the one held in 1869, the city Burke migrated to was in the midst of momentous
political and economic upheaval. Cynicism and pragmatism were pitted against ideological and
idealistic concerns in the postbellum era in ways that were particularly suited to opportunistic
ambition and tough-mindedness but also allowed for masculine authority and respect for Civil
War veterans in the pursuit of their postwar goals. New Orleans’s precipitous collapse from
prominence was a shattering event that stained communal honor and respectability.18 Amongst
the Civil War’s dislocations was the all but total loss of New Orleans’s tobacco trade. New
Orleans financial institutions, which had made the city the leading banking center for the South,
likewise suffered rapid decline with uncompensated abolition and widespread land destruction.
Even without the Civil War’s devastating effect on the New Orleans financial sector and
trade, railroad growth in the Upper South, West, and North had begun in the antebellum era to
divert the flow of trade away from Mississippi steamboat traffic and towards iron tracks that ran
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east and west through such growing metropolises as Chicago. While New Orleans remained the
cotton metropole in 1860, leading the nation with annual exports of four and a half million bales,
the share of the cotton crop lost to east coast railroad traffic already topped over one hundred
thousand bales in 1870. The city’s drop-off in cotton profits was a driving factor for strategies
like those displayed in the 1869 commercial convention, which sought to offset the loss by
courting foodstuffs from the Midwest and Great Plains. Railroads and merchants with ties to
Chicago and the east coast likewise provided new means of credit, merchandise, and
transportation that capitalized on the postbellum entrenchment of sharecropping and small
country stores. New Orleans businesses increasingly found themselves marginalized by northern
wholesalers and merchant creditors that offered what used to be New Orleans’s economic
hinterland more efficient options. The completion in 1874 of James Buchanan Eads’ bridge over
the Mississippi at St. Louis, an engineering marvel funded by Andrew Carnegie, provided an
efficient means of shipping cotton through St. Louis and established the city as a burgeoning
commercial hub.19
Such factors as structural problems and a changing global economy were not the sole
reason for the Crescent City’s economic woes. Many residents in New Orleans allowed partisan
battle lines and racial antagonisms to hinder a search for common ground with northerners over
economic development. The New South’s reconciliation message collided with steadfast
resistance to Yankees. Republican newspapers routinely reprinted the narrow-minded remarks
of recalcitrant southerners, as when the Picayune opined in 1869 that New Orleans was “not yet
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prepared for the footsteps . . . of the Northman . . . the impress of his as a soldier is yet too fresh
upon the Southern heart . . . so, although the Northerners’ money and energy are welcome aids to
southern recuperation . . . the man himself, or the man’s wife, or his daughter, are . . . reminded
that there is no welcome for them.”20
Local political clashes in Louisiana were long remembered and caused decisions at the
municipal and state level to play a significant role in the course of national and international
business. While Benjamin Butler’s infamous General Order No. 28 resulted in lingering hostility
toward all Yankees, his economic agenda also had a lasting legacy in Louisiana. Butler’s heavyhanded attempts to push New Orleans infrastructure and sanitation into the modern age made a
significant number of New Orleanians perceive subsequent modernization efforts as the schemes
of nefarious northerners. Such opinions had roots in the postbellum political landscape of New
Orleans, whose “Republican leaders knew that if the ‘gospel of prosperity’ was going to succeed
anywhere, its best hope was in the Crescent City.”21 Henry Clay Warmoth’s youthful zeal for
economic development as governor is the best example. He aimed to expand the Crescent City’s
railroad trunks to east Texas, the Great Lakes, and Northeast, repair the levees, construct modern
sewers, relocate slaughterhouses away from municipal water supply, and build a nineteenthcentury equivalent to the industrial canal that would make New Orleans a more efficient Gulf
port. Some opponents of Republican rule viewed such ambitious schemes for economic
development as a ruse to promote racial equality. When the Republican legislature in 1870
authorized the city of New Orleans and the state to sell their stock in the New Orleans, Jackson,
and Great Northern Railroad to the Southern Railroad Association, headed by the Northern
capitalist Colonel Henry McComb, opponents of the measure won a court injunction to block the
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sale and even arrested McComb in New Orleans. Former U.S. Supreme Court justice and exConfederate John A. Campbell won the case by smearing the Republican-backed decision as a
product of racial inferiority and corruption.22
If new economic competition in the form of Chicago and the mid-Atlantic were not
enough to darken the horizon of the New Orleans economy, former trading partners also became
fierce competitors. St. Louis, Memphis, and Atlanta were in the vanguard of adapting to the
economic dislocations wrought by the Civil War as well as to changes in market forces and
technologies. In addition, these cities refused to let their regional affinities and southern pride
blind them to the fact that northern capital was fundamental to local growth. The fifteen years
after Appomattox proved crucial in establishing the geopolitical and economic terrain of an
increasingly competitive industrial capitalist country. Atlanta became an early example of how
to separate anti-Yankee politics from pro-northern business recruitments. Atlanta procured
seven million dollars in northern investments in the 1870s. As a result, Georgia added nearly a
thousand miles of railroad track in the decade after Appomattox, bringing the state’s total to
2,264 miles. During the same period, obstructionists in Louisiana allowed a mere two hundred
miles of track to be constructed in that state, a woefully backward total of 539 miles in
operation.23 Southern cities on the Atlantic seaboard also competed for trade that had once gone
to New Orleans. Norfolk made efforts for direct trade with Europe and considered the Crescent
City a rival. As one sagacious New South advocate observed in 1869, “Every man who lives on
the sea coast naturally thinks his harbor destined to be a great seaport town.”24
Plans in the late 1860s for direct trade of western foodstuffs and southern cotton between
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St. Louis and Liverpool particularly rattled New Orleans businessmen. William M. Burwell, a
member of the local chamber of commerce, represented New Orleans leaders in a concerted
effort to thwart the plan. In a public letter to St. Louis capitalists, Burwell presented a statistical
argument meant to demonstrate that pure logistics made such a direct route economically
disadvantageous for St. Louis. Aspiring St. Louis merchants would be far wiser to ship goods
through the mouth of the Mississippi, which offered “the cheapest rates between production and
consumption.”25 Essentially, New Orleans businessmen were telling their counterparts in St.
Louis that it was in their best interest to remain partners, not competitors. If hard economic
theory could not persuade, New Orleans businessmen also emphasized that both cities should be
on the same side of regional rivalries that formed the north-south trade of the Mississippi valley
competing with new east-west lines from Chicago to New York. “Instead of separating the
interest of the river cities from those of New Orleans,” Burwell contended, “it is alone by
cooperation with her that the river trade can be preserved at all.”26 Appealing to sentimentality
was not an unfounded rationale. Like New Orleans, St. Louis had a vibrant pro-Confederate
community and a strong presence of Catholics and French Creoles.27
Attempting to mitigate the potential advantages of new competitors and strengthen their
connections to international trade, New Orleans created a cotton exchange in 1871 modeled after
those in New York and Liverpool. Yet the exchange proved to have unintended consequences
that added to the economic woes of New Orleans. By permitting futures trading in cotton, which
allowed merchants in the hinterland to buy cotton in advance and ship it through New Orleans on
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bills of lading, interior country merchants were able to bypass New Orleans merchants’
commission fees and a significant amount of port surcharges.28
Shortly after moving to New Orleans, Burke seized upon his personal bond with New
Orleans firemen to make inroads into the city’s political and social scene. He “became a wellknown member” and “achieved eminence in more ways than one” by serving as his fire
company’s elected representative on the Firemen’s Charitable Association’s (F.C.A.) twentyfour member board of delegates and finance committee.29 The Louisiana legislature chartered
the Firemen’s Charitable Association in 1837, and since 1855, the independent volunteer
organization had functioned as New Orleans’s official fire department by renewing five-year
contractual agreements with the city. All told, the F.C.A. included around a thousand volunteer
firemen who were representative of a wide swath of the city’s social strata, from leading
businessmen to day laborers. Except for a handful of paid administrators, none received a salary,
not even members of the finance committee and board of delegates like Burke.
Burke’s involvement in the fire brigade provided him with a strong resume of public
service, charity work, and political experience that resonated with all socio-economic sectors of
postbellum New Orleans. During his tenure on the finance committee, for instance, he helped
oversee F.C.A. aid to firemen injured while on duty as well as to one-hundred-ninety widows,
three-hundred children, and fifty orphans of New Orleans firemen. Along with the better known
exploits of Carnival krewes, the fire department was a frequent contributor to the vibrant civic
culture of New Orleans and often partnered with the city’s fraternal organizations and clubs. The
department put on a combination of festivities, games, and parades while also hosting benefit
performances and events at various theatres and opera houses to aid the association’s charity
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initiatives. Recognized as an official social event along with Mardi Gras, All Saints Day, and
July 4th, the city’s firemen put on an annual parade on the fourth of March to celebrate the day
of its charter. Even before gaining public office, Burke’s role in the F.C.A. allowed him to dole
out services in return for reciprocal networks of favors. Operating in such political and social
circles even strengthened Burke’s conviction that Latin American trade was a necessity for New
Orleans prosperity, in as much as board of delegates members worked closely with the
organization’s president, Isaac Newton Marks, who was president of the New Orleans, Florida,
and Havana Steamship Company.30
Firefighting companies also gave Burke significant political capital with immigrant and
working-class families. Wood frame houses and shanties were those most likely to burn in a fire,
not the relatively fireproof brick buildings of businesses and elites. Drives to enact municipal
legislation to regulate more fireproof construction threatened working-class home ownership and
property. By protecting working class homes from flames, firemen like Burke were also helping
to protect working-class independence.31
In 1871, Burke was instrumental in defeating Republican efforts not to renew the
F.C.A.’s five-year contract with the city. Never before had the organization “been subjected to
so severe a trial,” declared Marks, as their opponents sought to centralize fire services under a
municipal department. In a public letter to Governor Warmoth, Burke spoke for the F.C.A. and
argued that the city’s contract with the association was at least twice as cost effective as an
alternative plan to expand government services. A larger municipal budget would then require a
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rise in taxes. Moreover, Burke asserted that a streamlined government-run fire department
would induce fire insurance companies to increase their rates, bringing the aggregate economic
pinch felt by citizens and businesses to over a million dollars annually. Warmoth, seeking to
build a broad business-friendly Republican coalition, was convinced by Burke’s logic and
recommended to New Orleans officials that the city would be “best served by a renewal of the
contract with the Firemen’s Charitable Association.” With such a bipartisan campaign to
maintain the arrangement between the city and the F.C.A., the organization received another
five-year contract of $140,000 per year to handle municipal fires.32
By 1872, Burke had not only risen to become the head of the freight department of the
New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad, but also chairman of the local Democratic
campaign committee. There he was closely aligned with the politically active banker, Louis A.
Wiltz.33 In 1873, Burke’s roots in New Orleans grew deeper when he married Susan Elizabeth
Gaines. Born to a family of Kentucky slave owners, Gaines was said to be a “brave, clearheaded woman” of “independent fortune” whose first husband, William Meade Montgomery,
died in the Civil War.34 Burke’s position on the railroad and as a Democratic operative
intersected on at least one occasion. H.S. Kimball of Philadelphia was an agent for the New
Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad, charged with lobbying members of the Louisiana
legislature in 1871 to support the passage of House Bill No. 282, commonly known as the
Jackson Railroad Bill, which would allow Henry S. McComb to purchase the state’s shares of
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the railroad. Following his aforementioned unsuccessful 1870 attempt to purchase the state and
city’s interest in the railroad, McComb used his deep pockets to dispatch Kimball in an effort
that would ultimately achieve success.35 Kimball approached S. W. Scott, a Union veteran from
New York and member of the Orleans parish Democratic party executive committee, to serve as
a clandestine witness in the exchange of money for support since “some members would object
to giving [Kimball] a receipt.”36 After successfully distributing up to a thousand dollars each for
the support of roughly fifty members of the state house, the railroad lobbyist agreed in the parlor
of the Saint Charles Hotel to pay up to twice as much for the support of key state senators. In
addition to Senator Hugh J. Campbell, railroad agents allegedly exchanged money with
Lieutenant-Governor Pinckney Benton Stewart Pinchback, a wealthy mulatto from Mississippi
who was both “daring” and “morally ambiguous” as well as one of the leading black politicians
in postbellum Louisiana.37
After a falling out between Kimball over his own payment, Scott revealed details of the
intrigue in sworn Congressional testimony in February 1872. Scott claimed that roughly forty
thousand dollars had been spent to secure the support of state legislators. As a Democratic
partisan, Scott singled out leading Republicans and claimed not to remember bribing any specific
Democrats. Nonetheless, another forty thousand was distributed for other purposes. Along with
city government officials, local police officers and railroad officials had been paid “quite an
amount” of the latter sum for successfully inducing an opposing lawyer to withdraw an
injunction against the bill.38 Machinations like those used to secure the Jackson Bill’s passage
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occurred with such frequency that politicos and lobbyists who greased the skids of postbellum
Louisiana politics were known as “the third house” of the legislature. However, Scott’s
testimony demonstrates the ambiguity characteristic of postbellum politics. When asked whether
he explicitly bribed anyone, Scott replied in the negative by claiming that he had merely “carried
messages to men, and told them that if they were all right on certain questions they could find a
certain amount of money.”39
Burke’s role in the attempts to oust radical Reconstruction in 1872 demonstrate his
growing political stature. Three tickets competed for the votes of Louisianans who were
dismayed with the current direction of the Republican party in the 1872 election. The Liberal
Republicans were aligned with the morally flexible and pragmatic incumbent Governor Henry
Clay Warmoth, who led a strong group of mostly white Republicans out of Louisiana’s state
party convention in July 1872. The rival faction of Republicans that controlled the “bastion of
Republicanism in Louisiana,” the New Orleans Custom House. Known as the Custom House
ring, its members used ties to the national party and federal patronage to overtake the party
apparatus and nominate William Pitt Kellogg, Louisiana’s Republican senator, for governor.
Stephen B. Packard was the U.S. marshal for the state, chair of Louisiana’s Republican party,
and staunch nemesis of Warmoth. Meanwhile, President Ulysses S. Grant, who likewise
harbored animosity towards Warmoth, installed his brother-in-law, James S. Casey, as New
Orleans’ custom house collector. Overlapping with a larger national movement among
disillusioned Republican operatives to nominate Horace Greely for president, Louisiana’s
Liberal Republicans were motivated by more than mere patronage. While speaking to centrists
who accepted a constitutional amendment to extend civil rights to African Americans, they
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sought to replace the emphasis on racial egalitarianism and partner with southern whites behind a
vigorous platform for government-aided economic growth.40
The Reform Party constituted another of the anti-radical factions. They were a
Democratic splinter group centered in New Orleans and led by wealthy merchants who sought a
middle road that accepted the reality of black political and social reforms in the interest of
political stability. The leader of New Orleans Reformers, as they called themselves, was none
other than Isaac Newton Marks, the wealthy president of the Firemen’s Charitable Association.
A member of the elite Boston Club, an antebellum Whig, and president of the New Orleans,
Florida, and Havana Steamship Company, Marks embodied the background and goals of most
Reformers. Marks and the Reform Party also represented Louisiana’s position on the New
Departure movement within the Democratic party, which repudiated race baiting and sought to
achieve “home rule” through a paternalistic wooing of black votes.41
Burke acted as political realist and pragmatist by siding with Democratic moderates who
sought to unite all anti-Grant factions in an effort to defeat the Republican establishment they
viewed as radicals. More than a few Democrats had previously broken bread with the custom
house faction in shifting Republican power away from Warmoth, and many of them continued to
oppose any union with Warmoth’s allies. In the Democratic state convention of April 1872, one
delegate spoke for “last-ditch” Democrats stridently opposed to fusion when he thundered, “I
want to save Louisiana, I am willing to cohabit with the devil . . . I am willing to cohabit with the
naygur [sic], but I am damned if I will cohabit with Governor Warmoth!”42
Ultimately, the moderate faction of Democrats that included Burke overrode naysayers in
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their ranks who maintained a diabolical hatred for Republicans of any ilk. How this feat was
accomplished reveals the fluid political situation and rapidly shifting coalitions that were
characteristic of postbellum New Orleans politics. In August 1872, Burke was among a
significant number of Democrats who attended the Liberal Republican convention as a voting
delegate. Indeed, the roster of delegates represents a who’s who of rising postbellum Democrats.
Burke and John Fitzpatrick, destined to become intrepid Ring Democratic rivals, represented
New Orleans’s Second Ward and commanded its six votes. Thomas O’Connor, the longtime
chief of the F.C.A., and James D. Houston, future Burke ally within the Ring, represented the
Third Ward. Robert Nash Ogden, a sitting Democratic state senator, represented the Eleventh
Ward and was the cousin of Crescent City Democratic Club president and subsequent
commander of the White League, Frederick Nash Ogden. All eighteen delegates from East
Baton Rouge, meanwhile, had been active at the Louisiana Democratic convention earlier in
April. Burke and others clearly seized on the opportunity of a divided Republican party and
attempted to influence the convention to accept fusion under terms favorable to Democrats.
Previously, staunch supporters of the Democracy, including Ogden and Robert Hardin Marr, had
exhibited a similar strategy when they took part in the meeting that established the Reform
Party.43
Even as an acknowledged Democratic organizer in the 1872 campaign, Burke took an
active part when the Liberal Republicans met on August 5 at the Academy of Music in New
Orleans.44 Indeed, Burke’s nomination of W.W. Pugh, a leading sugar planter from Assumption
Parish, as the president of the convention was unanimously approved. Burke’s choice reflected
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his goals as a moderate Democrat. Pugh’s acceptance speech expressed the hope that the several
hundred assembled delegates would be “influenced by a spirit of harmony and good feeling” in
order to “unite all the parties opposed to the Custom House ticket and Grant.”45 The task fell to a
central committee, dubbed the Committee of Conference, which included Burke among its
fifteen members. They were elected for the express purpose of conferring with Democratic and
Reform leadership in order to hammer out a fusion ticket. The Liberal Republicans’ association
with Warmoth was a particularly large impediment. The Picayune, a leading voice of “lastditch” Democrats, pilloried Warmoth as “false . . . deceitful . . . [and] devoid of honor and
principle” while crying that “the Czar of Russia would not dare to exercise the same despotic
sway over his people that this detested young man does over the people of Louisiana.”46 To
make the pill of fusion less bitter for those who opposed Warmoth, Burke and convention leaders
successfully induced the incumbent governor to withdraw his name from any consideration for a
spot on the ticket. Nonetheless, Burke spent the next several days in talks that lasted well past
midnight to build a fusion ticket acceptable for all three factions. In a speech of good faith to
those who lamented Warmoth’s removal from consideration, the governor included Burke when
singling out a dozen-odd political leaders who were “gentlemen of the highest standing.”47
Liberal Republicans, along with Reform Democrats, shared a common cause with
Regular Democrats in opposing the Republican establishment of Grant and Kellogg. Yet
partisan wrangling hampered any easy solution. Burke and Democratic leaders acted from a
position of strength and demanded that they control the top of the ticket. When the committee of
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conference presented the Democratic offer, the Liberal Republican convention voted it down.
The convention adjourned shortly thereafter, and the ensuing weeks of informal backroom
dealings proved more successful for Democrats. By early September, Liberal Republicans and
Reformers accepted a fusion ticket headed by Democratic stalwart John McEnery for governor.
For the vast majority of other state and national officers, from lieutenant governor to secretary of
state, Democrats accepted candidates chosen by Liberal Republican and Reformers. Democratic
operatives also astutely realized that control of New Orleans was a seminal stepping stone to
overtaking the whole state. Consequently, Burke, as candidate for administrator of
improvements, and Louis A. Wiltz, as mayoral candidate, were among the Democrats on the
municipal fusion ticket.48 As in their agreement to support the contract renewal of the F.C.A.,
the seemingly strange bedfellows of Burke and Warmoth united again in the interest of
pragmatism, moderation, and similar economic agendas.
In July 1872, Burke resigned from his post on the F.C.A.’s board of delegates to focus on
his campaign and lessen apparent conflicts of interest. Ultimately, the decisive factor in Burke’s
attempt to become administrator of improvements was the emergence in the campaign of Pierre
G. T. Beauregard. The well-known former Confederate general was a conservative sympathetic
to the Reform party who rejected the fusion arrangements and ran as an independent candidate
for the office.

Despite Beauregard’s renown, Burke’s own natural charisma and the support of

the Democratic machine brought him within thirteen hundred votes of the former general.49
Burke placed third, garnering a total of 8,834 votes to Beauregard’s winning tally of 9,972 and
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the Republican candidate’s total of 9,187. While Beauregard split the anti-Republican vote,
Burke outpolled the general in the Democratic machine strongholds of the Third Ward, the
largest in the city, and the Fourth Ward.50
At the state level, the election of 1872 witnessed both the Republican Kellogg and the
fusionist-aligned Democrat, McEnery, claiming gubernatorial victory with “no means short of
necromancy” used to determine the legitimate winner.51 The contest devolved into an issue of
which faction could undercut the other with political maneuvering and threats of violence.
Legality was not a concern. At one point, Republicans accused fusionist supporters of planning
to blow up the statehouse with nitroglycerin. On another occasion, Democrats nearly approved
an audacious plan to kidnap Kellogg and take him hostage aboard a boat in the Gulf of Mexico
until McEnery was recognized as governor. On January 13, both Kellogg and McEnery held
inauguration ceremonies as governor, and each appointed separate sets of state officials. Both
sides resorted to gunplay in the crisis of legitimacy. Only with the backing of Washington and
the support of federal troops did Kellogg finally “win” the election.52
Even in defeat, Burke’s purported activities improved his stock with the New Orleans
citizenry. A popular story around the Crescent City was that Burke pulled off an ambitious and
comical heist that thwarted Kellogg’s attempts at voter fraud. The custom house faction allied
with Kellogg deposited several wagon loads of election returns intending to cull fusion tickets.
Before they could complete the task, Burke and two of his long-term political partners, Marshall
Stoddard and Jim Houston, snuck into Mechanics Hall and “bootlegged” the returns by hiding
them in their clothing and secreting them to Democratic operatives. According to the tale,
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Stoddard was assigned to stuff tickets from large Democratic parishes and the Third Ward
because “the seat of [his] pantaloons” was the “size of a bake-oven.” It is highly likely that
Stoddard was Burke’s old business partner in Galveston. Listed as “M. Stoddart” in Galveston
records, it appears that both men made a minor change to their surname and maintained their
friendship in New Orleans. Six years later, when Burke was a New Orleans tax collector, he
employed Stoddard as a clerk.53
While McEnery’s defeat was a significant setback for Burke, Wiltz’s election as New
Orleans mayor ensured that Burke’s political trajectory was rooted at the local level. The defeat
of the fusion ticket in 1872 incurred a major, if unforeseen, benefit for Democrats in that
Republicans subsequently inherited the fallout from the ensuing Panic of 1873. The panic
proved how industrialization, corporate capitalism, and increased globalization could create a
tangle of problems that produced a seemingly bottomless economic abyss. Beginning with a
financial crash in Vienna, Austria, the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke and Company on September 18,
1873, caused a ripple of economic collapse from Wall Street to main streets across the United
States. Republicans from Capitol Hill to New Orleans were then faced with economic divisions
that only compounded already divisive racial policies. Facing the worst economic downturn the
country had known, the Panic of 1873 was a crucial factor in Reconstruction’s demise and the
resurrection of Democratic power. An analysis of how the panic shaped Louisiana’s political
terrain provides an illustration at the state level.54
The Panic of 1873 crippled industrial production, foreign trade, and agricultural prices
especially hard in the South. In New Orleans, it sank the economy. The Picayune highlighted
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how the Crescent City’s unique economic circumstances engendered “peculiar difficulties” that
made New Orleanians suffer “greater in proportion and more in general than in other sections.”55
Faced with severe unemployment, the panic’s dislocations fragmented workers along lines of
race and skill instead of serving as a vehicle for class-based cooperation. The Kellogg
administration’s passage of a new civil rights bill in 1873 that mandated equal public access to
accommodations and transportation heightened poor-white angst.
Despite a setback for labor unions, laborers organized a rowdy popular movement that
demanded state and municipal authorities alleviate the plight of their constituents through public
works projects and an expansion of positions in the city’s administrative departments. Similar
movements in other cities, from New York and Philadelphia to Chicago and Cincinnati, had
already arose by the spring of 1874. The dire situation emboldened volatile workers to shift their
tactics in pressuring for change by pursuing direct political action, such as petitioning the
government for employment relief. Meanwhile, Kellogg and the Republican controlled state
house’s attempts to alleviate the economic situation where not what most laborers had in mind.
One such example was a joint resolution calling on Congress to establish a national observatory
in New Orleans to cement its relation to Greenwich, England, and aid the city’s participation in
the “world of navigation and commerce.”56 When a key Republican constituency, black sugar
workers, struck in Terrebonne Parish in 1874, Kellogg hesitated to use force but ultimately called
in the state militia. In July 1874, hundreds of white laborers and mechanics gathered in
Lafayette Square to rally for government-sponsored employment relief. Instead, Kellogg zigged
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when Republican opponents zagged. The governor sought to meet standard Democratic
allegations of corruption and bloated government with a reduction in government spending.
Rather than alleviate railroad corporations that collapsed in the panic, Kellogg liquidated them.
Neither initiative would likely have met strident opposition in normal times, but the charged
political atmosphere induced by the panic was anything but normal.57
Meanwhile, Burke continued to present a public stance that favored pragmatism over
partisanship. The New Orleans press published an open letter from Burke in which he
repudiated shifts towards “making a straight out fight under the Democratic, White League
banner.” Burke continued to espouse his message of a broad consensus coalition of
conservatives united against what he termed “Radical demagogues” and in favor of Louisiana’s
much-needed economic rehabilitation. “The organization of a political party based upon race
distinctions is a political blunder,” he asserted, and would prove “destructive to the development
of our material interests,” such as government aid in river improvements. Burke was among
those, including many sugar planters, who saw excessive political terror as bad for business and
agricultural harvests. Despite having worked for Democratic interests in previous campaigns,
Burke epitomized a common postbellum political strategy of appearing to rise above
partisanship:
Thirty per cent of the voting population of the South have become voters since 1861.
They have trained under Democratic leadership since the war through nine years of
disaster and defeat. To many of these young men the glories of the Democratic party are
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only traditional. We now seek for peace, through the burial of dead issues, and yearn for
the restoration of the era of material prosperity in the South.58
Thousands of unemployed in a city that was roughly seventy percent white and in a state
where a fusion ticket of anti-radicals failed to oust the Republican establishment just two years
earlier proved an explosive mixture in September 1874. White League ranks swelled with
people who were stung by perceived economic injustices that only added to their long-held
opposition to racial equality. The fusion of Liberal Republicans and Democrats had dampened
political violence in 1872, but economic despair made many whites embrace more desperate
measures after the panic.59 A full year after the 1872 elections, remnants of the fusion campaign
held even tighter to their view that the Kellogg administration was stillborn and illegitimate.60
In these circumstances, Kellogg’s hold on New Orleans was tenuous by the fall of 1874,
and the days of his control of the old French city were numbered. On August 5, the state
Republican convention nominated Antoine Dubuclet for the only state office elected on off-cycle
years, that of treasurer. Democrats convened a few weeks later to nominate John C. Moncure for
treasurer along with congressional candidates. In the following days, six Republican politicians
were shot in Red River Parish.61 Racial tensions were as thick as the humidity. Disillusionment
with the Republican establishment, particularly its failure to provide tangible economic benefits,
the state’s increasingly dire economic prospects, and the threat of racial violence, induced some
African Americans to vote Democratic. William Alexander, president of a local black fraternal
society in the First and Second Wards, lamented,“[Republicans] used us for their benefit on
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election-day, and then afterward . . . had no use for us, never give [sic] us any work.”62 In
addition, White League terrorism against blacks who were politically active Republicans was
wearing on New Orleans’s black community.
Sometime in August, the seven-hundred-and-twelve members of Alexander’s working
class-black organization voted to support the Democratic ticket in the upcoming election. Their
rationale was both economic and racial. With the Panic of 1873 hitting non-white laborers worst
of all, some blacks bargained that Louisiana’s economy under Democrats “could not be any
worse than it was.” “We thought we would have a change,” Alexander later recounted to a
congressional committee, “simply to get a better living; to get work for the laboring man.”63
Valid fears of an impending White League murder spree likewise induced the group’s members
to exchange their vote for assurances of safety, which the White League on occasion guaranteed
to Democratic-voting blacks through a certification of protection.
While Alexander swore that his organization did not switch its party preference due to
direct intimidation or overt promises of employment, he knew Burke from working six years for
the major on the Jackson Railroad. In the small world of New Orleans politics, it is a distinct
possibility that one of them approached the other in search of a tit-for-tat arrangement.
Intimidation and paying Republican leaning voters to stay home was a common tactic among
Democrats. Yet, as prevalent as black voter intimidation and suppression was, Democratic
activities in New Orleans also included token gestures toward blacks, public statements of
support, and compensation to black leaders for their assistance. Burke himself asserted that he
did not extend specific guarantees of employment, but promised to treat people of color who
supported the Democratic ticket “fairly and give them a fair division of patronage.” African
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Americans, however, encountered physical violence either way they chose in the lead-up to the
election. Other blacks retaliated for what they regarded as Alexander’s group’s treachery by
injuring several of them and killing one in an ambush.64
On September 14, the day after breaking into the Republican-aligned metropolitan police
armory under the cover of moonlight, and taking advantage of the absence of a number of federal
soldiers who had withdrawn to Mississippi to escape the yellow fever season, the anti-Kellogg
forces coordinated to overthrow of Republican government in what would become known as the
Battle of Liberty Place. The city’s elites played a prominent role. The Boston Club had
previously supported the defendants in the Colfax Massacre of 1873; this time, members of the
Pickwick Club led the resistance against Reconstruction. As freight agent for the Jackson
Railroad, Burke, a few days earlier, had helped ensure the delivery of several cases of weapons
to White Leaguers. Then, potentially ruinous intelligence arrived: federal troops were to be sent
to the city to investigate the armory theft. Bloodshed with Kellogg’s partisan mercenaries was
one thing, but open conflict with U.S. troops was a matter to be avoided at all costs, so Burke
devised an ingenious plan. Instructing his foremen at various points along the southbound line to
remove staggered sections of track, he created gaps in the line as long as five hundred yards. His
agents masterfully feigned confusion and naivety to cause multiple hours of delay at each station.
Finally realizing the scheme in the sweltering New Orleans heat, the commander of the federal
forces drew his pistol on a foreman and demanded an end to the disruption.65
In the meantime, Burke helped supply arms and provisions to the conservative forces in
New Orleans who initiated a chaotic type of partisan warfare. While not formally a part of the
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White League, Burke acknowledged “an intimate association” with its leaders and was singled
out for merit by the White League’s commanding general, Frederick Nash Ogden, whom Burke
served as a staff officer during the fight.66 Part raucous brawl and part battle, near anarchy raged
in the streets as armed White Leaguers clashed with metropolitan police forces and the black
state militia, the latter commanded by one of the South’s most reviled scalawags, former
Confederate general James Longstreet. New Orleans women even took an active part in the
conflict by distributing ammunition to White Leaguers. By sunset, the White League had
captured most state buildings and controlled the city. The large anti-Kellogg coalition was
initially overjoyed with its sweeping success, confident that the federal government would not
back Kellogg again. To the outrage of the conservative forces, President Grant promised the
weight of federal authority to help uphold Kellogg’s administration, and so the brief period of
White League control ended. As one of the last Louisiana militia officers among the insurgents,
Burke turned over control of the state house and stockpiles of arms the insurrectionists had
captured to General John R. Brooke of the U.S. Army. However, the writing was on the wall for
Republicans in Louisiana, and the Kellogg government had only a veneer of legitimacy heading
into the November state elections.67
In October, tensions between Burke and Kellogg escalated from partisan to personal
when Burke took a leading role on the state central committee of registration. Indicative of
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political maneuverings amid the turbulence of Reconstruction, both Burke and Republicans
attempted to rectify what they argued were fraudulent voter rolls. When the committee dissolved
around October 20, Burke took it upon himself to carry out “a plan to secure fair revision of the
registration.” His rationale was that “prominent Republicans,” most likely former allies under
the fusion banner, had disclosed that no more than twelve thousand black voters resided in
Orleans parish. Yet, registration rolls in 1874 contained 18,394 African Americans. Burke then
gathered affidavits and claimed to have discovered 5,200 examples of fraudulent registration of
black voters. It was a case common in postbellum politics and one of the few policies that
enjoyed bipartisanship. “Some were registered in . . . six different wards, declared Burke, “some
were registered five times in the same ward . . . many names were found to be non-residents, and
many were found to be registered under different name in different wards.” Still, Kellogg and
his Republicans did not budge an inch.
Kellogg and Burke corresponded in the days before the election, but came no closer to
resolving their dispute. Acting as agents for their respective camps, both men became embroiled
in a battle over the legality of naturalization in New Orleans’ Second District Court.68
Animosities on paper and through committees spilled into the streets just a week from election
day. Burke was walking down a New Orleans thoroughfare when Governor Kellogg rode by in a
buggy. Recognizing the major, Kellogg leaned out of his window to make a “gesture of
derision” with his finger. “While perhaps lacking the patience of Job,” as the Democratic New
Orleans Bulletin reported, Burke’s response proved that he was “not destitute of the attributes of
true manhood.” Burke lunged at the governor, grabbed him by the same arm that had borne the
insult, and attempted to pull Kellogg from his buggy. In the course of the melee, Burke thrashed
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his Republican adversary with several stinging licks from a cowhide while the governor’s driver
desperately whipped the horses and sent the major tumbling to the dusty street. Kellogg then
produced a pistol and fired from his retreating buggy. The enraged Burke returned fire at the
Vermont carpetbagger, although neither man was hit.69 This was but the first of Burke’s bold,
popularity bolstering, physical altercations. The future Democratic newspaperman knew how to
cause a public display that would mobilize votes in a campaign.
Nonetheless, Democratic fears were realized when the polls opened. Some Republicanaligned registration clerks had intentionally filled in erroneous addresses on Democratic voter
registration certificates. In addition, Burke claimed that “not less than 2,080 white voters were
stricken from the polling-lists and refused the right to vote in the parish of Orleans” on election
day. He insisted that the drastic increase in white registration was due to massive mobilization
efforts that had induced two thousand immigrants, “who had heretofore declined to perform the
duties of citizenship,” to receive naturalization and cast a ticket. Burke alleged that Republicans
countered by spending $100,000 to bribe a hundred white men to pose as Democratic toughs and
instigate racial violence.70
Accusations of fraud, misuse of funds, and other forms of corruption were standard
tactics employed and decried on both sides of the political aisle. “Vote-buying was not one of
the dirty secrets of the Gilded Age,” historian Mark Summers asserts, “it was done out in the
open, and, like most other vices, came in different moral shadings.” At times, the outrage was
not over citizens having received cash or services for their votes. People instead complained that
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a certain party had violated the normal protocols or that the price of votes had climbed too high.
Burke’s accusations against the Kellogg regime did the same.71
Yet one must take into account how elections were conducted to understand the crux of
the issue, which revolved around the finite differences between outright vote-buying and
legitimate reimbursements for time and inconvenience. First, numerous election services had a
significant impact on voter mobilization. Party coffers legally and commonly were used to
provide transportation to the ballot box as a public service. Second, the line between someone
put on the machine payroll to work for the party with a standard job, such as sweeping the floor,
and someone paid to vote a certain way was all but indistinguishable under the spoils system.
Third, more than a few citizens eagerly accepted campaign favors-in-kind in the form of
barbeques and beer or joined partisan election night festivities in saloons and clubs. Party
organizers would often “treat” the electorate with a service rendered or “set ‘em up” with game
and grog.

If voting Democratic meant an invitation to one of the year’s best feasts, such as

those held at public Carnival balls, was that seen as an effort to buy votes? The resounding
answer for New Orleanians was no. Moreover, Gilded Age political culture taught that “paying
for votes was not the same as buying them.” In an era in which corporate capitalism became
entrenched, it made sense to many people that commodification would spread to electioneering.
Many voters expected compensation for their time. Indeed, voters could routinely count on both
parties to recoup wages lost while leaving the job site to vote. The significant fact about the use
of money in Gilded Age politics is that it functioned as a form of voter mobilization more than as
a type of voter manipulation or fraud. Therefore, postbellum politicians no doubt took Burke’s
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claim that Republicans had engaged in bribery, not compensation or mobilization, with serious
disdain.72
Whatever the exact mixture of postbellum chicanery that made up the campaign and
election day events, Burke finally found himself on the winning side. The reasons were ample.
As a prominent member of the New Orleans fire department, Burke used the department as did
other aspiring Gilded Age bosses in New York and Chicago. Its essential public services served
as a vehicle to cultivate numerous personal and political connections. His service as a firemen
also provided useful experience during his campaign for administrator of improvements.
Crescent City firemen had to overcome the city’s shoddily paved streets and unreliable
municipal water supply, at times petitioning the administrator of improvements to rectify the
situation.73 Serving as a fireman also provided inroads into the city’s ethnic working class,
among whom ward politics were crucial for political success. His association with the White
League and role in the Battle of Liberty Place aided his standing with hyper-conservatives and
racially motivated whites. At the same time, Burke’s work on the Jackson Railroad made him
known to the city’s business interests. Finally, his public statements against the White League
per se and previous partnerships with Liberal Republicans gave him a reputation for pragmatism
that appealed to the most common sentiment among white Louisiana voters: calls for renewed
prosperity and disillusionment with radicals. Toward that end, such brash displays of bellicosity
as Burke exhibited in his physical altercation with Kellogg excited public attention and increased
support for the major among those who favored bombastic populism. The Seventh Ward
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Reformed Republican Club, for instance, opened its meeting in the evening after Burke’s run in
with the governor by giving three cheers for Burke as a “noble champion.”74
As the votes came in, Burke beat his Republican opponent 25,915 to 14,025, and so
gained a salary of six thousand dollars a year. More importantly for Burke’s aspirations, the
office of administrator of improvements had roughly one-hundred-eighty-five patronage
positions to dole out, the number of employees needed to maintain forty miles of streets and over
a dozen miles of wharves along with the city’s drainage. As with Tammany Hall, control over
street-cleaning and public infrastructures formed a core source of patronage and power. Located
in room sixteen of City Hall, Burke’s office also comprised a Bureau of Streets with seven
positions and a Bureau of Drainage with two posts.75 Burke used the patronage his office
afforded to reward men who had helped undermine Republican control in the 1874 election.
William Alexander, the black organizer who supported the Democratic ticket, became a foreman
overseeing a group of labors on the levee.76 However, election to public office meant Burke
retired from his railroad career. The president of the New Orleans, St. Louis, and Chicago
Railroad, Henry S. McComb, regretted that Burke was resigning in order to pursue “political
preferment” but expressed confidence that the railroad’s loss “has been the city’s gain.” New
Orleans would reap the “benefits arising from [Burke]’s wisdom,” “energy, capacity, and
promptitude in the discharge of every duty.”77
However, politicians in Louisiana were increasingly confronted by the economic
contraction of the Panic of 1873. New Orleans received a deluge of laid-off workers from
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surrounding areas that added to the already swelled ranks of the city’s unemployed. As a result,
a dynamic movement began in 1874 that gave voice to a host of popular cries for relief. In the
winter months following the 1874 election, an invigorated Mechanics, Workingmen, and
Laborers’ Association set its sights on rooting out government waste and mismanagement. The
city’s financial condition was indeed desperate. New Orleans banks that had not closed were
faltering, having already suspended currency payments in October 1874. The association railed
against the “inefficiency and fraud of men in office” who had furthered the crisis, even
presenting a proposal that the positions of city officials “drawing large salaries and doing very
little for it” be replaced by working class jobs on public works and transit. Such working-class
resentment also expressed itself by arguing that party patronage had bloated city budgets with
needless administrative positions and sought to remedy the situation by calling for public
transparency of all municipal jobs, those who filled them, and what salaries they drew.78 When
the association organized workers to refuse to pay when riding street cars until city officials
added more public works jobs, municipal authorities quickly dispatched the city police to
suppress the movement.
The decisions of Burke and Democrats during the mid-1870s illuminates where their
loyalties lay. Burke, in his quest for the administrator of improvements and role as Democratic
campaign operative, had long railed against the “languishing” condition of the city’s “commerce,
industries and real-estate interest.”79 Burke was among those who were quick to assert that the
root cause, made more apparent in the wake of the Panic of 1873, were burdensome taxes and
inefficient use of funds. The promised recourse, then, was smaller budgets and lower taxes,
each of which would benefit business interests. Simultaneously, Burke had assured loyal
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working-class conservative voters that the spoils of patronage would flow their way when proper
government was restored. However, compounding the problem of city and state finances were
the numerous public notices of property auctions the tax collector’s office held for derelict taxes
stemming from the Panic of 1873.80
Even the Louisiana Lottery was not immune from the panic’s effects. It lowered its
grand prize from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand, but also reduced ticket prices by fifty
percent in order to stimulate sales. Nonetheless, gamblers realized that the reduced prizes were
worth more on the dollar in the aftermath of the panic.81
Thus, Burke was confronted with a difficult choice a year into his post as Administrator
of Improvements. Burke figured 5,000 men in the city were unemployed. While city
newspapers estimated the numbers were no less than 2,000 unemployed men, they concluded
that as many as 15,000 family members were impoverished within the city as a result. Such dire
straits led the Picayune to project that the “great deal of distress among the laboring classes”
meant “perhaps there has never been more in the history of the city.”82 Burke was besieged by
skilled laborers and businessmen who previously “had a thriving business” but were reduced to
begging for jobs as low-wage day laborers. All told, Burke in 1875 reckoned that over three
thousand job seekers came to him “from all classes…pleading for any employment that will give
their families bread.”83 Burke made his choice in early June 1875, significantly cutting the size
and scope of the Administration of Improvements. Ever the adroit politician, however, Burke
acquiesced to working-class anxieties about what they considered over-paid city officials when
he likewise reduced the salaries of public works officers. Moreover, Burke and local Democrats
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shifted the debate by emphasizing the job opportunities available for those helping Captain
James Buchanan Eads continue the long-awaited engineering project to allow ocean-going
steamers access to New Orleans that had begun the previous August.84
Nonetheless, the conservative stabilizing forces of both the two party system and
American capitalism converged in the press and helped leaders like Burke weather the storm of
labor unrest. Newspapers overwhelmingly supported the status quo and took strides to maintain
business confidence. As Burke’s rhetoric indicates, defining progress as material progress
became redundant in the Gilded Age. Working-class politics and racial activists were seen as
inherently unsettling to the environment of business and politics on which prosperity was based.
Newspapers tended to focus on the disruptive results of class or race-based protests and strikes
rather than the issues themselves. When a contingent of white working-class Democrats in the
Second Ward responded to Burke and city officials’ rejection of more public works employment
by bolting from the Democracy to form an Independent Workingmen’s Club in March 1876,
even the city’s Republican press quipped that their demands should “rest in a dusty pigeonhole
for all time to come.” Nor were some of the nation’s press above fabricating anti-labor issues
whole-cloth from made-up interviews with unsavory labor leaders or false reporting of
violence.85
Nonetheless, Burke helped ensure a substantial, and ultimately decisive, number of white
working-class New Orleanians remained in the Democratic fold. Johnnie McGeehan, whom
Burke made superintendent of carts, was indicative of an Irish working-class leader tapped for
his crucial links to ward politics. McGeehan was born in New Orleans to Irish parents, entered
the skilled industrial trades as a molder, joined the Irish American club, was on the Crescent City

84
85

Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 46, 274.
Summers, Party Games, 84-85; as quoted in Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 46.

52

Democratic club’s board of directors, and had previously held the patronage positions in Orleans
parish of court clerk and deputy sheriff. Described as “very efficient,” “energetic,” and “very
popular with the voters of New Orleans,” McGeehan delivered enough reliable votes to be
appointed to the lucrative position of license inspector during the height of Ring power, in John
McEnery’s governorship.86
A couple of years later, Burke deployed his gamesmanship in national affairs as the
representative of Louisiana’s Democratic gubernatorial candidate Francis Tillou Nicholls’ claim
to victory in the 1876 election. Burke chose not to run for reelection as Administrator of
Improvements or any other post that year, instead devoting his energies to party mobilization and
campaigning. A northern Republican would later concede that Burke orchestrated “one of the
most extraordinary political campaigns ever witnessed” in the state, yet the election results were
what had come to be the unfortunate norm in Louisiana, muddled returns for president and
governor, and crippling stalemate as both sides cried foul play.87 Louisiana had been the most
hotly contested political arena in the Union, and by 1875 it had become the “Republican party’s
albatross.”88 As chairman of the Democratic State Registration and Election Committee, Burke
wrote an official report that detailed Republican fraud, lamented that state government was “all
in hands of Republicans,” and decried the elections as a series of “gross violations of law;
arbitrary and unjust rulings, refusal to register citizens entitled thereto; discrimination against
whites in favor of colored.”89 Republicans thundered their own complaints against White
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League intimidation and Democratic voter fraud.
Following the unresolved election returns, Burke partnered with Louisiana’s
congressional delegation in Washington to put in place a Democratic strategy to continually
pressure and negotiate with Republicans to acknowledge a Nicholls gubernatorial victory.
Democratic congressman from Louisiana’s Second District, E. John Ellis, took part in more than
fifty meetings with President Grant during the crucial moments of the winter of 1876.90 Yet
Burke, whom Ellis later recalled as “the factotum of that whole series of conferences from
beginning to end,” emerged as the leading actor.91 In smoked filled rooms with high level
Republicans, including President Grant, Burke threatened to help organize a southern filibuster
to prevent Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes’s election in the House of Representatives
unless written promises were given to remove the remaining federal troops in the South and
support Nicholls’s installation as Louisiana’s governor. An observer in Washington wired back
to New Orleans that “Burke deserves infinite credit for his keen and diligent preparation of the
case . . . , both in committee and for presentation before the Tribunal.”92
Democrats back in Louisiana seized on the paralysis in the capital to consolidate their
control of the apparatus of state power. With Packard’s Republicans in retreat, the Crescent City
White League met at Masonic Hall on January 9, marched through the city, and was formally
sworn in at Lafayette Square as a part of the state militia.93 The city and state were once again a
powder keg. In February, Republicans claimed Democrats made an assassination attempt on
Packard. A month later, Democrats instigated rumors that Republicans had organized an attempt
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to blow up the state supreme court building with gunpowder.94 Democrats, who had established
their own rival “state house” at St. Patrick Hall steadily siphoned legislators from Packard’s
contingent of supporters, who were headquartered at the St. Louis Hotel. According to the New
Orleans press, Democrats paid low level Packard legislators eight dollars per day to help form a
quorum with Nicholls’s legislature while fifteen thousand dollars was spent to erode support for
Packard amongst Republican leaders.95
Charles T. Howard and John A. Morris, leaders of the Louisiana State Lottery Company,
took advantage of the political vacuum to demonstrate to both sides the power of the lottery
purse. The issue arose when the lottery’s state-mandated quarterly payment of ten thousand
dollars was due at the end of March 1877, but there was no legitimate government to receive it.
The ever pragmatic lottery did not want to make enemies with either faction and was confident
that it could deal with whichever side won the state house. So Howard and Morris sent their
lottery tax to the state bank in the form of a check addressed to the state auditor without
acknowledging either gubernatorial candidate as the victor. In a high stakes battle against the
clock, the Nicholls and Packard regimes went to their respective courts, received writs of
sequestration, and raced to the state bank to collect the funds. The Nicholls people won and
claimed the money. Other businesses and individuals simply refused to pay their taxes until they
knew which side had won. Thus, attempts at tax seizures was a daily nuisance to city and state
business.96
Later, during three days of interrogation and testimony before a congressional committee
to determine the details of the compromise, Burke would be pressed by another bombastic and
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controversial figure in Louisiana, former Union general Benjamin Butler, who was now a
congressman from Massachusetts. Although Butler was described as an interrogator of
“considerable dramatic skill,” Burke remained the same levelheaded politician, unflustered by
Butler’s prodding.97 Butler attempted to back Burke into a corner early in the first day of
testimony by wondering aloud whether African Americans in the state endeavored “to do the
best they could to elect Mr. Hayes, who would take care of them.” The New York Times reporter
recorded that Burke’s “reply was a smile, which he maintained until Butler saw he could not
mold the witness’ answers for him, nor flavor his testimony by his own argumentative style of
putting the questions.”98 The major candidly admitted that his maneuvers in the contentious
election were “a bluff game,” that southern congressmen would not have joined the filibuster,
and that Hayes had already planned to recall federal troops “before these negotiations were
entered into or these guarantees were given.”99
While Burke’s politicking in the so-called Wormley House Bargain might not have had
as a decisive role in the ending of Reconstruction as some historians have claimed, it is
significant on several accounts. Burke justifiably feared that radical, old-guard Republicans
would impede Hayes’s attempts to remove federal troops. At the least, then, Burke’s political
acumen assured their immediate removal. The Washington backroom dealings likewise
displayed Burke’s political skills on a national scale; for a man drawn to intrigue and conniving,
that alone was no doubt worth his trip to Washington. One northern correspondent later
exclaimed that the major’s “fertility of resources and indomitable perseverance exerted a
powerful influence upon . . . the masterminds of the Union.” Finally, in the aftermath of the
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Wormley House Bargain, Burke played an active role in shaping his public image by giving the
Associated Press the story. The bargain, as C. Vann Woodward points out, allowed Burke
rhetorically to transform the complex political web of compromise and southern support of
Hayes into a “knightly deed” that rescued the South from “the tyrannical heel of the
Carpetbagger.” Early in the midst of congressional dealings, the official organ for Louisiana
Republicans cried that Burke’s “only practical utility consists in cheering the Democratic mind
in Louisiana with highfalutin telegrams.”100
On April 24, 1877, fifteen years to the day since federal troops first began occupying
New Orleans during the Civil War, President Hays’ promises were carried out when federal
forces withdrew to their barracks and Packard evacuated the state house. Three days later,
jubilant Democrats organized a torchlight procession through New Orleans streets to celebrate
the Nicholls government taking power.101
All of this allowed Burke to play an even larger role in the coming age of Democratic
“home rule” in Louisiana. Democratic gubernatorial victory in the 1876 election resulted in
Louis A. Wiltz ascending to the position of lieutenant-governor and president of the Louisiana
Senate. As leading Louisiana Democrats set about consolidating their power, Burke won the
office of state treasurer by a landslide in 1878 and began an association with the most notorious
of political entities within the state, the Louisiana State Lottery Company.102 The subsequent
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league of state power brokers, including Samuel McEnery, John McEnery, Louis Wiltz, Charles
T. Howard, and Burke, inaugurated what opponents would call the ‘Ring’ for its machine-like
grip on state politics throughout the next decade.
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Chapter Two: Major Edward A. Burke and Louisiana Machine Politics
By 1875, Burke’s stature in Louisiana had grown enough that he was included in a
widely popular account of the participation of Louisiana’s native sons in the Civil War and their
postbellum careers, despite, of course, not being a native of Louisiana (See Appendix A). None
other than T. Harry Williams proclaimed Napier Bartlett’s Military Record of Louisiana a
“valuable source” of “permanent significance.” Relying heavily on the personal accounts of the
individuals in question, Bartlett’s work functions as an edited collection of autobiographies.
Thus, it provides an important window on how Burke consciously constructed his public persona
for political gain. Burke’s “Irish stock” was heavily emphasized, with Bartlett presenting him as
a son of Éirinn akin to Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun.1
Paramount in the description of Burke was a masculine work ethic in the vein of wage
laborers and artisans with no hint of the attributes of frugality or self-control attributed to whitecollar professionals. Burke cherished a pride “upon having earned his living in a red flannel shirt
as a common laborer when necessity demanded it,” Bartlett gushed, and possessed “a
constitution capable of enduring any fatigue, natural activity, [or] energy.” Burke was praised
not only for having the grit and drive of an industrious and self-respecting laborer, but also for
understanding and advocating their cause. As he advanced rapidly in railroad crews, Burke
“familiarized himself with laborers and mechanics and learned to understand their wants and
ideas.” Knowledge of such practical vocations allowed him to learn life-lessons more valuable
than a college education rooted in “musty Latin and Greek textbooks.”2
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Accounts of Burke’s service in the Civil War followed the theme of determination, pluck,
and pugnacity. Burke was presented as an able horseman, an impromptu marine, and even as a
lassoing Texan. These endeavors paled in comparison to his managerial skills as a Confederate
major. His reorganization of the Trans-Mississippi’s field transportation “became the basis of
the organization of the Field Transportation Department of the Confederacy.” After he resigned
his business interests in Galveston, Burke’s experience of temporary but grinding poverty was
cast to strike another chord with laborers. The major wandered the streets, was “anxious about
his next meal” but “still unwilling to be a burden.”3 Hard work and an honest character remedied
his situation, which allowed Burke to play a central role in the struggle for “better government.”
Burke displayed “political sagacity,” “finesse,” “unremitting watchfulness,” and “organizing
capacity,” which enabled him, in an ironic premonition of things to come, to oversee “large
moneyed interests.”4 Thus, Burke presented himself as a proud descendant of immigrants,
pugnacious and gregarious, familiar with physical labor, unselfish, clever, and attentive to the
needs of the common people. Manhood was viewed as a necessary requirement to rebuild New
Orleans and, through it, the South as a whole. These were fundamental qualities for a
postbellum New Orleans politician and the bedrock of Burke’s personal appeal. Hyperbole and
possible fabrications aside, politics in the late nineteenth century still revolved around the truth
that perception is more important than reality.
All of this allowed Burke to play a larger role in the coming age of Democratic “home
rule” in Louisiana. Democrats in the Nicholls administration were responsible for distributing
patronage positions to some nine thousand applicants within weeks of taking over the state
house, which led the New Orleans Times to begin the siren call of corrupt and inefficient
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government, this time under Democratic auspices. Nicholls appeared to agree. Burke and other
Democratic insiders aligned with Wiltz grew increasingly alarmed that the newly inaugurated
governor planned on holding firm to campaign promises of meritocracy and undermining the
spoils system. A Confederate veteran and a hero of Chancellorsville who lost an eye, an arm,
and a leg in battle, Nicholls proved to be a tough man to bend to the machine’s will. However
much Nicholls sought to undercut machine patronage, he could not refuse Burke an appointment
to one of the most powerful and lucrative positions at his disposal. Nicholls appointed Burke the
state tax collector for the first district (See Appendix B). With an office at 47 Carondelet,
located in one of the wealthiest portions of New Orleans, Burke’s office was reported to earn
thirty to fifty thousand dollars a year. By 1878, Burke also employed his long-standing cashier
and private secretary, Alfred W. Cockerton, who would later be indicted in Burke’s bond fraud
and abscond with him to Honduras. Burke’s old friend, former Galveston partner and fellow
Democratic operative Marshall Stoddard, was also one of Burke’s clerks.5
Nicholls’s position grew increasingly tenuous in the summer of 1877. The Orleans parish
court defied the wishes of the governor when it flexed its Democratic muscles and indicted the
four members of the Kellogg-appointed Louisiana Returning Board. Rumors circulated that the
indictment of the board was a Ring scheme to trap Governor Nicholls, who was inclined to
pardon the officials. Ring operatives would then use the pardons as a means to remove Nicholls
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from power. If there was a Ring scheme to skewer Nicholls, it was thwarted when the state
supreme court overturned the Orleans Parish’s guilty verdict.6
The wedge between Nicholls and machine Democrats widened over whether to amend
the Republican-directed state constitution of 18687 or draw a new charter. In February 1878,
both houses of the Louisiana legislature approved twenty-one constitutional amendments for a
plebiscite during the upcoming elections. White rural voters and New Orleans machine-led
ward clubs, despite objections from Governor Nicholls, the New Orleans press, and commercial
interests, favored writing a new constitution rather than amending the old one. Internecine
struggles continued to plague the Democrats when the Democratic state central committee met in
May 1878, to nominate candidates. Burke gained the nomination for state treasurer over two
other candidates on the fifty-eighth ballot. The election, to be held on November 5, 1878, would
set the tone, personnel, and course of Democratic rule.8
Burke and Regular Democrats encountered significant opposition. The Greenback party
was growing, particularly in the upcountry parishes where farmers affiliated with the Grange
were receptive to its message. Oscillating working-class discontent rose again in New Orleans,
where another incarnation of the Workingman’s Party put forth a slate of candidates with a
Greenbacker agenda. The familiar foe of Republican mobilization likewise appeared
problematic. Democrats responded with traditional methods. A Democratic organ in north
Louisiana, the Natchitoches People’s Vindicator, used race-baiting by declaring, “[We shall]
treat all who do not aid us as negroes, whether their skin be white or black.” In one northern
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parish along the Mississippi, Democratic operatives led vigilantes who violently dispersed a
campaign for a biracial Country People’s ticket. Democrats in New Orleans deployed their new
grip on the city machine, where the U.S. circuit court charged at least four clerks for refusing to
register African American voters. Election fraud in the Crescent City likewise played a role in
suppressing the Workingman’s Party, which received only two hundred votes.9
The use of these means reflected the high stakes for the Democracy. All state house
members, eighteen state senators, the state treasurer, six congressmen, and most parish and citylevel positions were on the ballot. The Democratic ticket proved victorious and won positions
from the federal level to municipal government. For his part, Burke won the office of state
treasurer in a landslide. In addition to the power the office afforded, Democratic control of the
treasury was no doubt a major symbolic achievement. Burke’s Republican predecessor, Antoine
Dubuclet, was an African American native of Louisiana who held the post throughout
Reconstruction. Born into a slaveholding family of gens de coleur libre, Dubuclet was the
richest free black sugar planter in Louisiana before the war, with over one hundred slaves. As
treasurer, he was the only African American during Reconstruction to hold the office for more
than one term. Democrats had previously attempted to tie the Republican treasurer to
carpetbagger corruption. With Dubuclet not up for reelection in the conservative sweep of the
state house in 1876, Democrats soon used their newly attained power to launch an investigation
of the treasurer.10
The Richland Beacon, a Democratic newspaper from the cotton parishes of north
Louisiana, recounted a familiar means of corruption in the state treasury, through the redeeming
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of state warrants and bonds. It contended that a "speculating ring of New Orleans" told people
seeking to cash a warrant that the treasury was out of money. Individuals were then left with no
choice but to locate a broker and sell their bonds at a measly thirty to sixty cents on the dollar.
Middlemen would then redeem the bonds at full value through a treasury official who received
part of the profits. According to the Beacon, Dubuclet was apt to understate the total receipts in
quarterly and fiscal year reports in order to keep the price of bonds low. The newspaper hoped
that Democrats could ensure "a strict accountability for a faithful and honest discharge" of the
treasury. They worried, however, that should such commonplace corruption continue through
the upcoming election, a new treasurer might "be exposed to the temptations with which the
office is now surrounded." Despite Democratic efforts, the legislative committee did not find
enough evidence to indict Dubuclet, but the Richland Beacon’s fears would prove prophetic
during Burke’s term in office.11
Meanwhile, all amendments but one, to move the capitol to Baton Rouge, failed in the
1878 elections. Apparently, a faction of Democrats mobilized voters to reject the amendments as
a means to strengthen the call for a new constitutional convention. The Sentinel of Bayou Sara
and West Feliciana Parish concluded as much. It argued that the defeat of the proposed
amendments meant that the people supported a wholesale new constitution rather than tweaking
the old one. With his preference to change Louisiana law through amendments defeated,
Nicholls’s belief that “the work of relieving the people of the state from all the burdens
consequent upon so many years of misgovernment” trumped his distaste for a new constitution.
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In early January, Nicholls publicly endorsed a new constitutional convention.12
In early 1879, Burke also played an active role among leading Louisiana Democrats who
set about consolidating their power. One of the first items on the agenda for machine Democrats
was to select Louisiana’s next U.S. senator. A revolving door of nominations by Republicans
and Democrats alike offered over a dozen ballots during a seventeen-day period that yielded a
who’s who of leading Louisiana politicians. Albert Sidney Badger, Pinckney B. S. Pinchback,
Edward Pilsbury, E. John Ellis, and even Gen. John Bell Hood received nominations. According
to the Picayune, the deadlock was a strategy on the part of Democratic insiders to get rid of
Nicholls by presenting the governor as the only candidate capable of ending the impasse. This
measure, they knew, would ensure that the machine-aligned lieutenant-governor, Louis Alfred
Wiltz, would ascend to the executive mansion. Alternatively, the over two-week long process of
selecting a senator reflected factional rivalries within Democratic ranks.13
With Wiltz presiding as president of the legislature, Burke was nominated on the eighth
ballot, the same day that Nicholls approved legislation for a constitutional convention. While the
major received only five votes, they were from prominent party insiders. As ever, the adroit
Burke knew the most influential people with whom to partner, thus developing ties with men of
the same cosmopolitan persuasion as himself. Leading them was Lewis Emmanuel Texada, a
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prominent Regular Democrat from Rapides Parish who ensured the party’s control of
Alexandria, a seminal geopolitical area for central Louisiana. His grandfather, Don Manuel
Garcia de Texada, had emigrated in the 1770s to Spanish Louisiana from Castile, Spain. Born in
1818, Lewis Texada graduated from the University of Virginia before inheriting his family’s
three thousand acre cotton plantation in Rapides, aptly named Castile, serving as a Whig in the
Louisiana legislature, acting as a delegate to the state’s secession convention, and serving in the
Confederacy. During Reconstruction, Texada joined Burke and other leading Democrats to
partner with Henry Clay Warmoth in crafting the Fusion ticket of 1872, the ultimately futile
attempt to oust federally supported Republicans.14
Yet a lot had changed in Louisiana politics since 1872. When both parties finally settled
their internal disputes on the fourteenth ballot and selected their respective candidates, Texada
led the Democratic delegation in nominating Benjamin Franklin Jonas to oppose the Republican
choice of Henry Clay Warmoth. Jonas won election to the U.S. senate on a straight party line
vote of ninety-nine to twenty-nine. Jonas’ experience and stature made him a good choice in
uniting Democratic factions. Following in the footsteps of Judah P. Benjamin, Jonas was active
within Louisiana’s Jewish community, a prominent lawyer, and a Confederate veteran. He had
been an active opponent of Kellogg, the city attorney for New Orleans, and a Democratic leader
in both the state senate and house during the 1870s. Until his term expired in 1884, Jonas
advocated for concerns central to Democrats of Burke’s ilk. He helped gain appropriations for
improving the Mississippi, promoted tariff protections for Louisiana sugar, and defended
Democratic interests on congressional committees investigating voter fraud and intimidation in
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the South. Jonas was also an intrepid Democratic insider, a man with “few equals . . . in the art
and science of planning and conducting successful campaigns.” He represented Louisiana on the
Congressional Democratic Committee and actively canvassed for Regular Democrats in state
elections. For his services on the National Democratic Executive Committee, which directed
Grover Cleveland’s successful presidential campaign, Jonas was rewarded with the crown jewel
of federal patronage in Louisiana in 1885, customs collector for the port of New Orleans.15
While Burke’s candidacy for U.S. senator was unsuccessful, he did benefit from a large
appropriations bill. A deficiency bill crafted in early 1879 used state revenues to refund the
expenses of officials and departments from the previous few years, which included
Reconstruction partisan fights. After both legislative houses presented amendments to designate
the amount of funds given to each position, from parish assessors and municipal school boards to
state printing contracts, a joint committee convened to determine the end result of the patronage
appropriations. Warmoth and the Republicans objected to a host of Democratic amendments,
including a refund of $619 that the state immigration board had borrowed from Burke “for
expenses of immigration to Louisiana.” Intentionally vague, this payment had likely been used
to facilitate immigrant naturalization and voter registration from when Burke was leading efforts
against Kellogg. The use of party money to cover immigrant expenses was a common tactic in
Gilded Age electioneering. Ultimately, the joint committee, with Texada leading the senate
contingent, settled on a compromise that appeased both Republicans and Democrats. The state’s
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reimbursements to Burke made the final bill.16
While previously entertaining ideas to eliminate the Republican-created Louisiana State
Lottery Company, Democratic leaders came to recognize the lucrative and powerful benefits
partnering with the state-sponsored gambling monopoly could infer. The league of state power
brokers, including Samuel McEnery, John McEnery, Louis Wiltz, Charles T. Howard, and
Burke, that formed the Ring strengthened their machine-like grip on state politics throughout the
next decade. Yet there was a significant contingent of voters, newspapermen, and politicians in
Louisiana who were opposed to the lottery. Overcoming anti-lottery schemes and partnering
with the corporation was a primary, and highly contentious, task for Burke and other pro-lottery
Democrats.
One of the Regular Democrats’ most strident antagonists was another ex-Confederate
editor of a partisan Democratic newspaper and one of the Crescent City’s most iconoclastic
citizens, Major Henry James Hearsey. Hearsey was the first newspaperman in the state to finger
Burke as a leading political mastermind and central cog in the new Democratic machine. But
where Major Burke courted outside capital from the outset in his paper, Major Hearsey was an
exceptionally vitriolic Lost Causer, race-baiter, and Yankee basher in an age when such people
were as common in the South as mosquitoes. Not only did Hearsey oppose Burke’s economic
strategies, he also led the chorus of voices that routinely objected to Democratic machine
politics. As editor of the New Orleans Democrat, Hearsey issued incessant diatribes against the
hypocrisy of Democrats who put patronage over principle and partnered with the monopolistic,
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Republican-created, Louisiana State Lottery Company. Ultimately, the lottery’s wealth and
muscle made it one of the Ring Democrats’ greatest assets. Yet it also became the Achilles heel
of party regulars, who were routinely threatened by reformers seeking to eliminate the
monopoly’s charter.
The Democratic party’s partnership with the lottery was indeed a recent shift in the
state’s political landscape. The Louisiana lottery was an outgrowth of a lottery syndicate based
in New York City under the name of C. H. Murray & Company and approved shortly after the
Civil War for operation in Mississippi, Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia. By 1867, Charles T.
Howard managed its New Orleans branch. The following year, Howard and John A. Morris
attained an act of incorporation and twenty-five year charter for a new state-sponsored lottery
called the Louisiana State Lottery Company. Immediately after ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment, the act incorporating the lottery was approved in the first legislative secession
under Louisiana’s Republican constitution of 1868, reportedly at the cost of over two-hundredthousand dollars in bribes. The Louisiana lottery came to being in spite of Congress passing an
anti-lottery statute earlier that year. It would not be the last time Morris and Howard’s lottery
defied the law.17
The original charter granted the lottery an exclusive monopoly and exemption from taxes,
although it was required to pay forty thousand dollars annually to the state in quarterly
installments, the money to go to public education and Charity Hospital. Howard and Morris led
successful lottery efforts to increase its powers throughout Reconstruction. First, lottery
advocates benefited from a significant legal loophole rooted in New Orleans' antebellum
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traditions of gambling and horse racing. A civil code passed by the Louisiana legislature in 1825
forbid state courts from mandating payment of winnings earned through "gaming or by a bet,
except for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms, such as the exercise of the gun,
foot, horse, and chariot racing." With little fanfare, the gambling provision of the antebellum
civil code was included verbatim in a revised civil code adopted in 1870. Thus, lottery winners
had no legal means of requiring the company to pay them the full amount of their winnings or
anything at all. The threat of public outrage over so explicit a swindle kept lottery insiders from
employing this prerogative except in the case of an inside job to steal from the corporation. In
1874, the Republican-controlled government also approved new laws that directed the police and
judges to shut down and fine, without a jury trial, any individual or operation that sold,
distributed, or held any lotteries other than the state-sanctioned monopoly. These laws,
contemporarily known as “Act 9” and “Act 10,” where routinely enforced.18
As late as 1878, the Democratic legislature passed a law that taxed lottery profits and
property. In “John A. Morris vs. E. A. Burke et als,” lottery leaders sued state authorities to
challenge the law as a violation of the corporation’s legal charter. The suit targeted Burke
because he was the tax collector for the city’s first, and most powerful, district. The courts
ultimately sided with the lottery, but the law in question and the case itself reflected internal
divisions among Democrats over the lottery question. As editor of the Democrat, Hearsey was
first to bring public attention to Act 9 and Act 10 as evidence of the lottery’s expanding
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powers.19
Despite its main office still garnering over twenty-three-thousand dollars a week in
money orders alone, the year 1879 opened with lottery fortunes and prospects at an all-time low.
Its stock, traded on the New Orleans Stock Exchange, was worth thirty-five dollars a share
despite a one hundred dollar par value.20 It also faced a backlash from rivals, the courts, and a
strong faction of Democratic state legislators. The Crescent City’s leading role as a circumCaribbean port and its strong Latin American ties presented both opportunities and threats for the
Louisiana lottery. Its biggest rival was the Spanish-run Havana Lottery, which held eighteen
lotteries a year under the direction of the colonial government. According to Frank Leslie’s
Monthly Magazine in 1880, most of the millions of dollars a year that Americans spent on
lotteries ultimately went outside the country. With tickets sold as far away as Europe and the
Spanish Philippines, the Gulf South and New York City joined Latin America and the Caribbean
as the Havana lottery’s primary hub. The magazine dubbed it “the principal lottery of the
Western Hemisphere.”21
Despite the Louisiana lottery’s legal status as a monopoly, the Havana lottery was
flagrant in its violation of state law. The Cuban-based firm placed prominent advertisements in
New Orleans city directories and often paid Latino residents and businessmen in New Orleans to
sell tickets on the side. Manuel Bornio advertised his import and wholesale company of Cuban
tobacco on 77 Gravier Street along with his credentials as a Havana lottery agent. Business was
good enough for Bornio and others to be frequently arrested and fined five thousand dollars for
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running the Havana lottery in multiple shops throughout the city. It was so easy to buy a Havana
ticket that a frequent strategy used by the Louisiana lottery was to pay a regular customer to act
as a spy and purchase a ticket from the Cuban company as proof of wrongdoing.22
The Havana lottery was an immediate and constant threat, as Howard brought suits
against their primary rival as early as 1870. Within several years, the volume of court cases and
police man hours dedicated to the seemingly impossible task of shutting down the Havana lottery
and others put an enormous strain on the city’s legal system and law enforcement. Lottery
related cases often constituted a majority of daily dockets in New Orleans courts. The Louisiana
lottery not only took illegal lottery vendors such as Bornio to court for between one and five
thousand dollars, but it also showed no mercy in prosecuting individual Havana peddlers for
fines of twenty-five dollars. In addition to legal recourse, Louisiana lottery operatives also
planted anonymous editorials to increase doubts about their rivals’ operations. One such piece
written under the pseudonym “Justice” claimed that Havana agents bought tickets in bulk from
the Cuban government but marked up the price in Louisiana and often paid out discounted
prizes. The editorial also played to New Orleanians’ sense of pride, arguing that the statesponsored lottery was a “home institution . . . owned and conducted by your own people.” That
Howard, Morris, and others were not from Louisiana, or the south, was not mentioned.23
The Louisiana lottery’s greed and overreach nearly brought it down in the late 1870s. Up
until then, the Louisiana and Havana lotteries had both won battles in court, which prompted the
Picayune to quip that lottery suits were decided according to “which has the largest surplus to
pay the lawyers.” The decisive case came in May 1878, when a recidivist small-time Havana
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lottery agent, Antonio Agusti, who had been repeatedly convicted and fined twenty-five dollars
in criminal courts, was charged again. Agents of the Havana lottery and opponents of the
Louisiana lottery seized on the opportunity to undercut the latter’s powers. Dubbed “the Lottery
Habeas Corpus Case” and “the Lottery War” in the Louisiana press, the Agusti affair quickly
devolved into a jurisdictional dispute. When Agusti refused to pay the fine and opted for jail
time instead, criminal court judges, who had a long history of pro-lottery rulings, sent him to jail.
However, a civil court judge issued a writ of habeas corpus to release Agusti and declared that
Act 9 violated provisions for a trial by jury and was therefore unconstitutional. Ultimately,
Governor Nicholls was caught in the crossfire, with the civil authorities requesting that he call
out the state militia, even that he declare a formal "posse comitatus." The issue subsided when
Nicholls demanded that all sides halt while he consulted with the state attorney-general.24
At the center of the issue was the power of the Louisiana lottery and its authority as a
state-sponsored monopoly. Agusti had been “habeas corpus-ed and mandamus-ed from pillar to
post" in a conflict that revealed Louisiana’s Latin American ties, consumed Louisiana’s public
attention, and came to define the terms of debate within the state’s Democratic party. In the
Democrat, Hearsey led the growing chorus of voices arrayed against the Louisiana lottery.
Hearsey claimed that Howard’s “pimps and private detectives” brought trumped up charges of
trading in Havana tickets against prominent and honest businessmen before the courts without
cause.25
Views expressed in the Democrat carried significant weight, as the paper was still the
official organ for the state Democracy. Following the return of Democratic rule in 1877,
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Nicholls had stripped the New Orleans Republican of the lucrative patronage position of state
printer and gave it to the Democrat, owned by George w. Dupre. Its voice influenced
Democratic opinion well beyond New Orleans. Jason H. Cosgrove, editor of the most circulated
rural paper in the state, the People's Vindicator of Natchitoches, was one such example. The
paper spoke for disgruntled Democrats amid the Agusti affair by reminding voters that
“Governor Nicholls was elected on the platform of reformation of the great evils established by
the Radicals in our midst.” High taxes and perceived slights to white southerners
notwithstanding, Cosgrove deemed the lottery to be “the most gigantic and most dangerous of all
these evils.” The main issue was not gambling or a lottery per se, but the lottery's powers. As a
monopoly, it denied a free market, thwarted economic competition, and unfairly victimized "a
poor fellow, struggling to support his family." It made police officers "spies and informers" and
flouted habeas corpus. Convictions were achieved without a jury trial in odious special courts by
judges who had "prostituted" their office. Moreover, it seemed, as “an act purchased from the
most venal of legislatures," to be a fetid holdover from carpetbagger-rule. According to
Cosgrove, the lottery only continued because a growing faction of Democratic leaders in the
executive branch, such as Burke, were in lottery pockets and “officially mum” about their stance
on the issue.26
On occasion, the Louisiana lottery spoke for itself through paid spaces in New Orleans
newspapers that assuaged hesitant customers amid the rising chorus of critics. Their argument
foreshadowed trickle down economic theory and claimed that "every enterprise calculated to
direct the flow of money towards New Orleans” was “deserving of encouragement." Pointing to
the calamitous effects of the Panic of 1873, lottery officials asserted, "With the influx of capital
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comes, directly or indirectly, increased prosperity." The lottery also boasted that since the
company was expanding nationally to "nearly every prominent city and town throughout the
Union," it should be a point of pride, not derision for Louisianans. The lottery company did not
directly address accusations of graft and fraud. Instead it took a pragmatic approach by implying
that since Americans would inevitably gamble, Louisiana should reap the benefits as much as
possible. According to lottery logic, the unprecedented number of ticket sales expressed
consumer confidence and was sufficient proof of "the integrity and acknowledged fairness" of its
operation. Moreover, the success of the Louisiana lottery aided U.S. business, as its sales
undermined the flow of American money to "Havana and other places abroad."27
However, in January 1879, the Augusti affair put enough pressure on Louisiana
politicians for the legislature to debate bills that limited the lottery. The state’s lower chamber
had been sympathetic to bills limiting or ending the lottery, but never garnered enough votes to
enact a law. The situation in 1879 proved different. The house debated a bill not only to end the
Louisiana lottery, but also to “prohibit lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets” in the state.
Several members spoke against the bill by arguing that to repeal its monopoly would burden
taxpayers with a forty thousand dollar shortfall that must be made up with an involuntary tax,
rather than to tax people who choose to partake in the lottery. Moreover, many legislators were
unsure they had the authority to rescind a state-granted act of incorporation. Others thought it
unfair that the lottery was singled out as a monopoly and attempted to shift the debate to
privileges granted to the Slaughter House Company and the Levee Company. Such opposing
views crossed party and racial lines. A Democrat from Caldwell Parish echoed a black
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Republican’s concerns that the bill was fiscally irresponsible and discriminatory in its singling
out of the lottery.28
People who argued in favor of repeal often did so because they viewed the lottery as a
legacy of Republican fraud. While conceding that lottery taxes and charitable drives contributed
to Louisiana finances, one representative contended that it was tainted money taken from hapless
"dupes who bought its tickets." Another legislator alluded to the power of such anti-lottery
newspapers as the Democrat by arguing that public criticism of Democrats who supposedly
lacked the courage to confront lottery power was a challenge to avenge Democratic pride by
destroying it "root and branch." While still others pledged to vote for repeal “on conscientious
grounds,” Warmoth, the former Republican governor, astutely concluded that the overriding
reason Democrats opposed the lottery was because of its political power, not any moral,
economic, or constitutional principle. Ultimately, sixty-three Democrats and three Republicans
in the house voted to end the lottery, as opposed to only six Republicans and four Democrats
who voted against the bill.29
The state senate, however, was already becoming a bulwark of party strength that
checked the more reform-minded lower house. While the rationales for state senators who
opposed the bill echoed those in the lower house, many were also pragmatic. Some senators
argued that Louisianans would gamble in violation of a lottery prohibition in any event. Since
the repeal bill would ensure any violators would receive a jury trial, Senator Garland argued that
lotteries were so prominent and accepted, "especially so in the city of New Orleans," that juries
would acquit all suspects. In reality, Garland argued, to end monopolistic privileges of the
lottery only meant that a ubiquitous black market of lotteries would operate with open, if still
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technically illegal, competition. Due to the habits and culture of Louisianans in the late 1870s,
Garland proclaimed that "this was not the time and this was not the people" to repeal a popular
leisure activity and naively assume the law would be obeyed. Many senators concluded that the
geographical characteristics of New Orleans as a major Gulf South port and nexus of the
Mississippi meant repealing all lotteries was like trying to stem the tide. To the contrary,
nefarious agents from outside lotteries would run rampant and Charity Hospital, having lost forty
thousand dollars of its budget, would be forced to kick out the most destitute of Louisiana’s
citizens. Another senator resented that the issue had been driven by the whims of such
newspapermen as Hearsey. “Whether the “Democrat [should] rule the Democratic Party with a
rod of iron or not” was a bigger issue.30
Just as the momentum appeared to be on the side of voting down the lottery repeal bill,
Senator F. C. Zacharie delivered a bombshell that changed the course of debate. His statements
alluded to collusion between the Nicholls administration and the Morris and Howard lottery.
Zacharie recounted his experience as part of a high level Democratic group dubbed the
Committee of Safety in early 1877, when Nicholls’ closest advisors were discussing how best to
claim and keep power. Given the chaos within the Republican party, Howard and lottery
managers decided to parlay with Nicholls' embattled partisans. A deal was hatched. Betting that
it was only a matter of time before Republicans lost control of Louisiana, as they had done nearly
everywhere else in the South, Howard and Morris struck a deal with the administration. P. B. S.
Pinchback, one of the leading amoral rogues in the state, acted as a middleman for the lottery and
the Nicholls regime by arranging lottery payments of as much as sixteen thousand dollars to state
senators who left the Packard legislature to aid the quorum in its Democratic counterpart.
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According to Zacharie's statements from the Louisiana senate floor, "The Legislature would
pledge itself not to appeal the charter of the Louisiana Lottery Company [so] that the company
might render material service in establishing the Nicholls Government." Zacharie opined that
the tenuous position of the Nicholls government and the specter of returning to Republican rule,
as had occurred after the Battle of Liberty Place, allowed Democratic hopefuls to allay the
concerns of big business. Implying that the economic sector of New Orleans favored Republican
policies, or was at least leery of Democratic changes, Nicholls insiders attempted to "obtain the
influence of all" and avoid promoting "hostility against any of the rich corporations which
existed in New Orleans."31
Perhaps worrying that his statements undermined the legitimacy of the Nicholls
government, Zacharie then backtracked when other senators questioned him. He said that there
was only a "tacit understanding” and that no quid pro quo nor “pledge was entered into” that he
“was aware of." As a result of some Democratic disagreement with the compact, either because
they were unaware of it or as a deliberate means to feign reform and constituent concerns, the
Democratic controlled state legislature introduced bills in legislative sessions of 1877 and 1878,
respectively, to end the lottery's charter. Yet lottery pressure ensured that enough members of
the legislature were persuaded to remember their end of the bargain. Moreover, Zacharie had
emphasized a pragmatic, ends-justify-the-means mentality. A partnership between Democrats
and the lottery, while not desirable in theory, was a better alternative than a principled obstinacy
that would have led to continued Republican rule. In addition, Zacharie presented fulfillment of
the arrangement as the honorable and dutiful response of a gentleman who honors his pledges.
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On the whole, his remarks largely corroborated congressional inquiries that found the Packard
regime had collapsed owing to lottery pressure and money.32
The bill to repeal all lotteries in Louisiana passed the senate by a vote of nineteen to
seventeen, and Nicholls signed it into law on March 27, 1879. Other communities across the
country did not let major news of the lottery's fate pass without missing an opportunity to jab at
Louisiana. "The Legislature of Louisiana has repealed the lottery law," the Daily State Journal
of Springfield, Illinois, proclaimed, "now let it abolish Mardi Gras." The exact particulars of
which group, Democrats or lottery agents, engaged whom were debated back and forth in the
aftermath of the bill’s passage and Zacharie’s explosive revelations. Proponents of the lottery
and partisan Democrats emphasized how Zacharie's ambivalent remarks about the agreement
meant that no firm understanding was reached and therefore no impropriety had occurred. The
Picayune even sent a reporter to Howard's office to get his account of whether or not a deal had
been struck. Howard did not deny that an understanding of mutual support had been reached, but
he insisted that the lottery had not made the first move or initiated an arrangement. According to
Howard, a Democratic operative went to Howard's office and arranged for Howard to meet
"another gentleman at the City Hotel" to discuss a partnership with Democrats. Yet Howard was
tight-lipped about which Democrats were directly involved. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely
that Burke, as chair of the Nicholls gubernatorial campaign responsible for assuring its success
through political maneuverings in Washington, D.C., and later rewarded with the lucrative
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appointment of First District Tax Collector, was not aware or did not approve of the plan.33
Burke’s past associations with Howard and Morris, the outcome of the 1879 state
constitution, and Burke’s ultimate partnership with lottery leaders to acquire a managing stake in
New Orleans newspapers offer compelling evidence that the audacious major was an early part
of Democratic partnerships with the lottery. Five years prior to the contentious lottery debates
among Democrats, Burke and John Fitzpatrick, a fellow machine politician who rose to be the
Democratic boss of the Third Ward, were among members of the Firemen’s Charitable
Association when Howard donated a new fire engine. The christening of the engine took place
during a banquet at Howard’s lavish home. Burke, then in the midst of his successful campaign
for administrator for improvements, was one of the local dignitaries who delivered a laudatory
speech about Howard’s generosity. Howard’s donation of the engine to the F.C.A., which had
strong ties to the Irish and immigrant communities, and Burke’s speech were also politically
strategic. That October, Burke was head of the Democratic and Conservative State Central
Committee’s registration initiatives and highly publicized for actively resisting Kellogg’s
attempts to strike a large portion of naturalized citizens from the rolls. The following May,
Burke was elected to the board of the Louisiana Jockey Club, where he joined Howard and
Morris, both avid horse breeders.34
On April 1, 1879, the day after the lottery's repeal was to have gone into effect, the
Louisiana lottery carried on as usual. The company paid its usual quarterly sum of ten thousand
dollars to Allen Jumel, the state auditor. When he refused the payment, citing that their charter
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had been repealed, Morris and Howard immediately filed suit in the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court.
Lottery lawyers again argued that the legislature did not have authority to violate their corporate
charter and that the repeal violated the company’s vested right to operate until January 1, 1894.
The judge hearing the case was Edward C. Billings, one of the lottery’s former attorneys. The
ever combative Democrat asserted that Howard and the lottery company “own[ed] Billings, body
and boots." The lottery won the injunction and remained in operation during the constitutional
convention that convened on April 21.35
The crafting of a new state constitution in 1879 to replace the Reconstruction era state
constitution of 1868 demonstrated the simultaneous consolidation of Ring power and the
promotion of a New South vision. New Orleans Ring politician and lieutenant-governor Louis
Wiltz was elected president of the convention in a landslide. With five-thousand copies printed
for circulation, the former New Orleans mayor’s acceptance address was delivered as a campaign
speech and foreshadowed his attainment of the governorship in the coming year. Chief among
the machine initiatives enshrined in the new constitution were new and expansive gubernatorial
appointive powers. The new constitution also expanded executive power at the expense of the
state legislature and local authorities. The constitution strengthened machine control by
enfranchising all immigrants in state, parish, and municipal elections who merely expressed an
intent to become citizens. Despite repealing all lotteries earlier in the year, Democrats
compromised on the lottery question. The new constitution established a new twenty-five year
charter for the Louisiana lottery but stripped its guarantee of a monopoly. The legislature was
authorized to grant additional lottery licenses to companies that paid the state at least forty
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thousand dollars per year. Thus, Burke and the machine gambled that the executive mansion and
state house would remain in the hands of enough pro-lottery Democrats to ensure no rival
lotteries received a license.36
Once the lottery’s survival was assured, Burke partnered with Wiltz to oust anti-lottery
officeholders. Governor Nicholls, who came down on the side of those opposed to the lottery
when he signed the repeal bill into law, was their primary target. In the closing days of the
convention, Burke and his allies were instrumental in passing a clause that mandated a new
election of state officials and legislators, including the governor. Burke’s office of state treasurer
was the only exception. Moreover, as testament to Burke’s influence, the convention extended
the major’s term for two more years, under the auspice of correlating the election of treasurer
with other state elections. This gave Burke six consecutive years in the office before standing
for reelection in 1884.37
Yet there where several areas where Democrats found agreement more readily. They
amended the tax code to grant exemptions from state taxes to nearly all manufacturers for ten
years. Government expenditures were cut and the state property tax, which was as high as
twenty mills in 1872, was constitutionally limited to six mills. These measures went a long way
towards ensuring Democratic loyalty among rural whites who were burdened by precipitous
declines in cotton prices. Calls to limit suffrage among blacks and poor whites through such
measures as a poll tax were widely rejected. Whether as tools of manipulation, fear of federal
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oversight, or a genuine belief in democracy, most Louisiana politicians in the decade after
Reconstruction supported voting rights. However, this sentiment did not extend to civil rights
provisions African Americans had won in the 1868 constitution. For example, a statute
forbidding discrimination in public accommodations was removed. Louisiana’s “home rule”
constitution, therefore, foreshadowing the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in a series of 1883 cases
that decisively gutted the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875.38
However, the convention floor witnessed only one part of a two-front campaign that
machine Democrats waged against dissident Democrats. While Burke, Wiltz, Houston,
McEnery, and Fitzpatrick increasingly partnered with Howard and Morris to advance their
interests in the constitutional convention, they also engaged in subterfuge to ensure the party
press in New Orleans did not challenge their rule. A day after the convention closed, Burke and
Howard successfully finished a plot to push out the Democrat’s leadership and take over the
paper for themselves. They did so by turning the poor condition of Louisiana state finances to
their advantage.39
The end of Reconstruction was also the end for the New Orleans Republican, which did
not last long without state patronage. The former production superintendent of that paper, H. W.
Green, was given a job at the Democrat but was soon fired. Green then sought retribution in
December 1878 by alleging that Dupre was wantonly overcharging the state for printing official
documents, a common practice in the Gilded Age. An investigation into the matter exonerated
Dupre and, in the process, Green admitted that he pursued the charges after an outside party
approached him. While it cannot be known for certain, circumstantial evidence links Charles T.
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Howard and the lottery to the underhanded scheme to undermine the Democrat ahead of the
lottery fight at the constitutional convention.40
Foiled in its initial plot, the lottery seized upon the nature of Louisiana politics to destroy
Dupre’s newspaper. During the investigation, it was revealed that the state paid Dupre mostly in
state bonds. The Louisiana attorney general, perhaps due to lottery influence, then delayed even
those payments. Moreover, the state senate, despite no evidence of wrongdoing on Dupre’s part,
stripped the Democrat of its position as state printer. Nicholls, who had a simultaneous personal
falling out with Dupre, subsequently transferred the privilege to George Nicholson of the
Picayune in March 1879. Whether in the midst of a backlog of state payments or as a strategy to
overcome the fact that there would be no future payments after his position as state printer was
revoked, Dupre used forty thousand dollars of state bonds as business collateral for a bank loan.
Shortly thereafter, the ruling of a federal district judge in New Orleans undercut the validity of
such state warrants as those issued to the Democrat. Dupre's lenders then foreclosed on his
property in the spring of 1879 when the bonds fell to ten cents on the dollar. In his last editorial
for the Democrat, Hearsey “bid a journalistic adieu” with his characteristic animosity. “Every
ring, monopoly, and bondholder in the state arrayed themselves against us,” he declared, with the
coup de grace dealt by “an infamous judge” who was the “tool and property of the rings we have
fought.”41
Burke and local ward boss James Houston immediately partnered with lottery president
Charles Howard to purchase the paper. Within months, the federal court reversed its prior
decision on state bonds and New Orleans bankers accepted the Democrat’s scrip, now in the
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hands of Burke and his allies, at full value.42 By the end of 1879, Burke was managing editor of
the Democrat. The means that allowed Burke to begin what would become an internationally
respected career as a journalist is telling. The genuinely beneficial policies he advocated for a
New South were rooted in transnational links that cannot be separated from, indeed were a
product of, the dubious and venal maneuverings that characterized the Gilded Age. In other
words, tangible and legitimate goals and policies on the one hand, and ethical ambiguity on the
other, were not mutually exclusive.
Burke’s duplicity was front and center in an 1879 visitor’s guide to the Crescent City. In
the first advertisement space, Burke did more than proclaim the Democrat as the “organ of the
Louisiana Democracy” that “stood by the pledges of the Democratic Party.” He announced that
his paper was opposed to “all Rings and Monopolies.” Thus, the veteran politico acknowledged
popular disillusionment with machine rule and monopolies such as the lottery. He blamed them,
however, on “Radical [Republican] Legislation” and the “Independent Press.” Identifying the
Democratic party as the only legitimate voice of the people, Burke hoped to channel any reform
attempts through the gauntlet of the party, which he helped stock with men and machinations to
mitigate reform.43
Burke’s direction of the state’s Democratic press proved immediately useful in staving
off a viable threat to Ring rule by a vocal coalition of reformers stung by the fall of Nicholls.
With Wiltz’s deft oversight of the constitutional convention and the ultimate extension of lottery
power, Nicholls, sensing defeat and citing health reasons, removed himself from consideration in
the upcoming election. As his former campaign manager and close confidant during the debates
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over Louisiana’s electoral votes in 1877, Burke’s partnership with Wiltz no doubt was a
particular blow to the former Confederate general. With Nicholls removed, the reform element
of the Democracy turned to Frederick Nash Ogden. Lauded as the leader of the White League
and the hero of the Battle of Liberty Place, Ogden was widely respected. Regular Democratic
hopes for an easy Wiltz victory grew dire when Louisiana congressman E. John Ellis announced
his support for the former White Leaguer.44
Democrats who favored Ogden used the fifth anniversary of the September 14, 1874,
street battle to boost his candidacy. Both the Times and the Picayune drew parallels between
Ogden’s seminal role in defeating the corrupt insiders of Reconstruction and the need to rid the
state of the taint of machine rule. Where once Warmoth and Kellogg took the brunt of abuses,
Ogden’s supporters saw the Ring as aspiring to fill their shoes under the auspices of the
Democratic party. In stump speeches for Ogden, Ellis stirred class and racial divisions. He
sought to mobilize the “poorer class of people” who suffered under the “rapacity and exactions
of Democratic officials.” “Democratic success,” Ellis contended, “brought no relief” from
jobbers and corrupt bargains that had hamstrung average Louisianans. Turning Burke’s
emphasis on economic development on its head, Ellis argued that machine rule kept away
“emigration, capital, [and] enterprise.” Despite campaigning for the former general of the White
League, Ellis endorsed the logic of reformers who pinned excessive “bulldozing,” or political
violence, against black voters in the sugar parishes on New Orleans party men and their Bourbon
planter allies. In so doing, Ellis also courted reformers who disdained the transactional politics
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of party regulars.45
Burke used his editorial pen to counter the Ogden contingent. Recognizing the relatively
unsullied reputation of Ogden, who cleverly did not campaign on his own behalf, Burke focused
the Regular Democratic counterattack on Ellis. Burke tactfully acknowledged Ellis’ stature as a
“prominent” and “distinguished” Democrat, but then emphasized how unfortunate it was that
such a man got carried away with false allegations. According to Burke, a “pruning knife, or
rather . . . the ax of the woodsman” was needed to remove the excessive hyperbole of the
congressman’s statements. More specifically, Burke charged that Ogden and his allies had
“inflam[ed] the Northern mind” against the Louisiana people and had begun to initiate “a panic
among the masses of ignorant negroes.” In an era when most white politicians used racial
anxieties as political posturing, Burke argued that Ogden’s previous White League campaign “to
establish an out-and-out white man’s government” would needlessly reopen racial strife and
invite federal intervention. That Burke had served as Ogden’s aide during the Battle of Liberty
Place was not mentioned.46
Where Ellis questioned the character and morality of Wiltz and Ring men, Burke cleverly
did the opposite. His paper printed interviews with notable personalities and leaders in New
Orleans who explained their endorsement of Wiltz. Some interviews featured men with strong
ties to the city’s immigrant communities and labor unions, such as future mayor William J.
Behan, as a means of mobilizing the machine’s base. In this respect, Burke took advantage of
the Democrat’s role as the party’s official paper, as its editorials and interviews were commonly
reprinted in the city’s ethnic newspapers, such as the German-language Deutsche Zeitung.
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Through these interviews, Burke emphasized that Ogden was no doubt “an honest merchant, a
good citizen, and a brave soldier . . . but honesty and bravery, priceless jewels though they be, do
not suffice for government.” When it came to experience in administering the levers of
government, the Regular Democracy was the natural choice.47
Burke’s campaign skills and the Ring’s firm grip on the party apparatus proved decisive
when the Democratic convention convened in October. Wiltz was nominated and newspapers
that had previously championed Ogden fell into line by dropping any mention of an independent
reform ticket. The Republican candidate was Taylor Beattie, a judge, sugar planter, and lillywhite scalawag. Democratic legwork was already complete when Louisianans went to the polls
on December 3, 1879. The new constitution and the Democracy’s slate of candidates were
endorsed handily. As a new decade dawned, Burke and the Ring were firmly in control.48
Indeed, Burke was reaping the rewards of membership in the political ruling class.
According to the 1880 census, he resided in the Democratic stronghold of the Third Ward at 235
Camp Street, which was five blocks west of the river and two blocks south of Canal Street, the
main thoroughfare of the city. Thus, Burke lived in the heart of the financial and commercial
sector. Government salaries and patronage politics allowed the major to afford a large
household. It included his wife Susan, sister-in-law Laura, eighteen-year-old stepson W. M.
Montgomery, seven-year-old son Lindsay, two young female servants of Irish descent (Katie
Farril, age twenty-four, and her sixteen-year-old sister, Louise), and a sixty-eight year old
mulatto servant, Charlotte Page.49
Yet Burke’s rapid acquisition of wealth and power brought inveterate enemies. Chief
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among them was the indomitable James Hearsey. While Burke and Hearsey did not share many
views, other than a hostility to radical Republicans, each man had a potent mix of dogged
persistence and pugnacity. After he was forced out of the Democrat, Hearsey wasted no time in
forming another paper, the Daily States, which first appeared on January 3, 1880. Through its
columns, he continued his attacks on Burke, the lottery, and the Ring. By then, Burke’s
Democrat was the official journal of the state of Louisiana, which was a particular sore spot for
the recently ousted Hearsey. In only a matter of weeks, both papers accused the other of
routinely lying. Hearsey’s temper and Burke’s resoluteness were then transformed from a war of
words to the code duello. Hearsey challenged Burke to a duel, which he promptly accepted.
When negotiations by their seconds failed, the editors met on the field of honor on the afternoon
of January 27 at Metairie Ridge. Burke, “dressed with care, wore a glove on his left hand, a pink
[flower] in his button-hole,” and appeared “very cool and collected . . . [with] no sign of
nervousness.” After stepping off ten paces beneath the shade of a large live oak tree, both
missed their shots with smoothbore dueling pistols. Hearsey then demanded an apology to end
the affair. Burke refused. After loading another round, the second volleys missed as well. A
parley by their seconds ensued, with Burke also acknowledging that Hearsey was “a gentlemen
of honor and courage.” When Hearsey then declared that he had satisfaction, “the principles
advanced toward each other and shook hands.”50
Burke and Ring allies acquired another newspaper, the New Orleans Times, shortly
thereafter, and by 1882 merged his papers to form the Times-Democrat. His consolidation and
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editorship of the Times-Democrat gave him such a powerful voice in the state that, according to
one historian, “few men dared cross him.”51 Samuel D. McEnery, the successor to Governor
Wiltz after his untimely death in 1881, was obsequious to the Ring to such an extent that
opponents dubbed him “McLottery.” One Louisiana congressmen noted that McEnery had “sold
himself body and breeches to Burke.”52 As in most Gilded Age political machines, machine
bosses preferred to place pliable men in the governor's mansion rather than seek the office
themselves. None other than Jefferson Davis, who on more than one occasion met with Burke
on trips to New Orleans from his residency at Beauvoir, approved of the editor’s New South
leadership. The former Confederate president demonstrated his faith in the former Confederate
major when Davis recommended a personal friend as an “honest and capable Democrat,” well
qualified for a job in Burke’s newspaper.53
The Times-Democrat had become the leading New Orleans newspaper by the mid-1880s.
It boasted a daily distribution of roughly 17,000 copies and between 105,000 and 122,000 copies
per week. The Daily Picayune, Burke’s closest competitor, distributed 10,000 to 12,000 copies a
day and between 70,000 and 87,000 each week. In a nationwide directory of American
newspapers, Burke purchased the leading advertising space to proclaim the Times-Democrat as
the “great representative journal of the New South.” Listing an agent in New York City, the ad
targeted “enterprising merchants and manufacturers who desire their names known in every
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Southern city.”54
The first edition of the consolidated Times-Democrat set the tone for Burke’s message.
“We this day inaugurate the effort to make the Times-Democrat the organ and exponent of
Southern progress, industry, commerce, and civilization,” he announced. “We claim as our
peculiar territory the great cotton states of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas,
Western Florida, Southern Tennessee, Mexico and Central America.”55 With still grander
bravado, Burke declared a new manifesto. It was time for the South, and New Orleans
specifically, to become the wellspring for capitalistic ventures throughout the Americas:
The fierce conflict attendant upon the tremendous revolution of 1861-5 had spent their
fury, and a great people, impoverished by war . . . were gathering together the scattered
remnants of their manhood and their courage . . . The stagnation of despair has, by some
magic transformation, given place to the buoyancy of new hope, of courage, of resolve . .
. We are a new people. Our land has had a new birth.56
He effectively used his paper as a New South oracle to tout the merits of Louisiana’s
Democratic party while also promoting the economic advancement of the Crescent City as a
commercial and manufacturing hub at the epicenter of trade in the Western hemisphere.57
Indicative of his transnational New South vision, Burke believed increased commercial ties with
the Americas was of such importance that he established a Latin American department within the
Times-Democrat. Burke selected E. A. Lever, a colonel under Benito Juárez in the Mexican
forces against Maximilian’s French army in the 1860s, to head the department from Mexico.58
Burke likewise sent correspondents to the tropics of Central America in hopes of stimulating
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southern industry and fostering commercial links with the Americas.59
Unlike the ersatz invasions of antebellum filibusters, who sought political control,
Burke’s New South endorsed the late nineteenth-century Western coupling of commercial
imperialism and progress. Assurances where given in the Times-Democrat that American
interests in Mexico, for example, were not akin to the territorial desires of the MexicanAmerican War or the filibusters of prior decades. Commercial ties would not only spread
progress and profits to Mexico, but also “leave no place for distrust or for the spirit of aggression
and conquest on either hand.”60
Shortly after forming the Times-Democrat, Burke’s paper had no shortage of noteworthy
events to educate its readers about the benefits of Latin American and southern ties. Chief
among them was a visit by Guatemalan president Justo Rufino Barrios, the man who inaugurated
Liberal rule in Central America. While en route to Washington, Barrios stayed in the Crescent
City in July 1882. Burke was among Louisiana dignitaries who joined the city of New Orleans
in hosting a banquet in the Guatemalan’s honor at the Spanish Fort, an elegant resort and
entertainment complex on Lake Pontchartrain. The Times-Democrat described Barrios as a “fair
type of the present Latin American Liberals,” “a man of extraordinary ability,” whose “liberal
policy” of government sponsorship of telegraph, railroad, and educational developments had
“rendered his country happy and prosperous.”61
Mirroring the Mississippi Valley Convention of 1869, New Orleans leaders such as
Burke sought other ways to capitalize on their geopolitical advantages. The New Orleans press
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sought to make the Crescent City the entrepôt of a growing trade with Latin America, rather than
with Europe, as markets for the crops and goods from the Mississippi River valley and the West.
To accomplish this end, Louisianans routinely attempted to acquire congressional subsidies for a
steamship line linking New Orleans and Latin America.62
Burke even backed an expedition that explored the resources of the South’s own untamed
tropical landscape, south Florida. New Orleans businessmen had long sought to increase their
steamship and railroad ties to Florida, which they dubbed “the pathway to the tropics.” The most
sparsely settled and undeveloped state in the Gulf South was in the midst of a revival in the
national consciousness as regarded its prospects for travel, commerce, and tourism. Burke
endeavored to realize the vision of “reciprocal trade with Cuba, St. Domingo, and their
dependent islands” espoused by boosters since the late 1860s. The choice of Major Archie P.
Williams to lead a Times-Democrat’s expedition through the Florida everglades reflected
Burke’s personal connections. Williams had been a lieutenant under Burke during the Civil War
and, like Burke, rose to social and political prominence as a member of New Orleans Southern
Yacht club while also holding various parish offices as an active Democrat.63
More specifically, Burke tapped into longstanding dreams of New Orleans political and
financial leaders to partner with Gulf South neighbors in building a transportation network by sea
and land from Texas to Florida to counter the increasingly dominant traders in Chicago and New
York. Southerners in the Lower Mississippi valley and Gulf South sold their plan in two ways.
According to these New South zealots, a Gulf South route to ship grains and other goods directly
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to Europe was a third cheaper than going by way of New York. They also sought to capitalize
on the commercial advantages of the Gulf South’s geography by promoting the circumCaribbean and Latin America as lands of all but incalculable value for southern markets and
trade. They insisted that the results of such trade would “principally fall to the profit of New
Orleans,” which Debow’s Review in 1869 considered to be “the great depot and entrepôt of the
Gulf and South Seas.”64
The most vocal critic of this New South vision and Ring rule, Henry Hearsey, continued
to oppose such schemes. In the winter of 1880, Hearsey’s Daily States called for an entrenched
position against any form of invading Yankee influence. Appomattox might have ended military
rebellion and an independent Confederacy, “but the war against every form of imperialism,
centralism and nationalism was never abandoned.” Hearsey cried, “Not even railroads,
telegraphs and telephones will reconcile us to reproduction on this continent of the Roman
Empire.” Less than a month later, Hearsey seized on Ulysses S. Grant’s visit to New Orleans as
an opportunity to focus his vitriol. He urged New Orleanians to remember the specter of
Confederate defeat and Republican rule and to jeer the former president. In January 1881,
however, even the recalcitrant Hearsey was forced to admit that the city needed outside capital to
stimulate its truncated banking institutions and slow-growing industries.65
Nor was the Picayune above criticizing such men as Burke who sought outside capital.
The press declared ostentatiously a year after Democrats regained state control that Louisiana
could “save herself, and stand alone, without a dollar of capital from other states.” The Picayune
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contended that “self-reliance and action more than . . . foreign capital” was needed. Such
opinions proved erroneous. A few years later, Louisiana investors failed to raise six-hundredthousand dollars to build a long-anticipated rail link to Marshall, Texas, one-hundred-and-fifteen
miles away. Indeed, hopes that the Mississippi River might again become commercially mighty
were bolstered in 1879 when James B. Eads completed his state-sponsored construction of jetties
at the mouth of the river, thus allowing access to oceangoing commercial steamers. One
editorialist outside New Orleans believed that Eads’ work would in time transform the city into
“the most eligible port in the world.” When newspapers in Cincinnati and Memphis doubted
whether the jetties significantly facilitated large vessels, Burke’s paper printed verified accounts
of steamers that drew twenty-five-plus feet of water, thus offering proof that further attempts to
“belittle the jetties” would be “ridiculous.”66
The coalition of Regular Democrats also took successful steps to accomplish the
previously failed rail connections to Texas. In 1881, Jay Gould connected the city’s railways to
its Texas neighbor and beyond when he established New Orleans as a hub in his consolidated
Southwest rail system. Yet New Orleans discovered that the economic ground they had lost was
too significant to regain against merchants and lines whose commercial connections had become
firmly entrenched. Burke’s coalition continued to oversee a total of five railroad lines that had
been completed by the end of the 1880s, and that made New Orleans a hub of trade with other
portions of the country. The return of the tobacco trade was among the many hoped for results
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of these two initiatives. City boosters argued that the environment of the circum-Caribbean gave
tobacco a “great benefit . . . passing through our mild and moist climate.”67
The completion of the New Orleans Pacific Railroad during the 1880s typified the mixed
benefits of the iron horse in the postbellum South. It opened up market opportunities for
backcountry parishes, but also pulled them into the sinkhole of cotton production, crop-lien
financing, and low crop prices. Burke’s New South vision was a strategy many hoped would
alleviate stagnant cotton prices caused by overproduction. Increasing steamship routes and
commercial ties with Latin America, small farmers in Louisiana’s interior were told to believe,
would increase the demand and markets for southern cotton, thus allowing for a profitable price
above ten cents a pound. While control of the party apparatus has been an acknowledged reason
for the lack of a viable agrarian political revolt in the 1880s, the optimistic forecast of New South
Democratic boosters contributed to rural white loyalty and delayed significant independent
organizations until the late 1880s.68
New South boosters confronted environmental obstacles as well. The specter of
contagious disease in the Gulf South and Mississippi valley caused some northern businessmen
to avoid investing in New Orleans well into the late nineteenth century. The yellow fever
epidemic of 1878 was among the worst medical disasters in U.S. history and darkened
perceptions of New Orleans’ commercial suitability for a long time thereafter. The modern
phenomenon of diseases spreading through global travel and trade was realized in the 1878
yellow fever epidemic when steamboats and railroads spread its infectious web faster and wider
than ever before. Once the disease had spread beyond the Crescent City, railroads cut access into
and out of the city, and other ports often quarantined New Orleans vessels. Previous resistance
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by some southerners to Republican-led efforts to pave the streets, build sewers, and improve the
water supply had the unintended consequence of adversely affecting the city’s public health
infrastructure. In June 1879, a prominent northerner linked “home rule” policies to poor health
conditions when he remarked, the “fanaticism which has grown out of the war and politics has
put a stop to the Northern man going down to New Orleans.” The city, according to his view,
was “delivered over to yellow fever . . . and folly.”69
Gilded Age misconceptions of health and the environment aided such city boosters as
Burke who sought heavy industries. Not only was smoke itself a mark of pride and progress,
industrialization and factories were seen by some people as aiding public health. The smoke
they produced was credited with combating what contemporary’s labeled miasma, the foul air
from wetlands that they believed led to malaria and yellow fever.70
Burke and ambitious-minded businessmen began the new year of 1883 by telling
conservative cotton-minded stalwarts that their lackluster and backward-looking goals were
failing. The Times-Democrat juxtaposed the Crescent City at its commercial height in 1860 with
the continual obstacles of a postbellum economic climate. The newspaper emphasized that while
the yearly cotton harvests of the early 1880s had increased to six million bales from the
3,200,000 harvested in 1860, New Orleans’s role in the trade had declined. It dropped from
handling 69% of the cotton trade in 1860 to just 23% in 1883. Tobacco in New Orleans had
similarly declined from 78,000 hogshead annually to under 10,000, despite rising national
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productivity. However, it was not just agricultural exports that experienced a precipitous drop
off: imports arriving in New Orleans fell from antebellum heights by more than tenfold.71
St. Louis was quick after the Civil War to adopt the method of dispatching commercial
agents, called “drummers.” Over twelve-hundred agents flooded portions of the Mississippi
River valley previously dominated by New Orleans merchants. Burke recognized the severity of
the problem and chided New Orleans merchants for their pride and refusal to adapt to changing
circumstances. “St. Louis merchants are not too aristocratic to touch even a five-dollar order if
they can see their way to getting paid,” the Times-Democrat bemoaned, “and that fact accounts
for the general prevalence of the St. Louis drummer within hearing of the Crescent City’s
peaceful snore.” Whether it was selling groceries or dry goods, “Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi,
and Louisiana swarm with St. Louis drummers, working the very lines of merchandise in which
New Orleans ought to take precedence.”72 The Gateway to the West also targeted the prime
economic stronghold of its downriver neighbors, the cotton trade. St. Louis boosters in the
1870s raised funds and invested heavily in building some of the largest and most advanced
cotton compresses in the country. Their bold incursion into the New Orleans cotton market paid
off in the 1880s. At the beginning of the decade, St. Louis processed nearly a half million bales
and became America’s third largest cotton market. No wonder, then, that Burke’s paper struck a
tone of righteous indignation as it lamented that St. Louis was “encroaching very seriously upon
New Orleans trade – trade which geographically, morally and sentimentally ought to be ours
under all circumstances.”73
Increasing Louisiana’s manufacturing capacity by connecting to Gould’s southwestern
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rail system and encouraging large steamship vessels, were tangible strategies Burke pursued as a
means of adapting to new economic realities caused by the rise of railroads and increased
competition for agricultural sales. Cutting into trade with Latin America overlapped with all
these initiatives. Burke’s paper highlighted opportunities for New Orleanians to seize on
Britain’s declining control of trade with Mexico, Central America, and South America. “Our
transatlantic cousins,” Burke reported, were concerned that Americans were “gradually, but very
decidedly” overtaking Britain’s lion’s share of “intertropical commerce.” Over the course of the
late 1870s and early 1880s, U. S. exports to Mexico, in particular, had increased at the expense
of British trade. Reprinting a report from a British agent in Latin America, Burke’s Democrat
stated that “firearms and military artillery, cheap timepieces, sewing machines . . . light
manufacturing machinery, [and] agricultural implements” were the exports Latin Americans
most readily purchased from the United States. Therefore, Burke stressed that fostering southern
industry and manufacturing, not merely reviving the Crescent City’s control of agricultural
exports, was paramount. These efforts were needed promptly, too, the Democrat warned,
because the French and Germans were also poised to overtake British trade.74
With “home rule” achieved and Regular Democrats consolidating their power, Burke’s
New South vision supported a vibrant homage to the Old South. In the postbellum era, New
Orleans, which voted overwhelmingly for the Constitutional Unionist presidential candidate in
1860, shed its tradition as a city that was lukewarm to secession and war. In 1883, fifteen
thousand people bought tickets to see veterans from the Army of Northern Virginia and the
Army of Tennessee partner with the Grand Army of the Republic to stage a Civil War
reenactment at the New Orleans fairgrounds to benefit a Louisiana Confederate soldier’s home.
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With no less than twelve thousand residents born in former Confederate states other than
Louisiana, Fitzhugh Lee remarked that New Orleans in the 1880s had become the “headquarters
for Confederate sentiment, feeling, and action.”75 Yet New Orleans also had a long history as a
magnet for internal migrants from the North and West. The Crescent City in the Civil War era
had more people from New York and Pennsylvania than any state below the Mason-Dixon line,
excluding Louisiana.76 The New South, like the Lost Cause, was a way to unite and reconcile a
city and state when their extreme diversity made community identity difficult. Both were means
by which southerners could achieve national reconciliation on their own terms, but in a way that
was good for business. Burke and New South boosters were leaders who realized that, as
historian Michael Ross has concluded “When it came to luring capital it was the public face that
mattered.” Moreover, New South zealots sought to use the Lost Cause as a salve for the pains of
a changing society. “The deeper the involvements in commitments to the New Order,” C. Vann
Woodward declared, “the louder the protests of loyalty to the Old”77
The New South and the Lost Cause became conscious attempts by Regular Democrats to
combat threats to their control whether from such rural groups as the Grange and Farmers
Alliance or from urban elites bent on reform.78 New South advocates countered their influence
by either making common cause with agrarian radicals or by trying to appropriate their strength.
One strategy used by some vocal leaders for regaining New Orleans’s economic supremacy was
to paint the city’s use of water trade as inherently more egalitarian than the monopolistic
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tendencies of railroads, thus appealing to the Jeffersonian agrarianism of the growing Granger
and Farmers Alliance movements. The Mississippi, the Picayune proclaimed, was a “natural
channel . . . a thoroughfare which cannot possibly become a monopoly” while transportation via
iron horses represented “the artificial and more expensive lateral routes to the Atlantic
seaboard.79
The control the Democratic party apparatus had over elections extended into country
parishes. Rural whites criticized machine control of the convention system for selecting
candidates. Whereas Orleans Parish was subdivided into wards, rural delegates were selected to
parish conventions from meetings in local townships, communities, or even militia districts.
Parish conventions would then nominate candidates for local office and elect members to serve
in larger conventions for congressional or state office. Politicking arose, however, since party
insiders often held Democratic community meetings at inconvenient times and locations or
provided little public notification of the meeting.
Driving white rural angst with seeming party apathy was an increasingly dire economic
situation. Louisiana farmers reckoned cotton needed a market price above ten cents a pound to
provide a small farmer with sufficient profits. In 1878, cotton prices fell below that marker and
would only hit ten cents or more for two years in the rest of the century.80
While some districts did away with these layered local communal meetings, parish-wide
meetings were often easier to control for party regulars. Mass parish meetings were invariably
held at the parish seat, which often required greater time and travel for isolated farmers. Towns
that were parish seats often had rail depots and were home to mercantile interests, planters, and
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the local partisan press, all of whom favored the maintenance of Regular Democratic control and
who exerted disproportionate influence over parish delegates sent to state conventions.
Primaries were often seen as a measure of democratic reform, but they did not fully overtake the
convention system until the early twentieth century. Even then, professional politicians could
manipulate primary elections with as much, if not more, skullduggery than in general elections.
No wonder that the leading scholar of Louisiana populism has concluded that “in no other postReconstruction state did planters so effectively dominate the political process.”81
Whether through the ward politics of New Orleans or rural parishes, the convention
system gave Democratic operatives incentives to mobilize voters, suppress opponents, and
manipulate the returns. The number of delegates at nominating meetings was determined by the
number of Democratic ballots a particular parish cast in the previous election. This allowed
planters in such black belt parishes as Tensas, Madison, and Concordia and urban ward bosses to
ensure that reform candidates and policies were defeated. Nonetheless, the large number of
business professionals and laborers in New Orleans meant that threats to party orthodoxy were
more frequent and viable in the city than the countryside. If reform from within Democratic
ranks was challenging, race baiting and sectional loyalties doomed the long term chances of
independent tickets and third parties.82
Political and economic structures in rural areas were a bastion of strength for Democratic
party control. Unlike the norm for states below the Mason-Dixon line, where most sharecroppers
were white, over seventy percent of Louisiana sharecroppers were African American. The
economic vulnerability of cotton sharecroppers was a primary tool of social control and political

81
82

Hyman, The Anti-Redeemers, 48-50; Barnes, The Louisiana Populist Movement, 128.
Barnes, The Louisiana Populist Movement, 128.

102

suppression. Merchants and landowners threatened to reduce or eliminate crop-lien loans if
sharecroppers acted contrary to their dictates.83
In Louisiana, however, cotton was not the undisputed king (See Appendix C). Sugar was
the overwhelming cash crop in eleven parishes in the postbellum era, meaning sugar reigned in
nearly a quarter of the state. Sugar plantations were much more capital intensive than cotton. A
moderate-sized sugar plantation equipped with refining equipment cost roughly two-hundredthousand dollars in the mid-1880s. Moreover, sugar laborers were overwhelmingly African
American. Unlike cotton sharecroppers or tenant farmers, laborers on sugar plantations worked
in gang labor under close supervision and received a low monthly wage that was often paid in
scrip good only at the plantation store. The distinct challenges facing cotton and sugar workers
made agrarian political mobilization even more difficult in Louisiana than elsewhere. The
cotton-oriented Farmers Alliance, for example, made a negligible impact on Louisiana’s sugar
parishes.84 Another factor was that environmental geography fashioned a close bond between
sugar planters and New Orleans politicians and businessmen. The Crescent City was within the
sugar region of south and southeastern Louisiana, which facilitated frequent social visits,
ownership of city homes, and “a stronger cosmopolitan outlook and commercial ethos” than
among most other southern landowners.85
African American resistance to Democratic rule, and the renewed strength it gave to
sugar planters within the party’s coalition, was immediate. While intimidation and fraud
suppressed the rural black vote, planters nonetheless recognized the level of black resolve to
exercise their political rights. Black workers feared that Democratic rule would bring back
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tactics used in the black codes allowed under President Johnson. Vagrancy laws, anti-enticement
clauses, and contract-enforcement statutes were particularly prominent legal means used to exert
white control. “The negroes quit the plantation to attend clubs,” a planter from the blackmajority parish of Ascension lamented, and “go in a body to election meeting[s].” Despite real
threats to their safety, more than a few African Americans voted against Democratic interests
even when planters monitored the polls. Moreover, African American workers commonly
convinced sugar planters to accommodate black political activity and delay intricate refining
operations until after elections.86
Democratic policies in New Orleans also confronted strident resistance from black
Louisianans. At its height in the antebellum era, more free blacks called the Crescent City home
than Charleston, Richmond, Mobile, and Savannah combined.87 An increasing number of those
who felt the decline in political participation voted with their feet to leave the state for Texas,
Arkansas, or, most famously, Kansas. Black migration reached a crescendo in 1879. That year
New Orleans was the site of a sizeable convention of African Americans, where debates over an
exodus to Kansas were central. George T. Ruby, a leading black Republican from Texas, spoke
to many rural and urban blacks in Louisiana who felt a haunting fear “in the turbulent parishes.”
“The horrid form of peonage” was the “avowed disposition of the men now in power,” Ruby
declared, as white politicians and businessmen sought to “reduce the laborer and his interests to
the minimum of advantages as freemen, and to absolutely none as a citizen.”88 Louisiana’s most
prominent black politician, Pinckney B. S. Pinchback, addressed the convention and tied their
fears to specific Democratic policies within the state. The former Republican governor laid the
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blame on Democrats who left African Americans “starving . . . swindled . . . and afraid of the
[upcoming Democratic-led] Constitutional Convention.” Black Louisianans from New Orleans
and its environs were among the ranks of Mississippi valley African Americans who migrated
first to St. Louis and from there to Kansas.89
African American distrust of Louisiana Democrats was well placed. Following the
adoption of the “home rule” constitution, people of color throughout the state immediately
mobilized to retain their political and economic freedoms gained during Reconstruction.
Indicative of the movement was a large-scale black sugar workers strike in 1880 over poor pay,
deplorable conditions, and lack of control over their own labor. Regular Democrats responded
immediately. Where Kellogg had only haltingly dispatched the state militia during the previous
sugar strike of 1874, Wiltz wasted no time in deploying the militia. Machine politics in New
Orleans dictated respect for labor concerns among dockworkers. Rural black workers toiling in
the cane fields was a different matter entirely.90
In the Crescent City, the Regular Democracy’s alliance with the lottery was a bulwark.
Indeed, the strength of lottery power and Ring rule were one and the same, and both were at their
height in the decade after Reconstruction. The lottery also furthered fulsome ties between the
Lost Cause and New South, as Pierre G.T. Beauregard and Jubal Early presided over the crucial
source of Democratic power through their sponsorship of the main lottery drawings. By 1888,
the lottery’s monthly prizes were equal to the semi-annual prizes of 1878. With over one hundred
“policy,” or ticket, shops and roughly three hundred ticket agents in 1880s New Orleans, vendors
selling lottery tickets could be found throughout the city but were especially prevalent next to
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cafés, saloons, and public markets. The lottery licensed each policy shop to a particular ward
boss or other politician. Agents and runners working for a shop received a commission of as
much as fifteen percent on each ticket sold (See Appendix D). The amount kicked back to the
ward boss is speculation, but it was by all accounts significant. For daily drawings, a customer
would purchase a numbered “policy,” which allowed customers to pick their own numbers.
Gross income from receipts in each shop fluctuated from sixty to five-hundred dollars a day.
Employing toughs or dispatching police to enforce Democratic or lottery interests were, if not
overlapping, impossible to distinguish. Likewise, the lottery’s prevalence in working-class and
immigrant communities provided a means for the Democratic machine’s mobilization.
Recording the names of ticket purchases created a ready-made “database” of voters. Having
established branch offices throughout Louisiana as early as 1870, the lottery was also an
important means of extending and maintaining Ring influence in all areas of the state.91
The lottery devised professionally organized and hierarchical procedures to manage its
business, from the individuals purchasing tickets to the dispersal of winnings. Unlike
prostitution or other illicit vices, the legality of the lottery ensured that no opaque signals,
passwords, or written ciphers were needed. A customer would enter a branch office or contact a
lottery vendor, select the drawing he would like to enter, buy a ticket or policy, receive a receipt,
and wait less than twenty-four hours after the drawing for word to arrive via telegraph. A lottery
agent recorded the ticket numbers, amounts of the payments, and names of each player in a
"book of plays," the Gilded Age trade term for a sales certificate. Alternatively, customers could
mail payments and specifications to the New Orleans home office. Forty-five minutes before the
drawing in New Orleans, branch managers throughout the state would close their office, and
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stamp a wax seal that enclosed a heavy envelope containing their branch’s "book of plays." The
branch agent would then deliver the envelope to a securities company, which would place it in a
safe and mail it by package steamer to the lottery’s secure carrier service in New Orleans, Pike,
Brother & Co. After the drawing, lottery agents in the home office would then compile a report
of the winning tickets and send it via package steamer to each branch office. The lucky few
would present the company with their receipt of purchase and collect their winnings. 92
On the whole, the Louisiana lottery did most of its business outside the state. In so doing,
it capitalized on one of the most iconic of American institutions. “The mail, like tendrils of a
poisonous vine,” asserts a historian of the intersection between the postal service and moral
reform, “spread the temptations of a lottery throughout America.” At the zenith of Ring and
lottery power in the 1880s, the lottery operated in the vast majority of states and territories
throughout the country, even Hawaii. At least one clandestine printing press was maintained in
New England to ensure the ubiquitous presence of Louisiana lottery tickets in lucrative
Mid-Atlantic cities. Lottery advertisements and winners were found in papers from coast to
coast. Thus, the power of Ring Democrats was furthered not just by city and state networks, but
also by the contributions of gamblers in nearly every state in the union.93
The lottery and Ring rule led many people to bemoan what they saw as the moral decay
of the late nineteenth century in Louisiana. The masthead of northern liberalism, The Nation,
linked the pernicious effects of the lottery to the already well-known tradition of Louisiana’s
alcohol consumption. With only half the population of Texas but seventy percent more liquor
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dealers in the state, the paper linked alcoholism as key to the “demoralizing effects of the lottery
system” that “extend[ed] its ramifications into the liquor business.” After also blaming illiteracy
on the lottery, no wonder the liberal newspaper thought Louisiana as a whole was “retrograding
in all that makes a community civilized.” Their solution: “overthrow the ring.”94
The immigrant and ethnic population of New Orleans was also central to the Ring’s
electoral success. On the whole, New Orleans in the late nineteenth century was unique in
relation to other cities with a significant proportion of immigrants. The Italian population had its
roots in the antebellum era, with the Societa Mutua Benevolenza Italiana, the city’s first Italian
benevolent society, founded in 1846. Italian immigration was climbing in the 1880s, when the
fifteen to twenty thousand who lived in New Orleans comprised roughly eight percent of the
city’s population. The press and public of New Orleans was unique in the nation in viewing
Italians as hard-working, honest, and capable citizens, rather than crime-prone vermin and akin
to the Chinese in their unassimilation. For example, a Times-Democrat article, “From Sunny
Italy, Arrival of a Shipload of Immigrants,” avoided demeaning caricatures of Italians and
presented them as economically necessary laborers who were industrious and upwardly mobile.
The timing of the article, published in mid-October 1888, suggests that Burke made calculated
attempts to court immigrant votes ahead of an election. New Orleanians lavished particular
praise on the Italian population for establishing a vibrant Sicilian citrus trade.95
Adding to New Orleans’s distinctiveness was the fact that ninety percent of its Italian
immigrants were Sicilians, significantly higher than the twenty-five percent of Sicilians among
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Italian immigrants throughout the country. Immigrant support for the Ring was strengthened by
a relatively high degree of ethnic mixing that fostered stronger commercial and political ties with
the native-born in New Orleans than was found among the immigrant enclaves of many northern
cities. The lack of tenements in the Crescent City ensured that racial and ethnic populations
were dispersed and overlapping. Moreover, Catholicism had an established history of respect in
New Orleans, perhaps more than in any other major city in the United States, which further
facilitated positive views of immigrants. As historian Terry Golway has shown in regards to
Tammany Hall, immigrants, especially those from Ireland and Italy, were not hapless tools of
political machines. Immigrant communities retained a “political and cultural framework,”
stemming from marginalization in their homelands, which complemented the brokerage politics
of urban machines. They viewed politics as a battle of self-interested groups, not a dispassionate
debate for the common good.96
Regular Democratic, pro-immigrant policies drew support from beyond the Ring’s
municipal machine. The Richland Beacon of northern Louisiana, the Louisiana Democrat based
in Alexandria, and the Weekly Messenger of the southern parish of St. Martinville also
encouraged European, including Italian, immigration. Indeed, long held beliefs about
nationwide hostility towards Italians in the 1880s have been demonstrated by recent scholars to
be a largely northern-based phenomenon. Most in New Orleans had already rejected a
“transatlantic narrative of Irish degeneracy” that was common in New York and London. 97 AntiItalian rhetoric mirroring that which was common from New York and Washington, D.C., to
Chicago and San Francisco did not occur until after the highly publicized murder of New
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Orleans Police Chief David Hennessy in 1890. Anti-Italian sentiment was not so much the cause
of the lynching of eleven Italians that followed, one of the single largest such episodes in
American history, as it was justification for the public violence meted out to Italians. 98
That said, not all immigrants were on board with the Democratic machine. Immigrants
and laborers in the Ninth Ward formed an “Honest Man’s Ticket” in 1880. Rallying voters
“tired of the rule of Corrupt Men,” they used the slogan “No Dudenhefer in Mine" in an effort to
send delegates to the state central committee who opposed the rule of their local boss, Ferdinand
Dudenhefer. Part of the resistance to the Ring within foreign-born communities was due to its
close association with the lottery, which made significant inroads within immigrant
neighborhoods and businesses.99
Nonetheless, the Crescent City’s social and economic progress, along with Burke’s
political achievements and management of the Times-Democrat, garnered significant nationwide
praise, including from the Mississippi valley’s most famous native son, Mark Twain. The
prolific writer offered valuable social commentary on New Orleans in the 1880s by praising the
city for its “progressive men” who were “thinking, sagacious, [and] long-headed.” After
detailing the city’s sanitary improvements, ubiquitous electric lights, and increased commerce,
Twain noted that “one of the most notable advances” was in journalism. Writing in 1883, with
the Times-Democrat in print for just over a year, Twain remarked that the press of New Orleans
had become “a striking feature” of city life. The reasons for such a revolution in the quality of
the city’s newspapers, according to Twain, was their financial budget and quality of
management: “Money is spent upon them with a free hand . . . the editorial work is not hack-
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grinding, but literature.” If the famous author did not mention Burke specifically, he did praise
the Times-Democrat as “an example of New Orleans journalistic achievement” and as a leading
New South oracle. Twain was impressed by the amount of news in each issue and its extensive
coverage of the “business of the towns of the Mississippi valley” that encompassed “two
thousand miles” from the mouth of the river to Minnesota.100
Burke’s guidance of the Times-Democrat to national prominence was also recognized in
1886 by William Hosea Ballou of The Journalist, the country’s leading trade journal for
members of the press. The major was the subject of a three-page cover story that detailed his
path to becoming one of the nation’s premiere newspapermen. The Journalist recognized that
the inseparable relationship between Burke’s politics and his editorship of the Times-Democrat
went beyond the paper’s official status as the organ of the Louisiana Democracy so that his
transnational New South vision was the sine qua non for each. Ballou spoke of Burke’s New
South boosterism when he credited the major’s unsurpassed efforts to facilitate the “growth,
development and progress of New Orleans as a great commercial and manufacturing city” while
also furthering the “advancement of the interests of the Southern states” as a whole. In
highlighting the Times-Democrat’s Latin American Department, Ballou recognized that Burke’s
creed was not confined by regional or even national boundaries, but possessed a fundamental
focus on commercial ties with the Americas. Burke’s vocal advocacy of industrialism no doubt
fueled national notoriety as an “enthusiastic and devoted champion of the South’s progress,” yet
it was the major’s international worldview that garnered the highest of praise. Ballou proclaimed
that Burke’s “breadth of mind” was only “equaled by that of Horace Greeley, and the enterprise
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of his paper by that of the New York Herald.”101
Burke’s journalistic endeavors also mobilized the Latino community in New Orleans. In
1888, Spanish-born José Antonio Fernandez de Trava, one of the Crescent City’s most
prominent businessmen dealing with Latin America and the first professor of Spanish at Tulane,
established the weekly Spanish-language newspaper El Moro de Paz. Along with the city’s
other Spanish publications, such as Revista Mercantil de Nueva Orleans and El Observador
Ibero, its goal of increasing the “commercial, agricultural, and manufacturing interests of
Louisiana and Spanish America” echoed that of Burke’s newspaper and furthered the ties
between New Orleans and the circum-Caribbean within Spanish-speaking communities.
Fernandez de Trava shared Burke’s interests in other ways as well. He had been an active
Louisiana lottery agent since its beginning in 1868, hired to take an active part within the city’s
Hispanic community to curtail the influence of the Havana lottery.102
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Chapter Three: The Crescent City on a Global Stage: The 1884 New Orleans World’s Industrial
and Cotton Centennial Exposition
December 16, 1884, dawned with bright skies and fervor. Fifty thousand people of all
ages and color thronged the streets and peered out shop windows from Canal Street to the
exposition grounds at Upper City Park, waving and cheering the procession as church bells and
cannon fire added to the cacophony. In a city known for its revelry, New Orleans was living up
to the billing. Walking near the front of the parade of nearly a thousand politicians from various
states, the federal government, foreign dignitaries, military officers, and noted intellectuals was
Major Edward A. Burke, Director General of the World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial
Exposition. Flanked on each side by a thick wall of enthusiastic onlookers, the entourage
boarded the ornately decorated Fred A. Banks for a brief steamboat ride to the exposition
grounds. After arriving, Burke and the leading representatives from the federal government
convened at his office in the Main Building. From there the director general led them to meet
awaiting foreign dignitaries as they strode to Music Hall. The vast array of national flags and
banners waving from archways and flying buttresses was the visual manifestation of the hope of
global progress, “a court, mid-way between the two great Americas of the new world, in which
the silken ensigns of all the nations of the earth waved a cordial salutation to each other.” As
Music Hall was overflowing its capacity of 11,000, the exposition delegates ascended to the
center platform stage. An American band began the opening ceremonies with the “Grand
Exposition March,” dedicating it to the seminal force behind the creation and direction of the
exposition, Director General Burke.1 The bombastic major was at the height of his career as
New South zealot.
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When one thinks of the American South in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the
traditional image of the region has been one of economic stagnation, xenophobia, and cultural
isolation. The traditional view of Louisiana in the last decades of the nineteenth century is a
state dominated by reactionary politics and mired in a malaise of sharecropping and extractive
industries. While these images have been explored extensively by scholars, the postbellum U.S.
South, and Louisiana specifically, also exhibited a vibrant mobility and cosmopolitanism
characterized by pragmatic ambition.2 A distinct, yet understudied, transnational New South
vision of national unity and regional prosperity through increased commercial and political ties
with Latin America buoyed the expectations of many leading politicians and ambitious
entrepreneurs. From local chambers of commerce to governors and congressmen, southerners
throughout the region were all too aware of the former Confederacy’s subservient position to the
more industrialized North.3 To counter the disadvantages of a persistent drought of capital,
skilled labor, technology, and market outlets, more than a few postbellum southerners tethered
their hopes for future prosperity to closer ties with Latin America. These vocal New South
disciples, with Louisianans in the vanguard, saw in Latin America’s vast markets for southern
surpluses, untapped natural resources for southern capitalists, and the geographical crux for the
dream of an isthmian canal bringing Atlantic and Pacific trading within reach of Gulf South
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ports. Fully exploring this strain of the New South creed adds a crucial outward looking element
to our understanding of postbellum efforts for national reconciliation and industrialization.
The first world’s fair in the former Confederacy, New Orleans’ 1884 World’s Industrial
and Cotton Centennial Exposition, serves to explore how a leading faction of New South zealots
sought to realize their goal of refashioning the South’s image from one as a region characterized
by slavery and sectionalism to one as the natural nexus of trade and industry in the Americas.
The fair’s exhibits, architecture, civic functions, and ephemera functioned as visceral propaganda
for the South’s development and a dynamic role in the wider world. The New Orleans world’s
fair, in short, was a defining moment for southern industrialization, national reconciliation, and
international ambitions wrapped in the pomp and circumstance of pan-American progress. As
the second nationally sponsored international exhibition, the 1884 world’s fair was also a
seminal event in the proliferation of education and knowledge. Most notably, America’s only
national associated academic organization, the Smithsonian Institution, came into its modern
form in no small part due to its participation in the New Orleans exposition.
In a state simultaneously defined as a gateway to the U.S. hinterland and the primary port
of the Americas, the 1884 exposition was a seminal moment in Louisiana’s long history of
presenting the Crescent City as the metropole of the U.S. South. The New Orleans world’s fair
likewise expanded upon the significant reciprocal links between Louisiana and Latin America
that had existed for centuries. Louisiana’s New South trumpeters found a receptive audience
among late nineteenth-century Latin American liberals, who endeavored to further national
economic and social development by courting the capital and entrepreneurial spirit of
industrialists. Leaders in Louisiana and Latin America, therefore, participated in the fair as a
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means to shape the commercial, cultural, and political exchange on their own terms in defining a
new era of globalization.
Finally, the 1884-5 New Orleans exposition was the high tide of power and prestige for
Louisiana Democrats who had ousted Republicans from state control several years prior.
Analyzing the New Orleans fair, then, also requires a reexamination of the exposition’s director
general and Louisiana’s exemplar of a transnational New South zealot, Edward A. Burke. As a
prominent New South spokesmen, Burke wielded his position as director general to mold the
exposition around his transnational vision.
As it happens, Burke was one of a diverse and motley crew of postbellum southerners
who advocated for a dynamic role in the world. Henry Watterson was another Confederate
veteran and late nineteenth-century New South apostle as the editor of the Louisville CourierJournal who preached free trade and access to overseas markets as the path to southern salvation.
Alabama senator John Tyler Morgan, one of the more prominent southerners at the national
level, was a former fire-eater, Confederate general, and proponent of free trade as an outlet for
southern cash crops furthered by an assertive modern navy and territorial expansion in the
Caribbean basin. Historian Joseph Fry has dubbed Morgan “the New South’s foremost
expansionist and the ‘father’ of the isthmian waterway.”4 Recent scholarship on such men has
succeeded in furthering understanding of postbellum political and economic goals that has too
often emphasized Georgia’s Henry Grady as the era’s “most celebrated proponent” of a New
South.5
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Historians have universally highlighted Burke’s moxie and political acumen as a prime
example of the boldness so prevalent in the postbellum South. C. Vann Woodward called him a
“cool-headed and daring gambler” with “splendid audacity.” More recent scholars have given
Burke the epithets of Louisiana’s New South “mythmaker-in-chief,” “Bourbon plunderer,” and
“dealmaker par excellence.”6 Many contemporaries and later historians acknowledged his
dynamism as well as his more devilish tendencies, but he has never been given his full due.
Burke’s quick rise to power and controversial career have distracted historians from properly
placing this leading politician of postbellum Louisiana among other prominent southerners of the
late nineteenth century. Yet numerous contemporary observers highlighted Burke’s credentials
as a New South spokesman and his instrumental part in molding the 1884 New Orleans world’s
fair.
International expositions in the nineteenth century may be likened to today’s Olympic
games, that is, international affairs that allowed nations to display their premier talents under the
auspices of cooperation and goodwill. Both also saw their hosts crafting elaborate ceremonies
and structures to legitimize political authority and celebrate cultural distinctiveness while also
serving as proxies for geopolitics. A highly contagious world’s fair fever began with London’s
1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition and ultimately yielded over one hundred expositions over the
next one hundred years. With hundreds of millions of people attending fairs all over the globe,
attendees gazed at myriad displays, ranging from such technological wonders as incandescent
electricity, such engineering marvels as the Eiffel Tower, and such popular culture innovations
as the player piano. World’s fairs of the late nineteenth century were not only cathedrals of
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cultural authority, they were also waypoints of change that affected people’s daily lives and
served to define modernity and perceptions of the world.7 Scholars of mass culture situate latenineteenth and early twentieth-century world’s fairs within larger trends of modernization. In
this context, each international exposition was another innovation amidst the era’s characteristic
“industries of spectacle,” from high-brow landscape art to the cross-class appeal of melodramatic
panoramas and such elaborate stage productions as Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show.8

All

told, there were thirteen world’s fairs authorized by the U.S. government between the 1876
Philadelphia Centennial Exposition and the 1916 Panama-California Exposition in San Diego.
The World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, therefore, built on the first federallysponsored international exposition in Philadelphia and became a harbinger of the granddaddy of
all American fairs, the Chicago Columbian Exposition of 1893. Such fairs represented the
formal U.S. push into “competitive multinational trade networks,” “beckoned the marriage of
trade and global expansion,” and “proclaimed the industrial revolution underway.”
In so doing, American expositions were active in creating and spreading a novel
American culture that exalted capitalism and consumerism as ethical and progressive. The
exposition sites, from such natural environments as the row of Live Oaks on the New Orleans
exposition grounds to steam engine behemoths and consumer goods, furthered this new
American ethos through awe and spectacle. Presenting industrialization and commerce as
amusements and attraction brought modernity into the popular culture and vernacular, while
spreading the political, economic, and cultural authority of organizers and leaders.9
Yet each fair differed in strategies and emphasis as their “cultural landscapes tease[d] out
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the changing aims of political economy” among competing regional differences.10 Set during
Reconstruction, the 1876 Philadelphia centennial had decidedly Republican leadership. The
president of the U.S. Centennial Commission that shaped the strategic message and contours of
the Philadelphia fair was a leading New England Republican and Union veteran, former
Connecticut governor, and editor of the Hartford Evening Press, General Joseph R. Hawley. As
such, the fair was planned and operated by Republicans, manifested their goals on an
international scale, and was meant to legitimize their rule. The exposition’s director general was
a Cincinnati manufacture, Alfred T. Goshorn, who managed all fair subcommittees and
individual departments. While New Orleans would have only two years to execute and open its
fair, planning began in Philadelphia on July 3, 1873. Despite revenues never surpassing much
then half of the fair’s eight million dollar bill, it breathed new life into consumer spending and
engendered corporations to end austerity measures induced by the Panic of 1873 in favor of
renewed business expansion. A contemporary observer for Century Magazine credited the fair
with helping stem the panic’s tide.11
Characteristic of American world’s fairs in the era, the New Orleans exposition emerged
from the idea to commemorate a particular occasion, in this case, the centennial of America’s
first cotton export in 1784. However, like the later and better known 1893 Chicago World’s
Fair, meant to memorialize Columbus’ discovery of the New World, the significance of the
Crescent City exposition quickly grew beyond mere memorialization. Modest regional fairs in
1881 and 1883 in Atlanta and Louisville, respectively, spurred the idea for an exhibition in
Louisiana when the president of the National Cotton Planters Association, Franklin C. Morehead
of Vicksburg, proposed a fair in New Orleans to celebrate the cotton centennial. While its name

10
11

Ibid, 124.
Ibid, 123, 135,

119

suggests otherwise, the National Cotton Planters Association (N.C.P.A.) strove not only to
increase the efficiency and productivity of southern textile mills, but also to lessen the region’s
dependence on staple crops by fostering industrial manufacturing and development of natural
resources. Based in Vicksburg and anchored in New Orleans, the N.C.P.A. held its 1882
meeting at Little Rock, the capital of another state with strong ties to the Mississippi Delta,
where in October it adopted resolutions to sponsor a world’s cotton centennial. President
Morehead arrived in Washington a couple of months later to garner support from agricultural and
industrial capitalists alike for a government sponsored international fair.
Morehead’s most willing partner was Senator Augustus Hill Garland of Arkansas.
Garland introduced a senate bill on January 23, 1883, that committed the government to an
exposition “national and international in character” that would comprise “all arts, manufactures,
and products of the soil and mine,” rather than merely a show of the cotton industry.12 Back in
New Orleans, Burke threw the weight of the Times-Democrat behind the endeavor before the bill
was even passed. Burke’s paper published the comments of the renowned engineer James B.
Eads, who confidentially predicted that the centennial would connect the Crescent City “to the
trade of the civilized world.”13 Garland insisted, however naively, that the New Orleans
exposition ask for “no financial aid of the government . . . but merely recognition.” Congress
passed the bill within eighteen days. It partnered the federal government with the N.C.P.A. and
established a board of directors that would go forward with the exposition if New Orleans would
subscribed $500,000.14 The fair was akin to others in the era “as a means toward interlocking
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municipal and regional economies to catapult national resurgence.”15 In March, Burke shifted
his pen from the editor’s desk to his pocketbook and became the first to subscribe to the
exposition by investing a sum of five thousand dollars.16
Given his positions as state treasurer and de facto Democratic party boss, combined with
his editorship of the Times-Democrat and national network of connections, Burke was on the
short list of possible exposition leaders. When the fair’s board of directors still suffered
lackluster fundraising efforts through June, Burke seized the opportunity to claim his first role in
the exposition as part of a small delegation of well-connected men with both experience in
lobbying and the necessary boldness to secure substantial capital. The role enabled Burke to
again court tangible ties between Louisiana and northern industrial capital. He led the delegation
on a two-week July tour of the North, visiting New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, to meet with
the likes of Jay Gould and George Pullman. The expansion of robber baron interests in the Gulf
South and West gave Burke ammunition he needed to court these leading titans of industry. He
likely stressed to railroad owners, in particular, how a successful international industrial
exposition in New Orleans would provide not only increased traffic for the event, but also
potentially provide opportunities for new capital and expansion. At the time of Burke’s
meetings, Jay Gould was in the process of taking firm control of several southwestern railroads,
including the New Orleans & Pacific and the Iron Mountain, which connected New Orleans to
national markets.
After their return to New Orleans, Burke informed the board of directors that the
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persuasiveness of his delegation had secured $203,000 towards the exposition.17 The board of
directors then concluded that “an able, active and influential man” was needed to serve as
director general and shoulder the responsibility for management, execution, construction, and
fundraising. Given all of Burke’s aforementioned attributes and his obvious enthusiasm for the
exposition, the search committee quickly offered him the position. Despite expressing, perhaps
in a ploy of calculated false humility, initial concerns over his already extensive professional and
political duties, Burke acquiesced when the committee stated that the leading alternative was a
“Northern man.”18
By the end of the first week of August 1883, Burke had begun his tenure as director
general of the World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial. Its administration, as he shaped it,
mirrored that of postbellum political machines. The executive committees of both major parties
during Gilded Age presidential elections consisted overwhelmingly of a wealthy merchant or
titan of industry at their head with “the intense political work,” as historian Mark Wahlgren
Summers has explained, “left to experienced politicians at a lower rank.”19 In this case,
Franklin Morehead fulfilled the former role and Burke the latter. Everyone, from local residents
to national officials, recognized Burke’s driving leadership of the exposition. Julia Ward Howe,
author of “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” whom Burke appointed director of the fair’s
Woman’s Department, credited Burke’s “genius and comprehensive intellect” with shaping the
fair as a truly international industrial exposition.20 Writing for the premier northern journal on
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southern affairs, Century Magazine, Eugene V. Smalley captured Burke’s designs to make the
exposition a vehicle of his New South focus on the Americas:
In [Burke’s] active mind the plan of a show of cotton and its manufactures soon
broadened into the conception of a universal exhibition in which the Southern States and
their foreign neighbors should play the most prominent part . . . an exhibition which
would spread the fame of New Orleans around the globe and emphasize its advantages as
the commercial emporium of all the lands and islands surrounding the Gulf of Mexico.21
Elsewhere, reactions to his appointment were mixed. Naturally, Burke’s foes worried
that the exposition was coming under his dominance. The prime antagonist was his stalwart
political opponent, the Daily Picayune. Warning that the exposition would become a channel for
Burke’s ambition and Ring patronage, the Picayune denounced Burke as a “machine politician of
the most profound type” and the boss of “one . . . of the worst rings . . . ever fastened on our city
and State.” However controversial his political modus operandi, more than a few people saw
merit in Burke’s indefatigable nature. The New Orleans Bee praised the “indomitable and
inventive energy” Burke would bring to the exposition, while the German Gazette proclaimed
that his involvement had resurrected “an undertaking whose vitality [was] still in doubt by
many.” Even some previous critics of Burke begrudgingly conceded his “high qualifications.”22
As a leading Gilded Age political historians asserts, in the postbellum South, “oratorical talent
went every bit as far as a bankroll in bringing out a good vote . . . personal popularity or a war
record went further still.”
With his ties to the deep pockets of the Louisiana lottery, the exposition’s single largest
purchaser of stock, Burke had a royal flush. Using his salary to purchase stock in the exposition
and donate the shares to Louisiana State University, however, was one way Burke undercut his
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critics’ cries that his leadership in the fair was merely a ruse for personal and partisan
advancement.23 Upon receipt of the bonds, President James W. Nicholson expressed his
gratitude and pledged “to assist in perpetuating . . . [Burke’s] honored name and in making a
lasting record” at the university.24 Moreover, contracts to build the grounds and exhibits were
not confined to businesses from the city or state, but open to national bids to stimulate
competition and to ward off critiques of Ring graft.
Burke’s tenure as director general is important for another reason. His use of the world’s
fair fit with the public pageantry and party atmosphere characteristic of Gilded Age politics.
While colorful parades and booze-infused barbeques were a tradition from the Jacksonian Era,
“the 1880s saw politics’ own industrial revolution.”25 Just as expositions were a hallmark of
postbellum America, so the resources required for expositions reflected the deepened pockets
needed for political mobilization and policy. Steam engines were not the only machines growing
in complexity during the late nineteenth century. Political parties were also employing more
sophisticated methods, and everyone from business lobbyists and single-issue groups to labor
organizations contributed to increasingly adroit use of mass-produced political materials and
networks.
This context of an increasingly competitive political marketplace is central to providing a
complete picture of the exposition’s importance. The inherently non-partisan nature of
expositions belies their equally inherent political significance. In the hands of such deft political
partisans as Burke, fairs provided legitimacy and were innovative vehicles for expanding party
influence, necessary, it was believed, in an era when “the mainstream parties’ monopoly on
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politics and policy . . . [had begun] to dim.”26 World expositions, moreover, were more tangible
in their political claims for making a global impact than were other Gilded Age crusades. As in
political campaigning, the total cost of the New Orleans exposition is impossible to measure for
records do not reflect how many services were given to the fair with lowered prices or pro bono
but compensated for in other ways. After all, a favor granted was a favor earned. Moreover,
Burke used the Times-Democrat to mobilize support for the fair and got people to the turnstiles
much as his “partisan newsmongering” got people to the ballot box. However, there was a major
advantage Burke and others who attempted to use fairs for partisan purposes received. Parties,
not public funds, paid all levels of political requirements, from poll watchers to the tickets
themselves, while expositions drew legitimate funds from national, state, and local
governments.27
Records do not contain direct evidence of corruption between Louisiana’s Democratic
party and the New Orleans exposition. Indeed, local and state exposition leaders, especially
those serving in federally-appointed posts, included numerous Republicans and Democrats
critical of the Ring political machine with which Burke was associated. One of Burke’s most
bitter foes, Henry J. Hearsey, served on a committee of prominent New Orleans citizens that
aided the fair’s efforts.28 Nonetheless, circumstantial evidence and the political system of the
time point to some element of patronage and strong-arm politics. As Mark Summers has
explained, an assessment paid by officeholders was at the crux of the postbellum spoils system.
Those who were appointed to an office or post, from jailhouse wardens on up, and those who
were selected on a party ticket were expected to contribute to campaign funds. Incumbents were
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no exception. Indeed, current office holders and appointees were solicited most. The marble
cake nature of American federalism had the unintended consequence by the late nineteenth
century of ensuring multiple layers of political costs and hierarchies. While the Pendleton Civil
Service Act of 1883 curtailed elements of federal assessments, it did not alleviate pressures at the
state and local level. Assessments in the spoils system functioned as an “informal tax system to
sustain the parties” and engendered a type of “trickle-down corruption” that left taxpayers
ultimately paying the bill. If “winning elections did not necessarily mean a lasting influence,”
expositions served as a stimulant for inducing political fruit.29
Expositions in the age of imperialism and industrialization “were, above all, exercises in
consolidating and perpetuating power.”30 Yet Burke never was able to shake a significant
amount of criticism. One of his most dogged opponents throughout the 1880s was the bitingly
satirical New Orleans Mascot (see Appendix E). In 1882, one of its cartoons portrayed a crying
Major Burke riding a wooden donkey inscribed with, “I want to go to the Senate.” On the wall
of Burke’s office, moreover, the cartoon lampooned Burke’s mottos operando as: “Go lightly on
hoodlums, ward-bummers, strikers, office-holders, or anyone that can help me. Sensational
items on our friends must be suppressed. Slobber the fiscal agent . . . the public is easily
pleased.”31
And Director General Burke sought to please. As the only federally-sponsored fair in the
decade, the 1884 New Orleans exposition received a significant amount of government support
to ensure it fostered the national interest. President Chester A. Arthur issued an executive order
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in May 1884 to establish a board comprising a representative from each of the eight U.S.
executive department participating in the exposition. The structure and function of the Board of
United States Executive Departments (hereafter abbreviated to ‘U.S. Board’) mirrored that of the
Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition. With different appointees, however, the board served to
administer congressional appropriations. A secretary and paymaster aided appointed officials
from all eight departments as well as the Bureau of Education and Smithsonian Institution. Each
representative oversaw his respective appropriations and immediately began the massive
undertaking of coordinating, collecting, packing, transporting, receiving, and displaying each
department’s exhibits and participation.
On the whole, analysis of the New Orleans world’s fair intersects with a host of larger
themes and questions. Burke’s logistical strategy and fundraising efforts as director general
leading up to its opening in December 1884 have received a fair amount of scholarly attention.
In characteristic manner, Burke combined embellishments, back-room dealings, and consummate
politicking on a national stage with his sheer audacity and will to bring the enormous task of
staging a world’s fair to fruition. Yet, many historians have been critical of the exposition. Its
financial shortcomings and poor attendance have led such scholars as exposition historian D.
Clive Hardy to find numerous faults in Burke’s management and all but deny the fair any
substantial historical significance. Burke’s synonymous role with the Ring meant political
opponents depicted him as a familiar Gilded Age type, “the money-bag bogeyman” who was at
once financially negligent, corrupt, and greedy, often at the people’s expense and to their
embarrassment.32 That the New Orleans fair would eventually be overshadowed by later and
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grander fairs, such as Chicago in 1893, has no doubt influenced historical scholarship on the
New Orleans exposition, as has its association with Burke himself, largely understood to be one
of the most notorious political bosses of the Gilded Age.
Ultimately, the New Orleans exposition also had an institutional legacy, as it set the
standard for the federal government’s organizational structure for future fairs. In particular,
President Arthur issued a second executive order in July 1884 that retained the structure and
personnel of the U.S. Board for the subsequent Cincinnati Industrial Exposition and the Southern
Exhibition held in Louisville, Kentucky. Yet the federal government reduced its presence at
Cincinnati and Louisville, reflective of the less grandiose scale of those fairs. No doubt,
however, many of the same exhibits that were produced for New Orleans were used in Ohio and
Kentucky.33
Burke ventured again to Washington the same month that President Arthur initiated
federal participation in order to coordinate with exposition leaders from across the country.
Before the U.S. Board officially convened for the first time at noon on May 17, 1884, Burke held
off-the-record meetings and “informal conferences” with groups of both U.S. state
commissioners for the fair and the heads of the U.S. Board. One such meeting convened in the
central parlor of the famous Willard Hotel on May 8. Burke no doubt fielded logistical questions
about the exposition’s facilities and transportation systems as well as the regulations for
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exposition contests.34
As he had done during the compromise crisis of 1877, Burke also found himself in 1884
lobbying government officials in the interest of Louisiana. This time, he was asking Congress to
pass a million dollar federal loan to support the exposition. The task required the utmost of
Burke’s vaunted politicking and charm. In no area was this more evident than in his dealings
with one of Louisiana’s most powerful Ring critics, Congressman E. John Ellis. The relationship
between the Ring and Reformer Democrat was at an all-time low after Burke, in retaliation for
Ellis’ failed attempt to block Louis Wiltz’s nomination for governor in 1879, unsuccessfully tried
to replace Ellis with a machine candidate in the 1882 congressional elections. Now, in
Washington, Burke used a Louisiana ally, Senator Benjamin F. Jonas, to set up a meeting with
Ellis. Realizing it was imperative that Louisiana’s congressional delegation put up a united front
in support of federal aid for the fair, Burke set his pride aside and made the first move of
reconciliation. “We fought, you won. Let us be friends,” Burke bluntly stated, and told Ellis he
hoped they could move on from any past “misunderstandings.” This proved satisfactory to Ellis,
who extended his hand to Burke while pledging to forget “all that was unpleasant.” Ellis was
true to his word and became instrumental in securing the loan’s passage.35
From businessmen and entrepreneurs to city boosters and government officials, an army
of exposition participants mustered their forces in the summer of 1884 to shape the New Orleans
exposition and advance their interests. Perhaps no two national departments seized on the fair as
an opportunity more enthusiastically than the most inherently transnational organizations of the
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American government in the late nineteenth century, the Department of State and the
Smithsonian Institution. For its part, postbellum world’s fairs were the incubators of the
Smithsonian as we know it today with an emphasis on research and museums. The lasting
legacy of the Philadelphia centennial led an official history of the Smithsonian, published in
1896, to conclude that the 1876 exposition “was destined to have a more important effect upon
the National Museum than any which had occurred since the founding of the Smithsonian
Institution.”36 Smithsonian leaders ingeniously utilized the near annual regional, national, and
world’s fairs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a means of diversifying and
expanding the Smithsonian’s collections at low cost, the Smithsonian staff acquired displays
from fair participants in both the private and government sectors. The Philadelphia fair produced
such a windfall of holdings for the Smithsonian that it led directly to congressional approval for
the first stand-alone Smithsonian museum building, the United States National Museum, for
which construction began in 1879.
The Smithsonian’s staff, having already participated in domestic and international
expositions on both sides of the Atlantic, was equal to the most experienced expositionists in the
world by the time of the New Orleans exposition. The institution had access to the finest
museums and learned minds in Europe, which allowed George Brown Goode, the U.S. Board’s
representative for the Smithsonian and head of the U.S. National Museum, to attain an
“invaluable knowledge of the most approved methods of installation of collection, labeling, and
storage.” Goode was a true titan of the Smithsonian’s ascendancy as a standard bearer of
American knowledge. The official history described Goode as “gifted with a philosophical
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mind, a profound love of nature, a marvelously repetitive memory, and untiring energy [with] a
range of knowledge and a grasp of affairs which astonished his associates.”37
Goode and Spencer Fullerton Baird, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, had fulsome
ambitions for the New Orleans exposition that almost outmatched those of Burke.38 Smithsonian
advocates were assuredly eager to use the New Orleans fair, the first nationally sponsored
exposition since the U.S. National Museum’s opening in 1881, to draw attention to their
expanding institution and fill the exhibit space of their new building on the National Mall.
Indicative of this aim, Smithsonian officials lobbied Congress to nearly triple the $72,000
appropriated for the previous Philadelphia fair in funding the New Orleans exposition.
Smithsonian leaders made elaborate plans to use the New Orleans fair as a grand opportunity to
advance scientific knowledge and the institution’s standing. The Smithsonian of the late
nineteenth century specialized in natural history and animal science, its emphasis on fish and
fisheries within the field of natural history dating back to 1871. In that year, Congress
established the United States Fish Commission, and Baird was appointed its director. The
Smithsonian Institution and U.S. Fish Commission formed a symbiotic relationship throughout
the rest of the nineteenth century, ensuring that the institution was one of the leading repositories
of marine life and aquatic animals. It aimed for nothing less than “a complete representation of
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all the species of fishes known in North America” and “all the mammals north of the Isthmus of
Panama,” coupled with a sizeable display of American birdlife, minerology, and outdoor
industries.39
The weeks following the U.S. Board’s formation in May were filled with ambitious
planning mixed with anxiety over the extent that Congress would open the purse strings.
Through the first weeks of June, Goode wrote to obtain exhibition plans from the representatives
of the Smithsonian’s various divisions and advised proponents of the fair to “possess their souls
in patience” while awaiting Congressional appropriations.40 Goode was already aware of the
time-sensitive nature and expressed anxiety that the effort to prepare exhibits for a December
opening would “necessarily be a brief and busy one” that required “very rapid action” dependent
upon appropriations from “the pleasure of Congress.”41
Participation in the New Orleans Exposition led Smithsonian officials to match the
Southern focus of the fair by dispatching Smithsonian scientific expeditions to canvas the Gulf
South and West, marking the first time the Institution conducted field reconnaissance and
collections in both regions. A fisheries expert in Pensacola, Florida, Silas Sterns, helped shape
the Smithsonian’s display of Gulf fisheries at New Orleans while a conchology team was sent to
the Florida Keys to collect specimens of conchs, sponges, and mollusks.42 In July, Goode
commissioned David S. Jordan, a professor at Indiana University, to collect fresh-water fishes
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south of Missouri and west of Arkansas. Given the title of curator, with a monthly salary of
$166.66, Jordan was to devote his time “entirely to the development of the collection without
reference to publication,” although the Smithsonian did allow Jordan to retain duplicate
specimens for his university. Another naturalist based in Indianapolis, C. H. Gilbert,
accompanied him on the expedition.43
Over the next several months, the Smithsonian examined and collected animals in
Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas,
and Texas “while the weather [was] warm and the streams [were] low.” The latter two states,
claimed Jordan, had never been explored at all by American scientists, while Texas had been
inspected “only by the Mexican Boundary Survey.” While admitting a lack of some East Coast
species, the Smithsonian considered the New Orleans exposition an “unusual opportunity . . . to
explore more distant regions” in the South and West, which were “most likely to yield new
species or species as yet unrepresented in the Museum.” Virginia and Carolina species,
meanwhile, could be “done in time by the ordinary resources of the [U.S. National] Museum.”44
After two months in the field, Jordan submitted a glowing report to Washington from the
McKibben Hotel in Fort Smith, Arkansas. His expedition had discovered over thirty new species
and over one-hundred-and-twenty known species that the Smithsonian had desired in order to
improve the quantity and quality of its collection. But he was also out of money, the $1,200
budgeted for the endeavor having been expended. In a series of telegrams, Jordan and Goode
debated their position. Were they satisfied with the collection as it stood or should additional
funds be provided? The latter option won out. The expedition was so successful and the
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opportunity to ensure a full survey of far-flung Texas and Arkansas so enticing that Secretary
Baird approved another $175.45 The decision proved a worthy investment. Jordan’s team
surveyed and collected from Texas streams in the basins of the Red, Trinity, Brazos, Colorado,
Guadalupe, and Nueces rivers. In Arkansas, they canvased rivers and tributaries surrounding Fort
Smith, Eureka Springs, and Little Rock. Ultimately, Jordan’s expedition collected over six
hundred specimens before it returned to Washington.
Southern leaders astutely recognized an opportunity to tap this increasing wealth of
scientific knowledge. The commissioner for the state of Mississippi’s exhibit at New Orleans,
writing on behalf of Governor Robert Lawry, told the head of the Smithsonian that
Mississippians were “anxious” to better understand and collect Mississippi fisheries “but have
not the least conception of a plan.” Having no doubt heard about the institution’s field agents,
Mississippi’s commissioner insisted that the state “would be under ten thousand obligations” if
the Smithsonian would send plaster casts of Mississippi fish in their collection. While the
Smithsonian deemed this particular scheme unfeasible, the New Orleans exposition
unquestionably functioned to educate Gulf South states about their own natural resources and
spread environmental awareness and education.
The Crescent City’s fair, therefore, not only enhanced the Smithsonian’s collections from
the American South and knowledge of the South’s natural history and animal science, it also
fundamentally advanced American higher education.46 Smithsonian leaders, conscious of their
expanding collections, sought to ensure that its participation in the fair, and the knowledge that
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such participation engendered on the whole, was made widely known. As such, the head of the
Smithsonian exhibits hired two additional printers and prodded the institution’s printing office to
“push forward rapidly the work in hand.” Added personnel had stepped up production by the
end of October, when a satisfied Goode stated that the Smithsonian was “printing accounts of the
various special collections as fast as they can be prepared” to advertise its position as the nation’s
leading museum and repository of knowledge.47
The Department of State likewise poured great effort into its display for the Government
Building on the exposition grounds. Its official report highlighted the significant role the New
Orleans exposition played in educating the public, encouraging domestic and international
entrepreneurial enterprise, and fostering a sense of progress. The department’s representative,
Charles H. Hill, insisted that its exhibit “was not a mere display of articles” but “a technological
school” that drew upon the commerce and manufactures of all countries that hosted U.S.
consulates. Visitors to the fair would see the material culture meant to demonstrate New Orleans
as an agent of U.S. industrialism, visible particularly in the Department of State’s immersive
globe, inlaid with prominent industrial and commercial developments of the late nineteenth
century.48 Newspapers from New Orleans to New York echoed the department’s boasts in
describing its prominent exhibit as “comprehensive” and “splendid,” a “display [that] arrests the
eye of everyone.”
By all measures, the display accomplished several key goals of the exposition, being an
attractive mix of novelty, exoticism, technological innovations, and industrial education. The
State Department’s display consisted of an immense glass globe with detailed topographical and
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national illustrations illuminated by electrical lighting. Yet what visitors admired most was the
interior of the sphere, which allowed them to access and observe statistical synopses of exports
and resources of each nation. The cultural “customs and handiworks of the various races” were
also included. As a cartographical production, the interactive globe manifested for each visitor
the exposition’s grand goal of positioning New Orleans firmly in the center of global commerce
and progress. No wonder that Burke’s Times-Democrat extolled the sphere as “more artistic and
wonderful in its revealings [sic] possibly than anything to be seen at the Exposition.”49 The
immersive globe was indicative of the New Orleans exposition as a platform for the production
of “scenic spectacles” and “sensory media” that provided interactive attractions that shaped
perceptions of modernity.50
Before the exposition opened, however, the various executive departments of the U.S.
Board had sobered to the reality that they had received less than the hoped for appropriations.
The Smithsonian Institution’s representative, G. Brown Goode, regretted in mid-September that
his original request for nearly $200,000 “was cut down to 3/8 of the original estimate,” resulting
in an “oblig[ation] to curtail our expenses in every direction.”51 The $75,000 the Smithsonian
ultimately received, three thousand dollars more than its Philadelphia centennial budget, led
Goode to express anxiety soon thereafter over “getting towards the bottom of the New Orleans
treasury bag.”52
The head of the Department of State exhibit also bemoaned a “very meager sum
appropriated by Congress.” Hill, one of the fairs enthusiastic supporters at the national level,
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recounted that he was motivated by “pride and ambition” to make an executive decision to
advance nearly three thousand dollars “to render [the state department exhibit] a most instructive
and worthy object lesson of the practical and important duties of the Department of State”
[original emphasis]. Nor was Hill alone in his recognition of the exposition’s ability to advance
American interests. He joined two members of the Congressional Appropriation Committee,
Senator James Beck (D, KY) and Congressman Benjamin Butterworth (R, OH), to urge the
Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard to loosen the departmental purse strings still further. Much
to the chagrin of an irate Hill, Bayard’s decision to direct more funds to the exposition occurred
too late to affect the department’s participation. Likewise, representatives from each executive
department bemoaned the lack of sufficient funds “to meet urgent expenses essential for the good
of the Exhibition.”53
On the whole, Hill criticized what he saw as a lack of both governmental support and
appreciation for the value of world’s fairs. He insisted that his department’s exhibit “show[ed]
the benefit of such Exhibits, and recognition of the industrial benefit in foreign countries of such
symbolic representations and ‘object lessons’ for the purpose of educating the people and in
developing commercial relations with other nations of the world.” More directly, he condemned
the Arthur administration for causing a general sense of “discouragement from the manifested
unappreciativeness [sic] and want of interest in the Exhibit by the administration.”54
Hill’s laundry list of complaints for what he perceived as negligence by the government
and state department bureaucracy in fully supporting what he considered a valuable endeavor is
also significant for who he did not blame. Nowhere in Hill’s report did he find fault with
Louisiana’s state apparatus or Burke’s leadership as director general. Instead, Hill’s glowing
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enthusiasm for the fair was matched by his unfiltered condemnation for national bureaucrats who
caused numerous “misrepresentations and great worry as well as demand upon my time without
compensation or consideration.” Hill’s report demonstrates that a senior official within the state
department recognized the viability of the New Orleans fair as an exceptional vehicle to
highlight the work of the foreign service and significantly further U.S. interests abroad. 55
Time was another common obstacle encountered by the fair’s proponents. Even
acquiring materials for a display of textile industries in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and
New England incurred “far more expenditures of time than one would anticipate” due to “many
delays finding the proper person and establishment.” Travel time, locating significant and willing
lenders or sellers, and acquiring approval for purchases and acquisitions led to delays for
exhibitors. Nonetheless, a Smithsonian agent scouting and collecting industrial displays
considered the endeavor “of great value” and one that would “prove of the utmost value in the
future.”56
In the face of such obstacles, Smithsonian officials also grew increasingly sober and
realistic as they recognized the possible restrictions on their exhibits. For instance, a fish
commissioner from Iowa had wanted to display live fish, but realized that New Orleans water
was too warm for trout. Burke, still doggedly promising to fulfill every request no matter how
improbable, extended the possibility that exposition management could cool the water to forty
degrees. Yet Smithsonian officials wisely decided to leave out displays of live fish, believing
that it was “doubtful” whether the exposition could control water temperature “continually and
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satisfactorily.”57
The most impressive exhibitors were astutely creative in the face of less than desirable
circumstances. For example, the Smithsonian proved flexible when a New York City business
raised the possibility of donating pieces to an exhibit as a means of soliciting potential customers
from among visitors. While the Smithsonian “must exclude everything which has the
appearance of an advertisement” from permanent display in the U.S. National Museum, Goode
wrote, it was able to display materials from private businesses for their New Orleans display in
part because “our policy in expositions is necessarily much more free than it can be in our
permanent Museum work.”58 Paying for the transportation, rather than outright purchasing of
private or commercial items, was a way exhibitors often added to their displays. In addition to
acquiring private displays from enterprising individuals and businesses, utilizing ties to auxiliary
organizations was often an inexpensive means to enhance an exhibit. One such partnership arose
when Burke acquiesced to Goode’s request in July that the Society of American Taxidermists
take part in the exposition under the auspices of the Smithsonian. While it did not require much
selling for Burke to agree to an additional exhibitor, Goode nonetheless assured him that the
society was “coming into considerable prominence” due to its “very popular and strongly
attended” previous displays in Boston and New York. “Nothing which we could take to New
Orleans would be more attractive than this very display,” Goode assured, “which will in the main
be repeated in permanent form” in the U.S. National Museum in Washington. Burke, ever ready
to increase the reach and attraction of the exposition, subsequently adopted Goode’s
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recommendation for rules and categories for a taxidermist competition on the grounds.59 The
exposition’s board of management also issued “Awards of Merit” through the Department of
State’s representative, Charles Hill, to the appropriate consul recipient’s nation and region. 60
Taxidermy was a noteworthy attraction for several reasons. While twenty-first century
animal rights groups and environmentalists are concerned with over-hunting, animal cruelty, and
ecological disruptions, late nineteenth-century taxidermy aided the public’s interest in nature,
appreciation for wildlife, and awareness of nature’s beauty. It was likewise at the forefront in the
development of animal science and thus served as a necessary prerequisite for later awareness of
conservation and preservation. Moreover, taxidermy reflected the exposition’s central motif as
ordered space, where mankind displayed ever increasing technologies and knowledge to control
the natural world. Animal displays also served as a cross-class attraction wherein people from
all walks of live marveled at the exoticism of global progress. The Darwinist and evangelical,
alike, could appreciate mankind’s supremacy over beasts of the land, birds of the air, and
creatures of the sea.
The arrival of the superintendent of the Smithsonian department, R. Edward Earll, on
October 11, 1884, affords an excellent window into the inner-workings of the exposition apart
from the rose-colored stereoscope of Burke and much of the New Orleans press. Earll noted in
his first report that the Crescent City in October was “wild with delight” and bustling with the
“craze” of the coming exposition. He found a city brimming with confident anticipation of
showing off the cultural qualities of New Orleans, and eager to seize the opportunity to get rich
in the process. Writing from his room in the St. Charles Hotel, the city’s mix of hospitality,
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bluster, and zeal for profit immediately struck Earll. “It may be truly said of New Orleans ‘What
a country and what a people,’” wrote the Smithsonian superintendent, “St. Paul, [Dwight L.]
Moody, or Ben Butler would indeed find a rich field for missionary labors.” Earll relayed to
officials back in Washington his acute impression that the much acknowledged genteel
hospitality was a calculated posture “to embrace the opportunity to make a fortune in the next six
months.”61
Few exhibitors were as fortunate as Julia Ward Howe and the ladies of the Woman’s
Department, who enjoyed quarters at the comfortable Hotel Royal.62 As such, Earll’s first
obstacle was to confront astronomical prices for accommodations. One prospective renter
sought $150 per month for a single spacious room without board. Another proposed to house
fourteen Smithsonian personnel in three rooms at $30 a month per person to attain a total rate of
$420 for three rooms. No doubt Earll’s charge to find suitable lodging for over a dozen
Smithsonian staffers and officials lent itself to a niche market of well-furnished and situated
accommodations. Nonetheless, he was left with the feeling that New Orleans homeowners and
boarders, many of whom were women, sought to fleece the “bloated bondholders of the North.”
Earll argued that exposition management, particularly the Department of Accommodations,
actively “canvassed the city and educated the people to believe that they can put two to five
people into every room.” The management’s official encouragement of lucrative lodging
contracts assuredly garnered the exposition increased support for the fair from the city’s
propertied sectors. Yet, in the face of such high costs, Earll considered making short term
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arrangements until the market price for lodging receded.63
When not searching for accommodations for Smithsonian staff, Earll relayed to
Washington his assessment of the fair’s progress. He began his report by noting that Burke was
“full of enthusiasm and confident of being ready in ample time.” However, Earll’s assessment of
the grounds left some doubt about the director general’s assurances. He had, for example,
promised to complete construction of the Government Building in ten days, but workmen had
only begun leveling the ground for the main floor, and that the majority of the building’s roof
was incomplete. Earll surmised that it would likely not open until November 20. Nor did Earll
find many other areas of the exposition to be on schedule. While Horticulture Hall was finished
and the Main Building was near completion, his pessimistic account of the progress on the river
wharf, saw mills, and stock stables would have sobered exhibitors eager to set up shop. That
said, the Smithsonian superintendent praised Burke’s optimism and confidence and called him a
“visionary.”64
To reduce expenses, salvaged iron from the Philadelphia exposition was used to construct
several buildings. The Main Building’s roof was largely built in Cincinnati. While admitting its
impressive size, the American Architect and Building News scoffed that this central structure,
looked like a “barn” and dismissed the designer as an “unknown Swedish immigrant.”65 Another
legacy of fairs was to transform urban development and expand municipal boundaries. In the
case of New Orleans, the fairgrounds expanded the city’s development and reach into a former
plantation that New Orleans had recently purchased in 1871. Guidebooks for fair visitors
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included city maps that highlighted opportunities for future development and investment on the
part of entrepreneurs and real estate agents.66
As Goode himself acknowledged, planning, coordinating, and running an exhibit for a
world’s fair created great pressure. Nonetheless, the Smithsonian representative remained
confident of the impact his institution’s collections would make when debuted in New Orleans.
A few days before leaving to oversee the final weeks of installation before the fair opened, he
drummed up press coverage from the New York Times. He encouraged a correspondent to “come
on for a day or two, and see what we are doing for the New Orleans exposition before we ship.”
Goode claimed it would “be worthwhile” since the Smithsonian had “not yet given data to any
newspaper yet, and there is material for three or four columns of striking new matter.”67
The official commencement of the World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition
on December 16, 1884, was stunningly grand. As Burke’s foe-turned-ally Congressman E. John
Ellis looked on, the president pressed an electric button in the White House to activate the
imposing 6,500 horsepower Corliss steam engines in the exposition’s Main Hall. At that
moment, Burke’s eleven-year-old son, Lindsay, hoisted a large portrait of Arthur to the immense
applause of the crowd of 20,000.68 An opening prayer was delivered by one of the nation’s
leading Christian orators and longtime newspaper editor, New York minister Thomas De Witt
Talmage. The reverend prayed that the exposition would breathe life into “the folded sails of our
paralyzed shipping,” ignite “the silent factory wheels,” drive plows in “deeper and richer
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furrows” and illuminate “hidden treasures of coal and iron and precious metal.” He beseeched
the Almighty to bless the exposition as a new “a process of Edenization.”69 The opening day
ceremonies did much to restore the morale of many exposition leaders. Julia Ward Howe
expressed a sentiment no doubt held by exhibit heads who had become disheartened by delays
and struggles. She recalled operating in a “weary, perfunctory manner” shortly before the
opening and “hated” anything to do with the exposition. However, her attitude suddenly
changed when she “stood with thousands of others in Music Hall, on [opening] day, and listened
to the inspiring' words and ringing voice of the man whom I must call the genius of the
Exposition, Major E. A. Burke, that my enthusiasm was aroused, and my heart was really in my
work.”70
Historians have demonstrated the correlation between the industrial aims of the New
South and its nationalist creed, yet the New Orleans exposition showed that the connection went
beyond regional and national boundaries. Talmage’s remarks illustrate that the transnational
New South vision for national reconciliation was a fundamental component of the fair from its
inception. Burke was no doubt nodding in agreement as the minister prayed that the exposition
would not only wash away “the last feeling of sectional discord” between North and South, but
also bring about the “unification of North and South America” and “solve for us the agonizing
question of supply and demand.”71
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A telegraph message from President Arthur emphasized the unifying component in a
nationwide pursuit of reciprocal trade with the Americas. The president acknowledged that an
international exposition in New Orleans, “situated . . . at the gateway of the trade between the
United States and Central and South America,” would promote “a profitable intercourse”
between the nation and her southern neighbors. The pursuit of increased commercial ties with
the Americas by like-minded businessmen from all regions of the country would prove the
“motives for strengthening the bonds of brotherhood.” With the United States linked as never
before by railroads and telegraph lines, Arthur looked to the exposition to engender “good will
and peace” between all nations while advancing “the material welfare of all.”72
Despite the festivities, the New Orleans exposition no doubt opened prematurely. Close
observers of the director general saw the normally energetic Burke unable to mask the “careworn countenance” produced by the “great mental strain” of events.73 The occasion for the fair –
to celebrate the centennial of America’s first cotton shipment – and the requirements of
congressional funding mandated it open before 1885. Consequently, many exhibits had still not
opened, and with the sluggish initial attendance, the debts began to mount. A week after opening
day, the superintendent of the Smithsonian’s exhibit faced significant obstacles in completing his
installation. Items that were documented by the Pennsylvania Southern railroad as received and
delivered were in reality left at the train yard amid a sea of crates meant for numerous exhibits.
Only a meeting with the company’s freight officer in New Orleans ameliorated some
transportation woes and allowed the Smithsonian team to receive a few cars at the exposition
grounds and install their contents. Nonetheless, mixed up shipments, missing packages, and
damaged items routinely plagued exhibitors even when they had the good fortune to receive
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them. Despite logistical frustrations, Earll reported that most state exhibits in the Government
Building were installed by Christmas. “The Main Building is filling up rapidly,” Earll reported,
“and much of the space . . . is now fully occupied” and “partakes somewhat of the manner of a
bazar.”74
Receiving deliveries and installing exhibits, however, led to other problems. Empty crate
boxes sat in the main aisle for extended periods of time when the railroad companies refused to
transfer them until exposition management settled their outstanding debts. “As no money was at
hand to settle accounts,” one executive department official remarked, “the boxes remain” with
“not the slightest evidence that the management will ever move them.” Concerns over the
multitude of public and private exhibitors raised additional fears that if the boxes were removed
in the interest of tidiness the subsequent confusion of organizing boxes by exhibitor would raise
still greater headaches. Ultimately, the executive departments pooled their resources to build a
temporary 35’x100’ storage shed near their exhibits in the Government Building.75
Events continued to spiral out of exposition leaders’ control. As if transportation issues
and construction delays were not enough, torrents of continual rain added to the woes. Earll
argued that the rain had a hand in sinking the exposition’s main mode of transportation,
steamboats, and in bringing down one of “Burke’s ‘Iron Hotels.’” The downpour led him to
address the location of a January 5, 1885, letter from New Orleans as “Mudville.” A leaky roof
over the Government Building plagued exposition leaders throughout the rainy winter. Labor
strife compounded difficulties. Earll informed Washington that shortly after Christmas New
Orleans had “been at the mercy of 1,000 striking car drives, who practically took the city
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government into their own hands, and the police [had] done nothing to control them.” As a
result, officials in charge of executive department exhibits had to amend protocols that required
an address for payment of services. There were also numerous “laborers and mechanics . . . from
other places, picking up odd jobs at the Exposition, and whose abode [was] therefore
uncertain.”76
As exhibitors worked from sunup and well into the night to retrieve shipments, unpack
boxes, and set up displays, circumstances grew more dire. Time and nature were continual
impediments. Specimens needed ample time to be transported first to Washington for
cataloguing and packing, because some animals required as much as four months to be stuffed
and mounted. In addition, ants and other insects plagued shipments in route across country.77
As early as December 29, Burke publically informed exhibitors that the fair was two-hundred
thousand dollars short and that he “hoped to obtain it by private subscriptions, or, as a last resort,
from Congress” (emphasis original). By the end of the first week of January, railroad companies
serving New Orleans announced that none “would either build or equip a road to the grounds.”
Burke and management then asked exhibitors to “shoulder the financial responsibility” of
railroad service to the grounds and “seriously discussed” a second opening of the fair.

When

exposition leaders met on January 5, “strong suspicions were aroused regarding the ability of the
Management to proceed further.” Some of them conducted their own investigations of the
problems. Earll secured the efforts of a nighttime police officer to gain access to the official
turn-stile index. He reported to Washington that barely 2,500 people paid daily admission to the
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exhibition during an eight day period, including Christmas and New Years. He regrettably
reported, “It actually begins to look as though [the exposition] is badly bankrupt.” The effects of
the fair’s financial distress spread beyond railroads and transportation, however, as some aspects
of the fair’s attractions closed shop. One of the exposition’s bands employed on a six month
contract, Currier’s Band, performed for the last time on January 5 “owing to,” as Earll recounted,
“the total inability of Burke to pay them.”78
Early to mid-January of 1885 was unquestionably the nadir of the exposition. “The
Management . . . is in bad shape financially, and are daily becoming more heavily involved,”
Earll reported. The daily attendance of paid guests, he continued, was well below five thousand,
while roughly ten thousand were needed to cover expenses. He “sincerely regret[ed]” the poor
attendance and financial hole the exposition found itself in, yet he did not explicitly blame the
management or Burke other than to marvel at their steadfast determination, if not blind
optimism, to ensure the fair’s success. However, the New Orleans Mascot routinely parodied
what it perceived as Burke’s shell game of financial reports. On the cover of one edition, it
depicted Burke as a two-faced jester who used his position as owner-editor of the TimesDemocrat to fluff his accounting reports as director general. With a Burke lackey depicted as a
dog chewing a bone at his feet, a member of the board of management in the foreground assures
an inquisitor that “Burke will fix us alright” (See Appendix F).79
Nonetheless, the Smithsonian superintendent continued to see positives in the exposition.
He considered it “a mammoth affair, unquestionably the finest exposition of America’s resources
and industries that the World [had] ever seen.” Even acknowledging that the fair was still
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incomplete, Earll contended that the weeks since the New Year had “wrought a great change” in
the exceptional quality of the exposition on the whole. Earll proudly reported that the
Smithsonian’s exhibit, completed January 10, sustained the “reputation of the Smithsonian for
eclipsing all competitors.” Moreover, he posited that all but the beautification plans of the
grounds would be completed by mid-February if additional funds were secured. He conceded
that lack of sufficient facilities for bringing people to the grounds remained a paramount obstacle
to attracting the requisite number of paying visitors needed for financial solvency, ten thousand
according to Earll. Yet he and others were optimistic about drawing many of the “thousands of
strangers” who would “doubtless flock to the city” during Mardi Gras.
Yet, the torrential rains compounded transportation woes. “Transportation by carriage is
out of the question, owing to the bad conditions of the roads, which are at present better suited
for canal boats than horses,” reported Earll.80 The deluge had not relented as February dawned.
Maintaining his humor amid the seemingly endless financial and environmental difficulties, the
Smithsonian Superintendent remarked, “We are having a little damp weather, here, the twentythird consecutive day that we have been entirely free from dust. No danger of dust in this grand
country!”81 While Earll acknowledged that attendance had improved to eclipse five thousand a
day on occasion, he was skeptical of the unrealistic expectations of New Orleans papers of
impending hordes of nearly seventy thousand paying visitors for Mardi Gras festivities. Instead,
he delivered a witty barb that the truer number would to divide the papers’ expectations “by
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1,000 and extract the square root.”82
Earll’s doubts were ultimately eased. The exposition began to turn the corner in
February, which led the superintendent “to report a more favorable condition of affairs here than
at any time since my arrival in New Orleans.” Perhaps most importantly, the weather seemed to
have “satisfied its spits against the city,” and the sun was “again shining.” Exhibits in the Main
and Government buildings had been mostly completed. As a result, Earll reported that the
exhibition, as a whole, had “taken on a respectable appearance,” and that attendance was
“considerably improved and daily increasing,” though it still averaged “considerably below ten
thousand.” Earll’s objective analysis of the success and importance of the exposition, if flawed,
led him to vent his frustration with what he perceived to be the local populace’s lackluster
support for the exposition. “New Orleans and its people have done nothing to help the
exposition except loan sixty thousand on condition that every cent be paid back within sixty
days,” he said, which led the management to take out a thousand dollars per day from gate
receipts.83
The exposition was finally all but complete a couple weeks into February. The change of
affairs led the ever candid Smithsonian superintendent to dub the exposition “a magnificent one,”
with a “city . . . full of visitors from all parts of the country,” and everyone speaking
“enthusiastically of the display in the Main and Government buildings.” Earll was optimistic
that “the reports that they carry home with them will doubtless send thousands to New Orleans.”
For instance, a vacation company in New England offered three separate sightseeing excursions
from Boston to the exposition via railroad to Chicago and luxury steamships to the Crescent
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City. In the midst of the continually increasing attendance, Earll was pleased to report that ticket
revenues were “considerably more than paying the running expenses.” Unfortunately, additional
congressional aid was needed as current profits were not enough to satisfy the half million dollar
debt to creditors who were still threatening to foreclose on the exposition. While the
Smithsonian superintendent noted that Burke would leave again for Washington to “help push
the appropriation bill along,” he reported “a strong sentiment in favor of a change of
Management in case of Congressional aid.” In addition, Earll’s favorable impressions of the fair
and its importance did not stop his pragmatic assessment that President Arthur had made “a great
mistake in recommending to Congress that authority be given to continue the Exposition through
the winter of 1885-1886.”84
Perhaps none spoke to Burke’s molding of the New Orleans exposition into a voice for a
transnational New South better than Century Magazine writer Eugene V. Smalley. Smalley
visited the exposition in the spring of 1885, when its buildings had been completed and all
exhibits installed, and was struck by Burke’s logistical feat. The major’s “very intelligent and
energetic direction” brought an international exposition to a relatively small city isolated from
the chief centers of population, all in less than a year. Smalley insightfully credited two
motivating ideas behind Burke and the exposition as a whole. First, the New Orleans exposition
was, according to Smalley, the manifestation of “the rise of a new national idea, namely, that
there are vast and inviting fields to the south of us waiting to be conquered for our industries and
our commerce.” Such an idea only “occasionally appears in our politics and governmental
resources,” he observed, yet it had taken “strong hold of the manufactures of the North” by 1885.
The New South tenet of courting northern capital combined with Burke’s New Orleans
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boosterism had convinced a large contingent of businessmen to send “their fabrics and
machinery to New Orleans” because it was the “natural mart of all the regions bordering upon
the Gulf of Mexico.” Smalley demonstrated how the nascent imperialism of the age was
inextricably bound to the New South’s nationalist creed with what he considered the second
grand idea behind the exposition, that the South was at “the portal of a great industrial
development” as part of a reconciled American republic.85
None other than noted political cartoonist Thomas Nast equated the New Orleans
exposition with burying issues of national disunity. A few weeks before the exposition’s
opening ceremonies, Whitelaw Reid of the New York Tribune and Murat Halstead of Ohio’s
Commercial Gazette, two leading Republican newspaper editors, suggested that the return of a
Democrat to the White House after the election of Grover Cleveland would revive southern
attempts for slavery and secession. In the same Harper’s Weekly issue that included an image of
Burke with other exposition leaders, Nast captured the absurdity of the statement as a “cock and
bull story.” Nast’s cartoon depicted Halstead and Reid leading a foolhardy charge under a
banner of “hate and malice” towards the New Orleans exposition building, topped with the
American flag, as a pair of amiable southerners, one white and one black, watch with amusement
(See Appendix G).86
In order to court northern capitalists to aid southern-led commercial ventures, Burke and
other exposition organizers first established their fervent support of American unity. As the first
major southern world’s fair, the New Orleans exposition functioned as a workshop of national
reconciliation, where exposition planners and exhibit directors took great pains to shape the
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perception of the former Confederacy as a region that had renounced slavery and secession. The
iconography of American nationalism was ubiquitous. U.S. flags covered the exposition grounds
and draped its buildings nearly as thickly as the Louisiana humidity. While the exposition
reflected a vision of the South’s future, it also extolled the national unity of its Revolutionary
past. A seminal symbol of American patriotism before today’s pantheon of monuments in the
National Mall was the Liberty Bell. Exposition organizers put special emphasis on successfully
inducing Pennsylvania to loan the famous bell to the fair, marking the first time it had left the
City of Brotherly Love.87 The Washington Artillery, a unit that had recently fought to break up
the Union, and had been a highly popular component of the exposition’s opening ceremony,
escorted the bell to the exposition grounds. The U.S. Government Building’s exhibits from
individual states and territories, all but Alaska and Utah being represented, also functioned as
visible evidence of national unity, a place where visitors strolled booths from South Carolina and
Massachusetts under one roof. That an aura of reconciliation pervaded the exposition was
noteworthy considering frequent rumors before the fair that southerners would use the occasion
to foment dissension. Distrustful Pennsylvanians, for example, had expressed concern that if
Louisianans gained temporary control of the Liberty Bell they would melt it down to cast a statue
of Jefferson Davis, or that the Louisiana lottery would steal the bell and offer it as a gambling
prize.88
Exposition management devoted particular days to individual exhibits that they believed
might operate as public displays of civic boosterism and national unity. Georgia Day was typical
of such events. A procession of prominent state dignitaries, politicians, and businessmen paraded
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down Canal Street, accompanied by the ever-present Washington Artillery, to a waiting paddlewheel river steamer that transported the group down the Mississippi to the exposition grounds
amid elaborate fanfare. Southern commissioners and state representatives routinely espoused
national unity, as did a Georgian who professed no “heartier gratification than to see the States of
this Union meet . . . beneath this ample roof.”89 A Georgia Democratic senator received raucous
applause when he patriotically predicted, “[The] exposition may be the means of binding with
closer ties the people of . . . this great Union . . . united by a common and glorious flag, no North,
no South, no West, no East, but one land, one country, one nation, now and forever.” The
Liberty Bell served as tangible proof of regional reconciliation as the Georgia delegation, federal
representatives, and members of the fair’s management ended the festivities by posing for a
photograph in its shadow.90
Burke’s decisions in regards to race also reflected goals of reconciliation and
maintenance of Democratic control. The major’s choice to establish a Colored Department set a
precedent that was followed by later southern expositions in Atlanta, Nashville, and Charleston.
In his account of the New Orleans exposition, Herbert S. Fairall wrote that “it was the favorite
idea with Director General Burke especially, to give the colored people an opportunity to show
[their] progress . . . in the arts and sciences.” Burke not only broke with the example set by the
Philadelphia fair of 1876, which excluded black exhibitors, but he did so after the 1883 civil
rights cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the right of individuals to discriminate against
blacks. African American Bishop Henry A. Turner, in expressing his disbelief at the
establishment of a Colored Department, declared, “[It] was so unexpected, so marvelous, so
Utopian, that we could scarcely believe it was true . . . All honor, I say, to Director General
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Burke.” The inclusion of such a department was no doubt an attempt to find common ground
with black elites and thus reflected the shallow but frequent overtures Democrats made to blacks
before Jim Crow disfranchisement. Interestingly, nearly a decade later, Frederick Douglass and
Ida B. Wells led a massive protest when leaders of the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair refused make
similar provisions for African Americans.91
New South leaders such as Burke used the Colored Department to underscore the
important, yet largely subservient, role of African Americans as laborers in the south’s network
of global trade. Like other New South spokesmen, Burke realized that the prosperity of the
South depended upon both white and black Southerners. He believed in the capacity of African
Americans – under the watchful, paternalistic eye of the white elite - and saw blacks as a
potentially large pool of workers whose labor would aid in the industrial flourishing of a New
South economy. Burke and other New South zealots voiced unwavering faith that the
omnipotent powers of progress would make racial tensions a thing of the past.92
The near daily structured festivities did more than draw attendance and further the fair’s
message of modernization and reconciliation; it also functioned to expand Burke’s power and
influence. Since Burke organized the festivities, he gave the final approval to the speaking
arrangements of various public functions. Moreover, each exhibit’s “opening day” ceremony
culminated with exhibit officials formally turning over the display to Burke as director general.
This gave Burke the nearly daily opportunity to do what he loved most, to speak in front of a
crowd. Whether off the cuff or with prepared remarks, Burke’s oratory left an impression. As
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head of the Woman’s Department, and so obliged to attend formal ceremonies, Julia Ward Howe
gave an honest assessment:
We passed weary hours in endeavoring to hear the addresses of distinguished individuals
whose voices contended with the din of the machinery by which the mechanical exhibits
of the Main Building were run. The most practiced speakers only were audible; and
among these we must mention Major Burke, whose clear voice was always heard, and
whose manner of address was very graceful and popular.93
Nor were rhetorical and visual outpourings of national magnanimity confined to former
Confederates. One of the fair’s largest audiences filled the Music Hall of the Main Building for
Philadelphia Day ceremonies and speeches from a diverse crew of state and national leaders
along with the wildly popular Mexican Eighth Cavalry Band. Many a patriotic heart was
touched as dignitaries touted the exposition’s theme “that sectional hate and discord” had
“passed away” in the shadows of “the revered and sacred old Bell of Liberty.” “The confidence
and love manifested in permitting this holy and time-honored herald of freedom to come
amongst our people,” proclaimed one official, “has paced us under a lasting obligation.” The
audience burst into applause when the Mexican Band ended the Philadelphia Day ceremonies
with a stirring rendition of “Dixie.”94
The exposition also was a significant moment for northerners and southerners to mingle
socially. Leading lights, from Julia Ward Howe to Jefferson Davis, visited the fair. Moreover,
the exposition was a significant step in the growing popularity of Civil War veteran reunions, as
aging Union and Confederate veterans participated in a thousand-man march for Veteran’s Day
and a Connecticut regiment returned a captured battle flag to its former Mississippi foes.95
While the Philadelphia exposition also possessed a missionary zeal for national reconciliation in
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the midst of Reconstruction, former Confederate states participated little. As both the first major
fair hosted by a former Confederate state and the first federally-sponsored fair after
Reconstruction, the New Orleans exposition was unquestionably a watershed for reconciliation.
Such frequent displays of national reconciliation went hand in hand with efforts to draw
northern capital as a means of furthering two of the exposition’s major goals, industrialization
and the expansion of the South’s share in commercial markets abroad. Burke hastily relegated
King Cotton to a secondary position in favor of the more progressive commercial pursuits of
industry, technology, manufacturing, and natural resources. Intentionally expanding upon New
Orleans’ defining French influence, the exposition management modeled the Main Building’s
architecture after the Louvre’s imposing towers and elegant arches.96 Leading southerners
established their fidelity to an indivisible United States to then proclaim the unique advantages
the former Confederacy held in shaping American foreign policy. The Edison Electric Light
Company provided the fifteen thousand incandescent electric lights in the Main Building to
illuminate the thirty-three acres under its roof, touted as the largest building in the world as
measured by its covered area. Such displays did much to link the New South with tangible
manifestations of industrialization and progress. Occurring amidst stagnant crop prices, racial
tensions, and lingering feelings of defeat that characterized life below the Mason-Dixon,
southerners fashioned ordered rows of abundant natural resources and the latest technologies to
present a sense of control and authority to the public.97 Many of the one million total visitors to
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the grounds remarked on the constant “hum and roar” of the massive Corliss steam engine as
they gazed at the thousands of manufactured goods and technological innovations on display. 98
Most southern state exhibits, it is true, were still dominated by displays of raw materials
and natural resources, but from the U.S. Navy exploding a torpedo in the exposition’s lake to
mark noon each day – initiated by an electric signal from the Capitol - to the first use of elevators
at a world’s fair, the countless visual displays of technology and industrialization were an
excellent way to assess what the South hoped to become.99 As a diorama on the grandest of
scales, Burke guided the exposition as an immersive landscape that sought to further the image
of New Orleans at the center of global commerce and culture. Yet the fair’s supporters did not
see the work as a zero sum game. Their rhetoric and aim were to increase the wealth and
prestige of the United States as a whole in a “rising tide lifts all boats” mentality.
Burke’s ambitious goal for the exposition was more than just the inevitable faith in
southern progress characteristic of New South boosters; New Orleans in the mid 1880s was in
the midst of an economic renaissance. The long anticipated rail connection to fertile fields of the
West was finally accomplished in 1883 when the Southern Pacific lines met those of the eastern
seaboard in New Orleans. Controlling a substantial share of western grain exports was a favorite
topic of Burke and New Orleans businessmen, and with the new rail juncture theoretically
favoring the Crescent City over far away New York, their dream had a chance to be realized.
The rail connection to the West did yield a significant increase in grain exports, as New Orleans
climbed from the fifth largest exporter of grain in 1880 to third among American ports in 1896.
That same year also saw New Orleans cotton exports finally equal the antebellum bumper crop
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of 1859. With an extensive rail network to aid the traditional commercial waterway of the
Mississippi, New Orleans exported more cotton than any other American port and was second in
the world only to Liverpool in the 1880s. While Burke directed the exposition, the depots of the
Crescent City saw a substantial increase of traffic as the combination of grain, cotton, and other
goods spurred a 692.9 percent increase in railroad tonnage and a 119.8 percent increase in the
value of all products between 1880 and 1896.100
Significant economic gains in commercial exports no doubt inspired Burke to promote
similar advances in other sectors of the New Orleans economy. Imports had steadily declined
since the Civil War, and the city’s new railroad connections were found wanting in comparison
to Chicago and St. Louis. Municipal infrastructure lagged behind the northern norm, as did a
relatively slow population growth, which saw the Crescent City fall from the third largest city in
the nation in 1840 to the ninth in 1880. Perhaps the most woeful circumstance for a New South
man like Burke was New Orleans’s modest industrial sector. The city boasted only 915
manufacturing facilities at the 1880 census and would need 15,000 new factory jobs in 1883 to
bring employment in industry up to the national average of American cities.101
Compounding these problems, the exposition opened amidst a short, but significant,
nationwide panic that persisted until mid-1885. Tens of thousands joined the list of the
unemployed from St. Louis to Chicago. The economic hardship of the early 1880s, no matter
how brief, no doubt further turned the eyes of Americans, both North and South to the markets of
the Americas as avenues for commercial expansion.
Southern emphasis on material progress and industrial technologies also mirrored the
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emphasis Latin American liberals placed on tangible manifestations of progress to legitimize
their authority.102 Just as southerners felt an acute need to stage an event that could change
perceptions of disloyalty and backwardness, so Latin American nations saw participation in the
New Orleans fair as a watershed moment “to construct the image of the modern nation at all
levels” and to change perceptions of Latin America as “violent and uncivilized.”103
A third aim of the Crescent City exposition was its concerted effort to increase the
international stature and commerce of the New South, with New Orleans explicitly leading the
charge. The transnational element of the fair was most salient in regards to Latin America.
Historians of the antebellum South have demonstrated that southerners had a proclivity for
pinning regional and individual economic hopes on Latin America, from Spanish Florida and
Mexico to filibustering efforts in Cuba and Nicaragua. The New Orleans world’s fair
demonstrates that the South continued this tradition but shifted the style to rhetoric of PanAmerican progress and its substance to the trade of manufactured goods, cash crops, and
capitalist development. Burke’s remarks during the fair’s Louisiana Day demonstrates how
national reconciliation coupled with a proclamation of southern industrial and commercial
advancement was used as justification for Louisiana to lead the drive for heightened ties with
Latin America:
Sitting at the foot of the [Mississippi] valley . . . she stands ready to uphold the banner of
American commerce . . . to the friendly shores of our neglected neighbors southward . . .
ready to extend a hospitable welcome to the people of all the world, and to prepare for
[her] proud destiny . . . as mistress of the American Mediterranean, and sharer in the
commerce of the Orient.104
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Of the seventeen foreign countries and colonies represented in New Orleans, six were from
Latin America. Their participation in the exposition was yet another example that New Orleans
was as much the northernmost city of the circum-Caribbean as it was the largest southern city in
the United States. From migrants to aspiring businessmen and exiled leaders, Latin Americans
had long been on familiar terms with the wharves and streets of the Crescent City.105 In
particular, Mexico’s role in the fair was by far the largest of all foreign nations. With the aim to
disseminate commercial information, draw foreign capital with displays of natural resources and
political stability, favorably shape perceptions of Mexican culture, and legitimize the regime of
Porfirio Díaz, Mexico formed a centrally controlled bureaucracy, the Department of Fomento,
dedicated to effective participation in international expositions.106 The department represented
the foreign policy arm of a leading Latin America nation that was increasingly adopting
economic liberalism, with Díaz approving all exhibits and financial procedures.
Indeed, Mexico offers an apt case study for ongoing debates over the best path to progress
amongst national leaders in Latin America. A significant element among Hispanic elites in the
1880s held the United States and Western European nations aloft as models of economic
development and viewed any form of their influence as beneficial. Yet others saw the Northern

105

The most noteworthy Latin American exile to New Orleans was Benito Juarez, who was forced to flee in 1853 as
an opponent of Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Juarez lived in the French Quarter and Mexico gifted New Orleans a
bronze statue of Juarez that was installed in the 1960s near his residency, on the corner of Basin Street and Conti
Street. See Ralph Roeder, Juarez and His Mexico: A Biographical History, 2 Vol. (New York: Viking Press, 1947).
One of the earliest works on Juarez in English, Roeder is noteworthy for his assertion that Juarez’s exile in New
Orleans where he met other Mexican expatriates was formative for his radical liberalism. For other work on Latin
American exiles in New Orleans, see C. A. Hutchinson, "Valentín Gómez Farías and the ‘Secret Pact of New
Orleans’" Hispanic American Historical Review 36 (February 1956): 471-89; Robert Ryal Miller, "Matias Romero:
Mexican Minister to the United States during the Juarez-Maximilian Era," Hispanic American Historical Review 45
(May 1965): 228-45; David Fitzgerald, "150 Years of Transborder Politics: Mexico and Mexicans Abroad," in A
Century of Transnationalism: Immigrants and Their Homeland Connections, Nancy L. Green and Roger Waldinger,
eds., (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 106-31; Dalia Antonia Muller, Cuban Émigrés and Independence
in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 15-42.
106
Gene Yeager, “Porfirian Commercial Propaganda: Mexico in the World Industrial Expositions,” The Americas 34
(October 1977): 230, 232.

161

Colossus as a multi-headed hydra, whose legal, economic, and cultural influences were liable to
permeate domestic institutions and values, thereby weakening Latin America’s distinctive array
of cultures.107 On balance, however, Latin American participation in U.S. world’s fairs fostered
expanded commercial networks, wherein the United States constructed a commercial sphere of
influence to guard against further European imperialism.108
Ultimately, Mexico fashioned a renowned presence at world’s fairs into the twentieth
century, yet the New Orleans exposition set the standard and was “without question . . . the first
major effort to portray itself as a modern nation on the world stage.”109 Two Mexican buildings
were constructed on the grounds, which, coupled with additional displays in the Main Building,
provided visitors with seventy-six acres dedicated to the country.110 Mexican architects built an
impressive octagonal building, dubbed the Mexican Alhambra, to house mineralogical exhibits
that blended Spanish and Aztec designs with steel and glasswork to create an exotically elegant
incorporation of light and color.111 Díaz himself courted southern capitalists when the general
and his new wife visited the New Orleans exposition, a key stop on their grand tour of the United
States following his recent reelection.112 The Department of Fomento also dispatched the
aforementioned Mexican Eighth Cavalry Band as cultural ambassadors. They were so wildly
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popular as to participate in nearly every ceremony during the exposition, where they were simply
known as the “Mexican Band,” and drew large crowds for their spirited musical renditions. Such
displays of cultural nationalism reflected how exposition participants not only competed for
commercial benefits, but also engaged in creative attempts to control “the intellectual, social, and
cultural authority and influence that shaped societal conduct.”113
Both visually and audibly, therefore, the New Orleans fair furthered viable connections
between the South and the wider world. Moreover, adhering to the dogma of industrialization
and capitalism writ large meant holding aloft the doctrine that “material production offered the
answer to societal problems.”114 This was one point upon which leading southerners and Latin
Americans, each anxious over race relations, legacies of defeat, and perceptions of
underdevelopment, both acutely believed. The hierarchical nature of the New Orleans exposition
and the strategies of southern Democratic governments as a whole were similar in many ways to
late nineteenth-century Latin American emphasis on “developmental liberalism.” While such
earlier liberals as Benito Juarez sought economic equality in a nation of small property holders
espousing civil liberties and anticlericalism, Díaz and many of his Hispanic contemporaries
coupled political stability through state control and a racial hierarchy with material progress that
“stressed the creation of wealth as opposed to the distribution of riches.” The fair made such an
impression on Hispanic residents in New Orleans that several years after the exposition closed
the city’s leading Spanish-language newspaper, El Moro de Paz, called for a permanent
exhibition to house changing displays of Latin American products and culture as a means to
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develop the region.115
The New Orleans exposition likewise functioned as a primary opportunity for Central
American governments to promote their liberal policies and attract international attention.
Guatemala was among Central American governments that used the fair to avoid monocultural
dependence on coffee by encouraging a wide range of agricultural production. As the region’s
first liberal leader, President Justo Rufino Barrios displayed over one thousand varieties of
Guatemalan produce at the exposition.116 With a moto of “Paz, Progreso, i Caminos” (Peace,
Progress, and Roads), President Luis Bográn marshaled Honduran energy and resources toward a
prominent place in the New Orleans exposition in order to attract capitalists to a modernizing
nation. As in Louisiana, 1876 marked a significant shift in Honduran politics, when the election
of Marco Aurelio Soto (1876-1883) inaugurated a liberal era. As part of his liberal reforms,
Bográn’s predecessor modernized the country’s mining code in 1880 to court large-scale foreign
mining corporations while also allowing for significant “prudent discretion of the executive
branch” to grant generous concessions and arrangements.117 Soto and Bográn were
representative of a dogmatic liberal faith that Latin American leaders need only open the
floodgates of foreign capital, science, and entrepreneurial energy to marshal, as Soto described, a
“wave of progress and civilization.”118 The New Orleans exposition was formative in increasing
Central American liberalism. Bográn seized on the exposition as an opportunity Soto did not
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enjoy, the ability to announce to the world the arrive of a new, developmental focus with
generous economic terms to foreign capital. The fair reflected and furthered a time in which
liberalism provided such a windfall of concessions in Honduras that dispensing them became an
industry in itself. Bográn’s presidency, from 1883 to 1891, was the height of Honduran mining
concessions with the number of companies more than doubling while as many as thirty-eight
zoning rights were granted to mining corporations each year.119
Bográn dispatched Dr. Reinholt Fritzgartner as superintendent of the national display. As a
well-connected German with a degree from the world’s oldest metallurgical university, Freiberg
University of Mining and Technology in Saxony, as well as being educated at universities in
Württemberg and Stuttgart, Fritzgartner was a man of wanderlust who embodied the European or
American industrial-minded men Honduran leaders hoped to attract. A leading assayer of ores
throughout the country, Fritzgartner ambitiously called upon all mine owners to provide a
comprehensive account of their businesses and to send numerous specimens, only stipulating that
none should be under five pounds. When Honduran industrialists understandably balked at
Fritzgartner’s request, La República, the official government organ, chided them by saying that
failure to “favorably impress” the attendees of “the important and glorious event” in New
Orleans risked missing a major opportunity to lure American skilled labor and capital. 120 While
Fritzartner’s ambitions were excessive, the Tegucigalpa newspaper proved correct in the ability
of the New Orleans exposition to boost the Honduran economy. At least one Honduran
landowner, Miguel Luis Aguilera, used exhibit materials to sell mineral rights to four American

Finney, “Precious Metal Mining,” 39, 44. This period was highly speculative, as many mining companies were
organized and folded without much or any work done. Nonetheless, fifty-four companies were in operation in 1889,
up from only nine in 1883. See Finney, “Precious Metal Mining,”49.
120
Reports of the Scientific Commission of the Republic of France on the Guayape and Jalan River Concessions and
on Six Mineral Zones, Also Statement of ex-Inspector General of Mines (Tegucigalpa: National Printing Office,
1897), 23; Finney, Precious Metal Mining, 34-35.
119

165

entrepreneurs. The Aguan Navigation and Improvement Company emerged a couple years after
the fair’s closing, yet could not remain in operation after two superintendents died of yellow
fever in 1888.121
The extent to which such transnational New South zealots as Burke saw the possibilities of
tapping into the potentially rich commercial, agricultural, industrial, and mineral veins of Latin
America was likewise evident in the personal attention paid to Hispanic exhibits. When the
Honduran official charged by Bográn to direct his country’s displays proposed a striking, but
costly, one-hundred-thousand-square feet panoramic national map, Burke personally contributed
a decisive amount of funds to create it. As an occasion to bring capitalists from around the globe
together, personal networks that began at the fair were fundamental to transnational links. Burke
begin formative relationships with skilled laborers in addition to those with such foreign
government officials as Fritzgartner. For example, Burke employed Englishman Stanley Rees in
the construction of the exposition and later hired Rees as an engineer to scout and survey his
subsequent Honduran mineral zones.122
The exposition was also an opportunity for American businesses to make contacts with
foreign educational leaders. The Smithsonian Institution, for instance, formed a connection with
the Mexican government’s delegation. The director of the National Museum of Mexico, Dr.
Jesús Sánchez, attended the fair and initiated a reciprocal agreement. Mexico’s National
Museum would loan displays, particularly of Mexican antiquities, to its American counterpart
and tour the U.S. National Museum in Washington in May before returning to Mexico. A
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Mexican naturalist from the Guatemalan and Mexican Boundary Survey, Rafael Montes de Oca,
also initiated an exchange in which he sent Mexican bird skins and mammal specimens to the
Smithsonian for a collection of native birds of the United States. Mexican officials and other
foreign nations actively exchanged, and even donated, materials to the Smithsonian, in part to
avoid the hassle and fees of re-packing and transporting collections back home.123
When the Smithsonian did not permanently accept specimens, duplicates for instance,
curators at the U.S. National Museum distributed them to colleges and museums throughout the
nation. The Smithsonian’s resources and reputation made it a desirable repository for foreign
governments wishing to expand their respective countries’ international awareness, appreciation,
and prestige. For all the rhetoric and tangible relationships the fair fostered between capitalists
from the American South and Latin America, Mexico also preferred the Smithsonian because it
could ensure that their displays did not languish underappreciated after “being gobbled up by the
smaller institutions of the South.” The Smithsonian also received collections from the majority
of states that exhibited at the fair.124 By the end of June, the superintendent of the Smithsonian
reported to Washington that donations were “coming in with a rush.” Mexico donated a large
part of its displays, including “an enormous amount of ores . . . entire collections of medicinal
herbs . . . a large collection of Indian basket work . . . and several fine sombreros.” All told, the
Smithsonian appropriated displays from Mexico, Japan, France, Belgium, Jamaica, Venezuela,
and Russia as well as “the entire Siamese collection.”125
The Smithsonian Institution saw the exposition as a unique opportunity to add international
items to the National Museum. One clever tactic was to have the secretary of the treasury
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authorize the New Orleans customs house to declare all foreign articles donated or purchased by
the Smithsonian duty free. Such a plan saved “much annoyance to commissioners from foreign
governments and . . . a great savings in the cost of articles to be purchased.”126 The
Smithsonian’s freight tonnage was so significant that it arranged with the Pennsylvania Railroad
to ship at no cost on its rails in exchange for the first 20,000 pounds. The Smithsonian ultimately
sent over a dozen railroad cars carrying roughly 1,500 packages. After months of constant trials
for labor and management, the Smithsonian superintendent left New Orleans in mid-July.127
Despite reflecting nascent American imperialism and its fundamental role in Burke’s
transnational New South vision, the World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition was
not a financial success. The national economic downtown, reluctance by railroads to offer
discounted rates, the city’s relative isolation, and consistently bad weather was too much to turn
a profit. Burke opportunistically resigned as director general a month before the exposition was
forced to close. At a ceremony honoring his stewardship, the exposition’s federal commissioners
proclaimed:
When the future historian comes to write of . . . Burke’s great works he will place his
name by the side of the greatest industrial leaders and educators of the nineteenth
century. In bringing to its present success this great Exposition he has reared a
monument to his memory that will make his name…a household word in every family of
our glorious and free republic.128
It could be said that attempts at commercial expansion abroad after the Civil War often ran
afoul of white southerners’ partisan disputes with Republicans, fears over aggrandizing federal
power, hostility toward racial contact with Hispanics, and fiscal conservatism.129 Yet the New
Orleans exposition spurred six more world’s fairs held in the South that, in the aggregate, helped
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to foster significant advancement of southern industry and commerce. Southern world fairs in
the late nineteenth century were a formative experience for millions of Americans that surely
increased white southern support for U.S. involvement abroad, particularly in the SpanishAmerican War, and the creation of an isthmian canal in Central America. As such, Burke’s
direction over the exposition reflected how fairs were crafted as material manifestations of
national, regional, and local booster attempts to fashion a version of industrialism, modernity,
and regional development according to their own geopolitical circumstances and social goals. 130
While some scholars have interpreted international expositions in the age of imperialism as
hyperbolic hot-air, the novelty, spectacle and hopefulness of the New Orleans fair was a
significant means of legitimizing a transnational New South vision and shaping both the way
southerners viewed the world and how people outside its boundaries perceived the region. The
fair’s vast exhibits, grandiose architecture, and lavish civic functions served as visceral
propaganda to shape the Crescent City as the metropole of the New South and leader of the
region’s hoped-for dynamic role in the wider world. The exposition represented a significant
moment of self-consciousness amongst southerners as they grappled with their role and place in
the world while demonstrating the ways in which local and individual experiences rooted in
geography and place fueled outward looking goals. Thus, we get a picture of a broad and
unfixed world view of southerners in the late nineteenth century that functions as a necessary
antidote to the dominant view of a backward and isolated region.
In the broadest sense, the string of fairs in the former Confederacy is evidence that the South
had myriad webs of vibrant and dynamic ties with the rest of the world as a result of the global
flow of commodities, people, capital, culture, and ideas that continued throughout the nineteenth
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century and into the twentieth. Moreover, New Orleans is not so much an exception to the rule
as it is proof that a vigorously contested fraternal fight existed among southerners for the future
of their region, as well as for who should lead it. Indeed, Atlanta’s much acknowledged New
South vision conceptualized itself as modern and progressive due to its own geopolitical history.
New Orleans, meanwhile, sought its own path, creatively molding its vibrant geopolitical history
with the Americas writ large.131
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Chapter Four: “Un Eminente Caballero:” Major Edward A. Burke in Latin America, 1886-1896.
Among the waving palm trees and whitewashed buildings of San Pedro Sula, Honduras,
an elderly American strolled down the city’s main street of Avenida Presidente Wilson in 1926.
With a flowing white mustache, Stetson hat, and a cut-away coat, he made an immediate
impression on a correspondent with the Atlantic Monthly as a “Southerner of the old order.”
“Majuh E. A. Burke, suh, at your service. I see you’re new to our country,” the eighty-seven
year old said with a smile and a handshake. “Permit me the honor of asking you to a toast, suh,
to the grandest country in the world - the United States.” After sharing several drinks and
stories, the journalist left their encounter with a seminal observation: “No story of Honduras is
complete without mention of the Major.”1
On September 20, 1886, Burke made his first visit to Honduras. The major’s reputation
preceded him in no small part due to the network of established personal connections with a
cadre of Americans, Europeans, and Latinos operating in Honduras. Prominent among them was
E. A. Lever, a former colonel under Benito Juárez whom Burke had made head of the TimesDemocrat’s Latin American department in 1881. By 1883, Lever was working closely with
Central American consulate offices in New Orleans, and Burke had promoted him to associate
editor. Lever used the connections his posts at the Times-Democrat provided to promote
contracts for southern-led development projects in Latin America. He partnered with a
Knoxville, Tennessee, railroad firm to secure a construction contract in Guatemala. Other
contacts included the former Confederate general John B. Gordon. Two years before Burke’s
trip to Honduras, Lever had even served as a brigadier general in the Honduran army, for which
Bográn granted Lever a concession on the Guayape River. While still based in New Orleans and
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working for Burke’s newspaper, Lever published an 1885 travelogue full of hyperbolic prose
about the rich potential of Central America.2
It was no surprise, then, when the official government organ in Tegucigalpa, La
República, published a detailed article to coincide with Burke’s visit in 1886. Negotiations for a
mineral zone concession were evidently in progress, as Bográn granted Burke concessions on the
Jalan and Guayape rivers two days after the publication of La República article. Therefore, the
piece on Burke preemptively sold the public on his merits as an “eminente caballero,” “a strong
defender” of Honduras, and well-deserving of a generous grant of land. In addition, the article
illuminated how Honduran leaders perceived Burke and his transnational New South vision.3
The newspaper highlighted two of Burke’s initiatives as being specifically noteworthy for
Hondurans interested in developing the country: his oversight of the Times-Democrat and the
New Orleans exposition. La República presented Burke’s newspaper as influential in “public
business” and a leading “thermometer of all public opinion” in the United States. Despite the
tendency of many Latin Americans to label all citizens of the United States as yanquis or
norteamericanos from el Norte, the newspaper acknowledged Burke’s vision as distinctly
regional. Burke was extolled as the founder of the “grande é importante órgano del Sur,” whose
“large influence” was obtained through its interest in the development of the natural resources of
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“los Estados del Sur, de la América del Norte, México, y de las Repúblicas de Centro América.”
This verified Burke’s claims to his readers in New Orleans that the Times-Democrat was an
active source of news for Latin Americans.4
The paper argued that Burke’s acknowledged role as a proponent of southern and circumCaribbean ties led to his formidable leadership in the New Orleans world’s fair. In reviewing
Burke’s position as director general, La República implicitly demonstrated that Honduran leaders
gave southerners equal weight in possessing the so-called distinctive entrepreneurial drive and
grit of men from the northern U.S. and Europe. Burke possessed the degree of “skill and
intelligence,” “patience and perseverance,” and “will and energy” to overcome the difficulties of
staging an international exposition that would have “discouraged a man of inferior aptitudes and
a less energetic character.” For its part, “Honduras figured with honor” in the “largest exhibition
ever seen in the world.” The purpose of Burke’s visit, according to the organ of Bográn’s
administration, was to meet with Honduran public officials and visit the country’s leading
mineral areas in order to determine zones for prospective development. An experienced civil
engineer and mining practitioner, Edward P. Mayes, accompanied Burke and collected reports on
their thousand-plus mile trip.5
Reflecting in 1890 on this first visit to Honduras, Burke recounted being struck by the
longstanding custom of local women to sift gold nuggets in traditional bateas, conical-shaped
pans developed by Mayans, from the banks of the Guayape. Observing the fruits of this common
female work was undoubtedly the formative experience for his preference for a concession
centered on the Guayape and Jalan rivers. Scouting mineral zones outside the crowded center of
concessions for the hard rock silver mining areas near Tegucigalpa was also a forward-thinking
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tactical decision, as the rush for these virgin zones would not occur for several years. During
Burke’s extensive tour, he visited numerous mineral works that were being developed or were in
operation, including Abelardo Zelaya’s El Crucero Mining Company and the Zelaya Company in
San Juancito, formed with New York and Chicago capital. Burke toured several zones
comprising companies with ties to the Crescent City that were also active in the Pacific and
Caribbean portions of Honduras in 1886, most notably the New Orleans and Curarén Mining
Company and the New Orleans and Honduras Mining Company.6
The dominant position of the Ring in Louisiana politics played a direct role in Burke’s
concessions. Burke was financially stable and well-connected enough to pay twelve thousand
pesos, representing twelve years’ worth of annual payments, in advance. Burke was granted his
concession on September 27, 1886, immediately following the delivery of the advanced payment
to the consul general of Honduras in New York City, Jacob Baiz. While perhaps such a payment
required a full consulate, rather than the vice-consul based in New Orleans, use of New York
points to the silent partnership of a Burke ally and co-owner of the Louisiana State Lottery
Company, John A. Morris. Morris, who had grown to prominence in New York, retained strong
business ties to the city even after he became a founder of the Louisiana lottery and moved to
New Orleans.7 The likelihood of Morris fronting part or all of the advanced payment is lent
further credence by Burke formally transferring ownership of his holdings to Morris when the
deed to the concession was finalized several years later. Had Morris and Ring Democrats
doubted their ability to continue the lottery, a central source of funds and muscle, they would
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have perhaps been unwilling to diversify into Central American mining.8
Burke’s concession granted by Bográn on September 27, 1886, provided the exact
perimeters, protections, privileges, and obligations that went beyond the country’s mining laws.
Burke also secured an adjoining concession that same year for mineral rights on the Guayape
River. According to the American Institute of Mining Engineers, Burke’s concessions were
“without doubt, one of the largest tracts of mineral land ever conveyed to one individual.” Burke
held claim to all mineral and metals from the subsoil to the waters and banks that encompassed
six hundred varas, or roughly five-hundred-and-fifty yards, on each side of the Jalan and
Guayape rivers. The contract applied to national lands, leaving intact the rights of private
property holders and the communal land of municipalities. He had a loose exemption from all
import taxes, which were substantially high at the time, on any goods necessary for his
enterprises, and he was exempt from any current or future taxes on the exports of any products in
his concession. Since tariffs made up more than half of government income, these stipulations
were noteworthy. Burke could also transfer, lease, or sublease any part of his holdings. If any
transfer or lease failed, the property would return to Burke and not another partner of the lease.
In addition, the government held Burke accountable for annual payments of one thousand pesos
toward an Industrial School, which Bográn hoped to begin building in 1887. The contract also
stipulated that two-and-a-half percent of the concession’s annual net profits would be paid to the
government for the operating expenses of the school, although this payment would fall due only
after a successful return on the company’s capital, operating expenses, and ten percent of
shareholder dividends.9
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The government stipulated that Burke’s concession not only aid an aspiring class of
skilled laborers through the establishment of education initiatives, but that it would also protect
traditional practices of rural Hondurans. The indigenous people were given special guarantees
for their gold washing customs as long as they used traditional bateas and stayed beyond five
hundred varas, roughly four hundred-sixty yards, from where Burke was “actually working.”
Washing for gold in this fashion was protected because the government considered it part of
indigenous patrimonio (heritage). Mestizo Hondurans were granted more expansive protections,
as they were able to use sluice boxes or machinery outside Burke’s working areas. However,
akin to the stipulations about school payments, the contract provided legal flexibility. Burke and
his agents could curtail local argonauts if they could prove that such freelance workers violated
the contract’s tool or distance stipulations. Moreover, the concession gave Burke the
wherewithal to expel locals by “working” an area they previously used. These stipulations
mirrored the more informal agreement between batea workers and Honduran landowners, who
often restricted local access or demanded a share of the results.10
President Bográn’s requirement that Burke contribute funds to an industrial school
reflected his administration’s priority in the mining sector. That government oversight of mining
concerns was housed in the east wing of the National Palace was just one illustration of Bográn’s
emphasis on mineralogical extraction. Bográn’s reelection bid centered on development of the
Honduran economy, and mining was his main issue. The concession to Burke was likely a
central piece of evidence Bográn used as proof of his efforts to spur development. The same
month that the Honduran congress approved his concession to Burke, February 1887, Bográn
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defeated his presidential challenger Céleo Arias for reelection. He saw a vibrant mining industry
as a national panacea, not just economically, but socially as well. A government newspaper
after Bográn’s successful reelection argued that mining benefited “all those sectors . . . related to
it, such as commerce, agriculture, [and] transportation routes.”11
Bográn took his reelection in 1887 as a mandate for his mining initiatives. His reelection
reassured investor confidence in the stability of Honduras and the protections foreign companies
and industrial concessions could come to expect. The first two years of Bográn’s second term
saw dozens of new corporations formed and the highest number of annual mining concessions at
thirty-eight for both years.12 To aid this effort, he established the Honduras Mining Bureau
within the Department of Fomento. Reinholt Fritzgartner, who supervised the Honduran exhibit
in New Orleans, became the nation’s mining czar. He streamlined the government assay office
within the new bureaucracy and modeled the bureau after similar American agencies in
California and Colorado.
The decision to model the bureau after these two U.S. states was not accidental. If
London, Paris, and northern U.S. cities were the urban capitals of finance, California, Colorado,
Australia, and India were the locales for the practical side of the industry. Numerous engineers,
mine superintendents, assayers, and import companies in Honduras had extensive ties to
California and Colorado. Several active members of the American Institute of Mining Engineers
that made thorough mining visits to Honduras were based in Colorado.13 Machinery and mining
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experts from California swarmed over Honduras, in part because many of the canyons and
gulches resembled well-known mineral zones in the Golden State. An early engineer for Burke’s
concessions, Henry Woolcock, was from Grass Valley, California. Yet the mining links between
Latin America and the United States were reciprocal, if uneven, as Chilenos and Sonoreños had
used variations of the batea to first exploit the California gold rush in the late 1840s.14
Bográn also ordered Fritzgartner to publish mining articles in English to spur American
interest. This directive ultimately led to the formation of the Honduras Progress in 1888.
Fritzgartner devoted his pen to mining to such an extent that the title of the bi-weekly paper was
soon changed to the more accurately titled Honduras Mining Journal. The Prussian mineralogist
continued Bográn’s favorite theme by extolling mining enterprises that brought “heavy capital”
to ensure employment and growth in overlapping and auxiliary commercial sectors. In addition,
foreign-led mining industry would “naturally bring with it wealth and industry, intelligence and
social progress, upon which the future prosperity of Honduras . . . [could be] based.” Such Latin
American positivists believed an emphasis on productivity and exports would generate revenue
and raise the standard of living, thereby facilitating auxiliary industries amid a wider industrial
revolution. The reach of the Tegucigalpa press was significant, because Honduran leaders would
frequently mail copies of La Gaceta or Fritzgartner’s publication to prospective foreign
investors.15
Modernizing the country’s telegraph services was an overlapping initiative of Honduran
liberalism. In addition to a national telegraphy school, established in 1877, that graduated
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twenty students a year, Bográn recruited two “intelligent youths from established families” to
apprentice at each telegraph office throughout the country. State-sponsored means of improving
commerce via communication had long been a cause Bográn championed, having served as a
Honduran delegate to the Universal Postal Convention in Paris before his presidency. Links
between the Honduras government and the American South were strengthened further in 1888,
when Bográn recruited an Arkansan, Bertie Cecil, to operate the national telegraph system.
Ultimately commissioned as both the Director General of Telegraphs and Postmaster General,
Cecil merged both administrations and markedly increased the country’s communication
network through a series of reforms in line maintenance and office coordination between
telegraphers and postmasters. He oversaw more than two thousand miles of telegraph lines and
fifty-eight post offices with over three hundred workers in each division. To improve efficiency,
Cecil helped enact strident police measures to clamp down on the habit of campesinos to cut
telegraph wires for fencing and to use lines to hang clothes. Cecil also aided a Bográn directive
that required departmental politicians to pay for the repair of frequently damaged lines out of
their own salaries.16
In addition to initiatives to spur communication developments, Congress approved
Bográn’s concession to Burke on February 10, 1887, and plans were laid to begin surveys of the
zone, which had to be government-approved before a final title was issued. Bográn
commissioned Don José Esteban Lazo two years later as the government-sanctioned engineer to
survey the exact boundaries of Burke’s concession. Following over a month of field work that
spring, the government was sufficiently satisfied with the survey to issue final title to the
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concession on June 18, 1890.17 During this intervening period, Burke and his allies utilized a
legal sleight of hand to provide financial stability for the company and increase the number of
important men who had an interest in its success. Burke and John A. Morris appeared before the
Orleans Parish notary public on June 15, 1888, for the major to sell the “right, title, and interest
of every nature and kind whatsoever” of his Honduran concessions to Morris.18 The selling price
of ten thousand dollars gave Burke much needed cash reserves and was a negligible amount for
Morris, whose Morris Park horse-racing track in New York alone was assessed at two million
dollars, and whose wealth was already estimated to be in the tens of millions.19 Equally
important, a couple months after the Ring’s electoral defeat in 1888, Morris appointed Burke as
his “Agent and Attorney.” Burke now had the power to make, sign, and execute sales,
purchases, and contracts in Morris’s name. On January 30, 1889, in New Orleans, the Honduran
vice-consul and the British consul approved Burke’s appointment.20
As with so many men in state and national Gilded Age politics, Burke was optimistic that
his recent defeat in the 1888 elections would turn out to be a temporary setback in his political
career. His strategy was to make use of his mining concessions while simultaneously remaining
active in Louisiana and national affairs. He was among the scores of Regular Democrats who
lost state and local positions in 1888, but Burke and the New Orleans machine retained influence
with Senator James B. Eustis, who had been elected on the 1884 Democratic ticket. In the
summer of 1889, Eustis successfully lobbied Republican President Benjamin Harrison to
consider Burke for an appointment as a delegate to that fall’s Pan-American Conference.
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Harrison wrote James G. Blaine from the White House in August mulling over patronage
positions. Since Democrats in control of the previous Congress and presidential administration
of Grover Cleveland had passed legislation authorizing the conference, Republicans on Capitol
Hill were debating how best to deploy their political capital.21
Having already selected a New York merchant and banker, Charles F. Flint, as one of the
delegates, Harrison thought he would appease senators from the Democracy by adding Burke or
Henry G. Davis. Burke had the influential support of the Department of State’s executive agent
in charge of planning the conference, William Eleroy Curtis. Curtis achieved that position due to
a journalistic career in Chicago and Washington D.C. that had made him one of the nation’s
leading authorities on Latin America. He opined so often on the need for stronger commercial
and political ties with Latin America that he acquired the moniker “the Patagonian.”22
Yet Burke’s candidacy was more than a show of bipartisanship. Harrison emphasized
Burke’s ability to speak Spanish, and pointed out that he possessed “a good deal of knowledge of
South American affairs.” Burke’s leadership in the New Orleans exposition and personal
relationships with such Latin American leaders as Porfirio Díaz and Bográn no doubt aided the
major’s cause. Burke also was more aligned with Republican economic and foreign policies
than many Democrats. His support of a federal tariff for Louisiana sugar and of federal subsidies
for steamship lines made him palpable to Republicans. The latter position reflected a common
Hispanic goal of closer ties with the United States. The Chilean newspaper El Ferrocarril
voiced a common opinion of Latin American leaders in pressuring American politicians to
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mirror Europe’s successful strategy of subsidized shipping as an “indispensable first step” for
heightened commerce.23
Unfortunately, Harrison had considered Davis a “personal friend” from the time when
Davis, a Democrat from West Virginia, served with Harrison in the Senate. Davis also owned
substantial shares in railroad and coal companies. It would have been quite unusual in Gilded
Age politics for friendships and wealth not to be decisive in issues of patronage. Davis received
the position; Burke did not. Although, as things turned out, it is unlikely that Burke would have
been able to serve as a delegate in any case. The New Orleans press broke the story that Burke
had misappropriated state funds as treasurer less than a month later, in September of 1889.24 In
terms of the amount of money stolen, Burke’s dealings as state treasurer remains the single
largest political corruption scandal in Louisiana history.25
Burke arrived in Honduras in December of 1889, and President Bográn personally
welcomed him to Tegucigalpa. Despite a standing $10,000 reward offered by the state of
Louisiana for his return, Burke’s arrival in 1889 began a thirty-eight year residency in Honduras.
The Chicago Tribune astutely predicted that such a well-connected and gregarious politico
would “play an important part in Central America, like [Henry] Meiggs in South America.”
While the luxurious and carefree life the New York Tribune imagined for Burke did not come to
pass, that newspaper was prophetic when it foresaw Burke’s ability to avoid the “indictments
awaiting his presence in Louisiana” amid a “life of official favor and patronage” in Honduras. 26
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As it happened, Burke would have left the United States in any case since his Olancho
Exploration Company had also been formed in 1889. Not that he had anticipated falling victim
to scandal that year, any more than he had initiated his mining concerns in anticipation of his
political defeat in 1888. Burke was among many in Honduras during the 1880s who experienced
a natural lag of several years from the granting of a concession by the executive, its formal
congressional approval, and issuance of a final title after the completion of a governmentapproved survey. More paperwork followed once a corporation was formed.27
Indeed, in 1888 and before public revelations of his alleged embezzlement, Burke had
made formal plans to take charge of three companies based in England: the Honduras Gold
Placer Mining Company, the Guayape Placer Mining Company, and the Comayagua Mining
Company. Records indicate that only the Honduras Gold Placer Mining Company was fully
incorporated. Burke likewise made unavailing attempts to form a company using his ties to U.S.
railroad owners. The late 1880s and early 1890s was a highly speculative period, when as many
or more companies failed or never advanced beyond preliminary incorporation as were
successfully formed.28 The appearance of a company based in the department of Comayagua
indicates that Burke had taken steps to act as an agent or manager of another mineral zone, as
Burke himself never held concessions in that department.
Thus, Burke was an individual player in a wider global era of British investment. English
capitalists invested in no less than one-hundred-and-thirty-two new mining schemes in Latin
America between 1880 and 1890, providing roughly twenty million pounds of British funds to
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the region. One-hundred-and-four companies were formed between the years 1886 and 1890,
with 1889, the year Burke organized the Olancho Exploration Company, being the peak of the
boom. While new technological and industrial demands for copper were one impetus to
investment, speculation in precious metals was the driving force. Neither before nor since has
Latin American mining experienced an “influx of British capital of such size and velocity.” The
Honduran gold rush vied with the copper and nitrate prospects of Chile to attract the fourth
largest amount of British capital behind Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia.29 Burke’s efforts
were largely focused on gold mining, but engineers and surveyors also reported that his
concessions contained traces of silver, lead, coal, wild cocoa, copper, platinum, tellurium,
diamonds, and “precious woods of various kinds.”30
In early 1890, Burke’s plans for developing his holdings advanced when Bográn ordered
detailed reports from the governors of state-level departments that contained portions of his
concession. These reports reveal how interactions with local Hondurans in villages, towns, and
rural areas, as well municipal leaders and departmental governors, set the trajectory for Burke’s
endeavors. The Honduras Burke found had a population of 300,000 mostly rural residents in
subsistence economies. Living on small cattle ranches scattered along the riverbanks, in such
nearby towns as Guaimaca, or in smaller villages, Honduran women were especially central to
his plans. Reports of auriferous quebradas (creeks) were based on knowledge gained from local
women. Sand and gravel river bars below the Jalan at El Chorro Cañón were indicative of many
areas within Burke’s concessions “known as having been washed by women.” The custom of
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gold-washing often arose from women who worked as lavadoras (laundresses). Government
reports described the success of local women on several quebradas whose skilled use of bateas
netted them from $.50 to $1 a day by selling chispas (sparks) to local tienderos (shop-keepers).
According to an 1880 Honduran census, three-hundred-and-thirty-three women in the
department of Olancho listed their occupation as lavadoras de oro (gold washers).31
Records indicate that at least one gold washing site, Sarah, was named for a woman who
worked it. Other sites, such as the Barranca Rica, were long associated with rich deposits yet
remained untapped. In these instances, long and difficult travel from the nearest town coupled
with the fear of tigers left significant stretches of Olancho rivers underdeveloped. The threat of
tigers to cattle and people led the Olancho departmental government at times to offer a bounty
for killing them. The experience of such local women as Rosa Rodríguez and others who lived
near creek mouths and gave approximate measurements for width and depth also informed
subsequent surveyors and engineers of the topographical dimensions of gold sites.32 Despite
describing the bateas women used as “rude” in an interview with Fritzgartner for the Honduras
Progress, Burke ultimately placed faith in their ability to locate profitable gold mining
operations.33
The most common way for the women to separate fine gold from sand and gravel was a
process known in America as panning, but some local gold hunters mined with more involved
and dangerous methods. Near an isolated section of the river with deep water rapids too
dangerous for pitpans (canoes), some women worked an area known as Cajón del Oro Menudo,
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or Box of Gold Soup, by diving to the river’s bedrock for nuggets of coarse gold commonly as
heavy as an ounce or more.34 Burke and other aspiring gold miners used these collective reports
from women to construct a zone for placer mining. These often involved installing dams and
flumes to direct auriferous gravel into sluice boxes that would ensure that the tailings of lighter
gravel carried through the box while gold dropped to the bottom of the box, where riffles would
trap it for collection. Burke also mentioned the mining technique of amalgamating fine gold
with mercury to produce a better product.
Some women in Olancho even held claim to mineral veins of quartz gold. What locals
dubbed Nana Julia was one such quartz mine, “worked by an old woman named Julia,” where
“coarse gold [had] been taken for many years in abundance.” Burke made prospecting this mine,
which he called the “Old Lady’s Mine,” a top priority. The major verified that it contained a
good outcrop, described as a “rich soft streak,” and a nearby stream. Regardless of whether Julia
or other Hondurans still worked the mine, Burke’s contract gave him supreme mineral rights and
the ability to supersede and expel local claims. Accordingly, Burke reported sometime in 1890
that he had “marked” it on his list. Despite Burke’s liberal contract disadvantaging rank-and-file
Hondurans, departmental governors echoed the national leadership in favoring foreign-led
development. The governor of El Paraiso, a vocal supporter of Burke’s concession, argued that
the “land in its greatest part” was “wild.”35 Burke was also aware that the Guaimaca section
contained a number of mounds, thought to be pre-Columbian in origin, which held ancient
pottery remains and suggested the possible location of a Mayan city.36
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Locally based leaders were apt to point out areas of Burke’s concession that were owned
by private individuals and thus outside his control. This was especially the case near the town of
Teupasenti, whose mayor, Ramón Moncada, made sure to inform government authorities how
much land he personally owned. Local and state-level reports emphasizing the boundaries of
private and municipal property made a significant impact on Burke’s operations. While surveys
estimated that he could command just over one hundred miles in the Jalan concession, Burke
preferred to “keep on the safe side” and target seventy-five to ninety miles for development.37
Local conditions were central to Burke’s own survey team, headed by Edward Mayes.
Despite having brought tools and camping equipment, Mayes relied on a local male guide, used a
batea to pan for gold, and navigated the Jalan in a dugout, flat-bottomed canoe used by locals
called a pitpan. While not on the scale of other efforts to recruit Americans to Honduras, Mayes
envisioned a colony south of Juticalpa, some dozen miles up the Jalan from where it joins the
Guayape. He concluded that machinery and materials for the mining outpost could be
transported on the river with more ease than on most of Burke’s Guayape concessions. The
Jalan was worthy of its indigenous name for “beautiful” in Mayes’s eyes on his December and
January scouting expeditions. The landscape had plenty of valuable forests, alluvial soil,
abundant fish in the river, and a “most delightful climate.” Its primary occupants at the time
were “tigers, deer, tapirs, monkeys, peccaries, wild boars, wild turkey, and other game.”38
A colony of workers, or more aptly a mining camp, was needed because Mayes suggested
a sixty-mile stretch up the Jalan from where it joined the Guayape, not only because he found
gold deposits there, but also because of its isolation from local gold washers, who were
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prominent farther up river near Teupasenti and Guaimaca. “Fear of snakes and tigers,” as well as
a particularly difficult and isolated portion of forested terrain, had “kept back the batea workers”
from this rich area. Yet isolation had drawbacks as well. Mayes contended that labor for much
of the Olancho section of the Jalan was “both scarce and costly.” Local Hondurans, more than
likely many who had provided information on the area to municipal and regional political
leaders, knew of Burke’s recent concession and were possibly holding out for higher wages.
Mayes, who had experience overseeing Honduran workers at the aptly named locale of Minas de
Oro (Gold Mines) near Comayagua, reckoned that labor near much of the Jalan was “double
what it used to be.”39
Ultimately, Mayes suggested targeting the end of Cajón del Oro Menudo for immediate
works. He sent Burke the results of two bateas that netted roughly three hundred “colours to the
pan,” which no doubt verified the traditions of local Hondurans who dived the area for gold
nuggets. While its inaccessibility, long distance from a nearby town, and fear of the wildlife had
kept the Cajón del Oro Menudo’s gold supply from being drained, Burke was warned that
hundreds of batea workers would “flock” to work once a mining outpost began. Plans were
made to take a census of employed local workers to “prevent others pretending” to be from the
region and freelancing Burke’s deposits.40
Eighteen-ninety was a mercurial year for Burke and his family. The Burkes gained a
measure of stability early in the year, when Assistant Secretary of State John Bassett Moore
finished his influential A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition. It encapsulated
Gilded Age foreign policy concerning fugitives as a simple act of reciprocity. Since the United
States required an extradition treaty to remove a fugitive from American soil, it only demanded
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extradition from foreign governments with which the United States had an extradition treaty.
Moore applied the principle to Burke in 1890. His decision not to pressure Honduras for Burke’s
return was foundational to establishing the policy precedent. Maintaining friendly relations with
Latin American governments was the only guarantee of safety for such fugitives from the law as
Burke. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ker v. Illinois (1886) effectively gave American
bounty hunters broad tactical discretion when capturing fugitives abroad, regardless of
diplomatic relations with the United States or permission from the host country. For example,
just months after Moore formally ended government efforts for Burke’s extradition, the
American Exchange Bank in New York paid famed detective Robert Pinkerton to capture and
return Edward Sturgis Crawford, who had absconded to Honduras with over forty thousand
dollars of stolen funds. Back in New Orleans, shortly after news of Pinkerton’s high-stakes
chase, Burke’s old newspaper rival, the Picayune, spoke for Louisianans who still sought to
bring the major to justice when it opined, “Why not Burke?”41
That same year, Burke’s son Lindsay sought to attend the University of Freiburg in
southwestern Germany. While records do not indicate Lindsay’s wishes or family discussions,
Burke’s recent scandals likely trumped previous donations to Louisiana State University and ties
to notable figures throughout the country, and so prompted the Burkes to seek Lindsay’s higher
education outside the United States. It is quite possible that Burke’s association with Rienholdt
Fritzgartner, who held degrees from several universities in the state of Baden-Wurttemberg,
aided the young Burke’s prospects. In any event, the seventeen-year-old Lindsay was denied
entry due to his youth. Whether Lindsay attempted to attend a university at a later date is

Unterman, Uncle Sam’s Policemen, 62-63; John Bassett Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate
Rendition, Vol I (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1891), 40; “Why Not Burke?,” New Orleans Daily Picayune,
May 7, 1890.
41

189

unknown, but he ultimately aided his father’s business interests in Honduras for the next several
years.42
Burke’s efforts to survey and prospect his mineral zones so extensively demonstrated a
degree of prudence lacking in the mining endeavors of others. According to Fritzgartner, the
allocation of capital without thorough reports from experienced engineers was a common pitfall
of most mining companies. Once the locale was prospected, assayed, and surveyed, the next step
for a functioning mine required a cadre of skilled laborers, including a mining engineer, an
operator of the works, and a superintendent. Recruiting and employing these crucial laborers
was no easy task. Honduran officials bemoaned the country’s relative remoteness from the
“main currents of the world’s travel,” which meant that many potential workers resisted taking
the lengthy trip to a country where they perceived the “language and customs [were] strange.”
Working in most mines and placers meant living in isolated mining camps, which necessarily
resulted in the wife and children of most skilled laborers remaining at home abroad rather than
live separated in Tegucigalpa, Guaimaca, or Juticalpa. Providing a sufficient salary to lure
engineers and superintendents to Honduras when they could find similar employment in Europe
or North America was difficult. When the task proved insurmountable, mine owners were left to
hire men without experience or training. Owners could also demand too much of a skilled
laborer they were fortunate enough to employ, such as placing the duties of a mill man on an
overly stretched superintendent. As Hondurans liberals such as Fritzgartner could attest,
immigration laws meant to court large numbers of the working class to Central America instead
induced smaller numbers of entrepreneurs who exploited the country.43
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Once skilled laborers and local workers were employed and the construction of a mining
outpost completed, life in a mining camp often presented its own obstacles to a successful
mining operation. The loneliness of camp life and freedom from absentee overseers meant that
more than a few men “drifted into habits of dissipation and vice.”44 While lavadoras de oro
were central to locating gold sites, gender norms dictated that men were employed not just for
the sake of discipline and productivity, but also to police moral behavior and, in the eyes of men,
protect women. Operating a rocker box or sluice required workers to move a large amount of
earth. Likewise, the construction and maintenance of mining outposts required hard physical
labor.45 If vice and idleness did not infect workers, isolation meant that nearly all of them
experienced “a most awful monotony.” The most conscientious superintendents mitigated these
factors with evening musical entertainments and refreshments. Too often, however,
superintendents were either absent or insisted upon unbroken strings of long workdays.
One American scholar of Latin America, Cecil Charles, noted while touring Honduras in
1890 that the cultural ignorance of imported American skilled labor was a significant detriment
to worker productivity. Inexperienced or stubborn superintendents often made the mistake of
enforcing American habits on local Hondurans. Charles argued that it was a “far truer economy
to avoid such radical changes” of Honduran customs, such as mustering for “breakfast at five
A.M, lunch at noon, and dinner at six P.M.” Instead, he contended that Americans should
respect the habits of their workers to “have their coffee on rising, their breakfast at ten,” a
midday siesta, and “their dinner at four or five.” Charles also posited that superintendents
should not interfere with the occasional “game of ball,” likely meaning fútbol, and allow workers
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to attend traveling maromero (acrobat) shows that came near the camp. However, for all his
adroit cultural sensitivity, even Charles could be obtuse, particularly when he was perplexed that
“tennis [had] never taken hold” among Hondurans.46
It was in similar circumstances that Burke began building works and camps at his
concessions in 1890. During the fallout from his embezzlement scandal the previous year, Burke
had left for London to promote partnerships with his Honduras Gold Placer Mining Company on
the Guayape and to court investments for a corporation to exploit his holdings on the Jalan. The
Olancho Exploration Company, Limited, was the successful result of the latter endeavor. Acting
as an agent for Morris, who had a home and horseracing facility in England, and was among the
many elite Gilded Age Americans who cultivated European social ties, likely provided Burke
with a network of connections in an era of what British historians P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins
have called “gentlemanly capitalism.”47 Ultimately, John Taylor’s Sons, a firm that held the
Mysore Gold Fields in India and the South African Exploration and Mining Company, partnered
with Burke for preliminary works on the Jalan and Guayape. On the Guayape, Burke hired
Douglas L. V. Browne as superintendent to begin works near an area known as El Retiro. Rather
than focus on quebradas that lavadoras de oro had already exploited, Brown began an ambitious
scheme to construct a dam across the Guayape that would channel the river into a thousand foot
long spill flume and expose the auriferous riverbed.48
The Louisiana public actively followed Burke’s endeavors in Honduras. Despite barely a
year having elapsed from the public revelation of his scandal, the major received positive press
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in Louisiana newspapers in 1890, one of which described Burke as “Louisiana’s wandering son,
who has such a yearning for home.” Even newspapers in north Louisiana were among a host of
Democratic organs that remained fond of Burke’s tenure in the state. Such newspapers widely
reprinted a Times-Democrat interview with an Associated Press correspondent, Frederick W.
White, who had recently visited Honduras and spent time with Burke. White considered Burke a
“busy man in a lifeless country,” for while Honduras was “a land of peppers and petticoats”
Burke found “no time for dolce far niente (pleasant idleness).” The major “breathed into the
republic a spirit of American restlessness,” White contended. According to press reports,
Burke’s personality and ambitions “gained the good will and profound admiration of the people,
resident and foreign, throughout Honduras.” “If all of New Orleans went down [to Tegucigalpa]
and denounced the Major,” the Homer Guardian argued, “it would not influence the public mind
one iota against him.”49
Yet Burke experienced problems from the outset. First, transportation woes caused
delays in the shipment of construction supplies. When the ninety-odd tons of supplies arrived,
negotiations broke down with local laborers to deliver the cargo. Browne then bought onehundred-and-sixty mules to help with the arduous task, but dozens either died or were lost or
stolen. In the face of early difficulties, Burke’s partners hired Grass Valley California native
Henry Woolcock, who had been supervising Peruvian mines, to serve as an engineer and provide
an independent assessment. Woolcock wired Taylor’s Sons in London from Burke’s Camp
Buenavista, near El Retiro, in February 1890 after inspecting and assaying several areas of
Burke’s concessions to confirm that the region was, indeed, of “great value.” With Browne
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developing the Guayape portion, Burke took advantage of Woolcock’s arrival to hire him as
superintendent of his Jalan works.50
The early spring provided a measure of success that was as tantalizing as it was fleeting.
The dam at Camp Buenavista was completed in March with hired laborers working the goldinlaid bedrock. Meanwhile, progress on the Jalan was catching up to the initially delayed works
on the Guayape. Woolcock ordered derricks and supplies from California and constructed a
mining camp adjacent to a dam and flume built in April for the sluicing of top gravel. Tests from
an independent assayer certified good results of free milling gold ores with negligible sulphurets.
By this time, John Taylor’s Sons had authorized the Honduras Syndicate of London, with
Burke’s Honduras Gold Placer Mining Company and Olancho Exploration Company
constituting two of the sixteen prospective companies for mining in central Honduras. The camp
offices operated out of a four room cedar building known as “the Syndicate house.”51
According to Burke, he then ran into the same problems mine owners frequently
encountered. Woolcock was “conscientious” but “frequently absent.” Hondurans only agreed to
labor if given what Burke considered “excessive salaries.” Woolcock’s chronic absences no
doubt fueled another problem at the Jalan works, where Burke complained that much “coarse
nugget gold was appropriated by employees.” The major estimated that Taylor’s Sons did not
receive more than one half of the true products’ claims.52
Whether or not Burke exaggerated problems with his employees, environmental factors
definitely undercut his prospects. Spring rains caused a flash flood on the Guayape in late March
1890 that left the dam at Camp Buenavista standing but significantly weakened. Despite dam
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repairs and an additional flume, Taylor’s Sons abandoned the Guayape project in June. Their
decision was due in part to equally unfortunate circumstances farther south on the Jalan, where
the same spring rains carried a tree into Woolcock’s flume. According to Burke, the absentee
superintendent erroneously cabled London that the dam and flume were entirely destroyed,
which prompted Taylor’s Sons to withdraw from the Jalan works, too.53
Burke’s indomitable spirit refused to accept defeat. The ubiquitous reports of untold
riches waiting along the rivers fueled his drive. Continuous encouragement by the Honduran
government and press fueled his ego. Burke devised a bold scheme to take responsibility for
renewing operations on both the Jalan and Guayape works. He secured a loan from Honduras’s
leading female capitalist, Doña Victorina Berlioz, to reconstruct the works at El Retiro. Berlioz
was a French emigre who amassed an independent fortune in Honduras before marrying the
British consul to the country. She was among the top two dozen importers in Honduras and a
major commercial lender based in Comayagua. Burke had used Berlioz’s resources for financial
transactions since his Honduran interests began in 1886. The new arrangement between them
centered on the purchase of machinery, tools, and materials from French firms looking to offload
their goods after abandoning a project begun in 1878 to build a canal through Panama. Burke
used Berlioz as a middle woman to meet his needs at ten percent of their original cost.54
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Even when he found himself “at the point of death” in Tegucigalpa, Burke still pressed
on. When Taylor’s Sons accepted Burke’s telegraphed proposal to lease the property at Jalan
with the promise of a royalty or share of the profits, he upgraded Camp Buenavista with a system
of water wheels, elevators, and pumps. A saw mill, hydraulic piping system, and even electrical
power were put in place by August. Just as the camp was running consistently above operating
expenses with profitable sluicing, disaster struck. An even more violent creciente totally
destroyed the upgraded dam system and sluices on the Guayape on August 25. The next day,
Burke received another telegraph that the same flood had swept away the Jalan flume for good.
Burke recovered his health, but lost a fortune. Surveying the damages sometime later, he
reported that his works at El Retiro had been swept away without a trace, even though, as Burke
poetically lamented, “The patient batea washers [were] on the bars and banks scarcely touched
by this stupendous and fated effort.”55
Burke’s economic misfortunes coincided with equally disruptive events in his political
circle. The motto with which Bográn sought to govern Honduras, “paz y progreso” (peace and
progress), was increasingly undermined in the early 1890s. General Longino Sánchez, governor
of the department of Tegucigalpa and the city’s comandante de armas, initiated a coup in the
capital in November, 1890. The element of surprise forced Bográn’s government out of the city
to nearby Villa de Concepción, where it regrouped. In the chaos of the coup, Director of
Telegraphs Bertie Cecil had the wherewithal to remove telegraph equipment from the national
palace, pass through Sánchez’s pickets, and allow Bográn to wire for reinforcements. Acting
quickly to dispel what Hondurans called “La Traición (The Betrayal),” Bográn’s governors in
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surrounding departments heeded the call and sent a thousand soldiers to Concepción within a few
days.56
When Bográn’s forces re-entered the city three days after the coup began, civilian and
military leaders loyal to the government rang the bell from Tegucigalpa’s cabildo to signal a
counter attack against Sánchez. Southerners were instrumental in returning Bográn to power.
Burke, apparently sufficiently recovered from his illness, was among the three hundred citizens
who took up arms and answered the call. Meanwhile, Sánchez’s forces occupied the strategic
high ground of the city, known as La Leona, and attempted to repulse loyal forces from the
commanding plateau. Unlike Burke’s role in his last street battle, the Battle of Liberty Place, he
would not serve as an aide, but he did take part in the attack. He commanded a group of
“norteamericanos” within an “escuadra de soldados” (squad of soldiers) that stormed up
Tegucigalpa’s central streets in a three-pronged attack. New Orleans was also represented by
Colonel C. D. Beyer, whom Bográn had previously made jefe de policía for Tegucigalpa. The
assault was successful after three days of intense street fighting, and Sánchez’s coup lasted less
than a week. The unified action of most Honduran leaders in the face of Sánchez’s traición was
likewise short-lived. The uprising was the opening tremor of violent political earthquakes that
would rock Honduras intermittently for the next three and a half years.57
The increasingly divisive political environment proved deadly for at least one prominent
Southerner and Bográn supporter. Cecil’s heavy-handed communication reforms and role in
government no doubt earned him many enemies, as did his overindulgence of alcohol. After a
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particularly raucous Christmas bender in 1891, Cecil was killed in a gun fight at Tegucigalpa’s
International Hotel.58
Occurring simultaneously and furthering political instability, the Latin American
investment bubble burst. What London papers dubbed the “Baring smash” originated in the
collapse of Baring Brothers holdings in Argentina, which sent tectonic shifts as far away as
Australia. With the “keystone of English commercial credit” gone, and the political stability of
Honduras in grave doubt, Burke lamented that it had become “impossible to float any Honduras
mining enterprise in London.”59
Honduran politics grew more fractured amid a bid to replace Bográn at the end of his
second term. In preparation for the upcoming presidential election, two main parties formed in
1891. The Progressive Party nominated the government-supported candidate, Ponciano Leiva,
while a rival Liberal Party advanced a prominent intellectual, lawyer, and businessman, Dr.
Policarpo Bonilla. The latter took an active part in the defeat of Sánchez, and Bográn, despite a
growing rivalry with Bonilla, made the doctor Tegucigalpa’s new comandante de armas.
Bonilla was also Burke’s lawyer, notary public, and active agent for Burke’s various legal needs
in Tegucigalpa, which prompted Burke to claim him as a “personal friend” (See Appendix F).
Nonetheless, Leiva won the presidency, declared the opposing Liberal party illegal, and sent
most of its prominent members into exile. Chaos ensued, and amid several anti-government
uprisings within Honduras, and the coalescing strength of liberals aligned with Bonilla across the
border in Nicaragua, General Domingo Vásquez assumed the presidency on September 14,
1893.60
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An armed struggle for control of the government between Vásquez and Bonilla soon
followed. Lawlessness increased at the local level in the early 1890s, with rural bandits
emboldened to disrupt trade and even mail service. With political polarization at high levels,
especially in the capital, Burke took an active part in Vásquez’s attempts to hold power. The
decision rested on Vásquez’s status as the government candidate who still held the loyalty of
former key Bográn men. The most successful American capitalist in Honduras, Washington S.
Valentine, also sided with Vásquez. Another factor likely influencing Burke’s preference for
Vásquez was that he, as the incumbent, was more apt to maintain the stipulations of Burke’s
contract. Most important in such times of unrest was a stipulation that exempted Burke’s
employees from military service, an obligation that had crippled previous mining enterprises.
Reflecting several years later on his pivotal choice to back Vásquez, Burke made his decision
after Bonilla countenanced a foreign invasion. “When [Bonilla] came in with Nicaragua against
Honduras,” Burke recalled, “I defended the country.” While he acknowledged that Bonilla was
“hurt for a while” over the major’s support of Vásquez, the ever gregarious Burke quipped “it
wasn’t much of an offense to shoot at one’s own lawyer.”61
Among influential Bográn men in the Vásquez camp was Herbert Jeffries, who arrived on
the border between El Salvador and Honduras in 1887. A man of martial proclivities, Jeffries
soon received a commissioned from Bográn in the Honduran army. By 1893, Jeffries was
known as General Heriberto and commanded a squad of Americans loyal to Vásquez. Thus, a
few dozen Americans lent their military services to Vázquez as aspiring soldiers of fortune,
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though whether they did so from a spirit of romantic adventure or for political and economic gain
is hard to say. Yet one characteristic united most of them: they were Civil War veterans, often
ex-Confederates. Civil War veterans in Central America clung to their former military ranks as a
badge of honor in the region’s machismo culture. Hondurans accepted this affectation and
routinely referred to them by their ranks. In recounting those who were instrumental in defeating
the Sánchez uprising, Bonilla referred to Burke as “Mayor.”62
In addition to Burke, two of the more prominent Americans in Vázquez’s corner were
brothers Frank M. and Jacob. P. Imboden, the younger siblings of Confederate general John D.
Imboden. Frank M. Imboden served the Confederacy as a mounted ranger until he was captured
at the battle of Roanoke Island in early 1862. After the war, the Imboden family embodied the
mobility of former Confederates who either journeyed to the North for economic opportunity or
lived in Latin America. Frank and Jacob Imboden did both by moving to Central America after
aiding their brother John’s northern-based business. “Capitán” Frank M. Imboden and Jacob P.
Imboden mirrored Burke in becoming capitalists with diversified holdings in Honduras. Frank
was a founding member of the Banco Nacional Hondureño in 1888 and became the only
foreigner on the Junta Directiva (Board of Directors). The Imbodens also partnered with Burke
on several occasions by selling the major control of their Monserrat Mining Company and
leasing from Burke’s Olancho concessions rights to operate the Imboden Placer Company. The
small world of the Honduran political economy also meant that Bonilla took the Imboden’s
support of Vásquez personally, since he, Bonilla, had been their lawyer and agent, as he had for
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Burke.63
Burke, as one of Vásquez’s “main advisors,” was in league with Imboden and Jeffries as
part of a group of Americans known to counsel Vásquez on military matters when Bonilla and
his Nicaraguan allies won increasing victories in the fall of 1893. While sacking the crucial
southern city of Choluteca on January 15, 1894, Bonilla’s supporters also seized on Honduras’
ties with New Orleans by forcibly taking over Crescent City steamers to carry out military
campaigns against such key north coast port cities as Trujillo. Nor was the powerful Pacific
Mail Steamship Company immune. When Bonilla’s forces preceded their capture of Choluteca
with advances on Ampala in December 1893, the company’s steamer Costa Rica was caught in
the crossfire. The affair was serious enough for Collis P. Huntington to complain to the
Department of State that Hondurans loyal to Vásquez and Bonilla, who had proclaimed himself
provisional president, were both commandeering Pacific Mail property and asserting that they
harbored political opponents that they deemed criminals.64
Whatever advice and aid Burke and other allies of Vásquez offered him failed to turn the
tide. Bonilla’s Nicaraguan supporters, who provided disciplined and well-supplied troops,
proved decisive. His forces controlled all major departments and laid siege to the capital by the
end of January. Bonilla’s revolutionists and the Nicaraguan army’s combined force of roughly
three thousand soldiers steadily gained the heights surrounding Tegucigalpa, where they shelled
the city. Burke, the Imboden brothers, and other Americans who had cast their lot with Vásquez
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found plenty of time to worry about their fate as Bonilla’s noose tightened. U.S. Department of
State officials in Central America considered the situation “desperate” and “very serious” for the
number of Americans who, they worried, “would undoubtedly be shot” if they became prisoners
of war.65
The tense crisis over the fate of Americans in supporting the legitimate government of
Honduras against Bonilla revealed how southerners in Latin America and both U.S. and
Honduran leaders sought to shape political realities on the ground. Frank M. Imboden, invoking
what he regarded as a gentlemanly code of ethics, told U.S. consular agents that Americans
serving with Vásquez were “men of character and good position, commercially and socially,” not
mercenary rogues or adventures. The former Confederate also employed an ironic use of Civil
War-era diplomacy by contending that men such as himself and Burke had as much right to
support the constitutional government of Honduras and the “amenities of civilized warfare” as
any “Englishman or German who [had] joined the American Army in 1861.” The political
history and culture of Latin America gave Bonilla a different perspective. The provisional
president considered men who had fought with Vásquez as so-called “sharpshooters and
volunteers” to have been nothing more than guerrillas. Since Burke and most other foreigners in
Vásquez’s forces, with the notable exception of Herbert Jeffries, fit that category, Bonilla
initially informed U.S. officials that they would be tried as guerrillas by a Honduran military
tribunal.66
Bonilla’s hardline policies were further revealed when his forces attempted to impress
American citizens working in Honduras into armed service. With “cannonading and musketry
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heard at all hours of the day and night,” Vásquez’s roughly fifteen hundred man force in
Tegucigalpa was consistently depleted by food shortages as the siege extended well into
February. On the thirty-first day of the siege, Vásquez and his core group of supporters thought
to capitulate. However, with Burke and other foreigners joining them, they decided on a bold
plan of escape rather than running up the white flag of surrender. According to his own account,
Burke “fought and fell with Vásquez” and was among three hundred of the government’s last
remaining armed forces to “cut” their way out of Tegucigalpa in a night assault through the
heavy resistance of Bonilla’s army to reach El Salvador. On February 23, 1894, the day after
Vásquez fled, Bonilla rode triumphantly through the capital’s Plaza de Francisco Morazán.
Meanwhile, Burke, Bonilla’s former employer, business partner, and friend, was facing poverty,
expulsion, imprisonment, or death. Nearly three decades after Kirby Smith’s surrender, Burke
was on another losing side in a civil war.67
Burke’s political and economic activities in Central America had been a frequent source
of gossip in the American press. His attempts to aid Vásquez and subsequent retreat to El
Salvador were widely covered episodes. After Burke had been in exile for a month, the New
York Times expressed “every reason to believe” that the major’s Honduran scheme was over.
President Ezeta of El Salvador, the Times predicted, would surrender Burke to the United States.
However, knowledge of Burke’s wiles made Louisiana authorities less certain.68
The ultimate ability of Burke and other foreigners who had supported Vásquez to
reconcile with Bonilla and return to Honduras rested on American foreign policy, personal
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networks, and overall constraints and opportunities of the Honduran political economy that
Bonilla inherited as president. The Department of State acted immediately to protect Burke and
other American citizens “against any exceptional or unduly harsh treatment.” In a show of
strength that foreshadowed twentieth-century gunboat diplomacy, the Department of State
arranged for representatives of Vásquez, Bonilla, and Zelaya to settle on terms of peace aboard
the U. S. S. Ranger in Amapala’s harbor. On March 3, 1894, Vásquez relinquished his claim to
power and Bonilla guaranteed the safety of Vásquez’s commissioned soldiers and property but
insisted on separate treatment for foreigners.69
Bonilla was astute enough to back away from his initial threats to execute as guerrillas
foreigners who had supported Vásquez. Instead, he proposed using a military tribunal to expel
all foreigners loyal to the previous president. Foreigners such as Burke could avoid this fate only
if they submitted to an “amicable arrangement” to “settle up business” in Honduras before
leaving the country. Bonilla also took great pains to emphasize that the dormant property of
foreign capitalists had not been plundered. However, hardliners in his camp pressured him to
maintain a tough stance against foreign opponents, perhaps seeking to benefit financially if the
government controlled or auctioned the property of outside capitalists. Meanwhile, the U.S.
consul in Tegucigalpa, James J. Peterson, and the foreign ministers of Britain, Spain, Italy, and
Germany used soft power to induce more liberal policies for the reconciliation of their citizens
and the Honduran government. U.S. Chargé d’ Affaires D. Lynch Pringle told officials in
Washington that to return the Ranger off the Honduran coast would have a substantial “moral

69

Acting Secretary of State Edwin F. Uhl to U.S. Minister to Central America P. M. B. Young, May 16, 1894, in
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President
Transmitted to Congress, December 3, 1894, 301; Pringle to Gresham, March 13, 1894, in Ibid, 300-301.

204

effect” on Bonilla by demonstrating that the United States was serious about promoting the
“welfare of American citizens in Honduras.”70
With connections throughout Central America, the United States, and Europe, Burke was
no doubt aware that diplomatic pressure and economic realities were softening Bonilla’s
position. The major also knew that Washington S. Valentine, the leading American titan of
industry in the country, as owner of the most successful Honduran mining operation, had already
“flopped” to Bonilla. As Bonilla was cementing his power and deciding his policies for foreign
capitalists, Burke returned to Tegucigalpa sometime in mid-April 1894. Having fought in the
Civil War, multiple street battles, duels, and the recent Battle of Tegucigalpa, Burke did not lack
boldness. According to his own account, he went to Bonilla “with my life in my hands” and
offered his old friend a simple choice. “Shoot me or order me out of the country, and that will
square my accounts, otherwise I must go to work,” Burke told Bonilla. Pleading further, he
declared, “I owe $75,000 to your people [so] I had to come back and respond for my
obligations.” In the interconnected networks of foreign capitalists in Central America, Burke
was also a partner in a New York-based corporation that had encouraged him to meet with
Bonilla in order to retain their contracted concessions for a railroad centered at Puerto Cortés.
Nonetheless, Bonilla recognized Burke’s political prowess when he allowed the major to return
on one condition: Burke must pledge to refrain from actively influencing Honduran political
affairs.71
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Another way Burke was able to remain in Latin America was by adroitly turning to old
allies: John A. Morris and the Louisiana State Lottery Company. The defeat of the Ring in 1888
was the watershed moment for the lottery’s fate. Coupled with ever increasing pressure from a
wide swath of the Louisiana public and politicians, anti-lottery initiatives were central to
growing national reform movements in the Gilded Age. Not only had pro-lottery Democrats lost
in Louisiana, but the return of Republican control of the White House and Congress following
the 1888 election was decisive. Congress and President Benjamin Harrison ended the lax lottery
policies of the Cleveland administration in 1890 and gave the post office sweeping powers to
enforce a ban on any lottery’s ability to use the postal service. Two years later, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the law in a suit filed by Morris and the Louisiana State Lottery
Company. At the end of 1893, the Louisiana legislature voted overwhelmingly not to renew the
lottery’s expiring charter.72
Yet Morris and his cronies did not concede defeat. Lottery executives turned to a scheme
that exploited reciprocal transnational links between the American South and the wider world.
Amid the increasing threat of American annexation, Hawaii’s Queen Liliuokalani entertained
preliminary talks with the exiled Louisiana gambling enterprise. In return for an annual payment
of five-hundred-thousand dollars, she promised to support a telegraph cable connecting Honolulu
to California.73 Ultimately, lottery agents bargained for a much more lucrative deal with
Honduras: a twenty-five year charter to operate in that country under the newly named La
Compañía Nacional de Lotería de Honduras (The Honduras National Lottery Company) in
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exchange for annual payments of twenty thousand dollars and twenty percent of the profits.74
Compared to Hawaii, Central America also benefited from more established and well-connected
steamship and telegraph services to the United States. The Honduran congress had approved the
lottery in August of 1893, when Vasquez still held power and was searching for ways to hold
back Bonilla’s growing insurgence. Finding himself in power, Bonilla made a choice similar to
that of Burke and machine Democrats in Louisiana in the 1870s. Rather than end a source of
power and funds created by a political enemy, Bonilla appropriated the lottery for his own power
network within months of taking the reins of government. Burke and Bonilla came to an
arrangement during the same time that the new president was debating the lottery question.
These facts indicate that Burke’s return and Bonilla’s continuation of the Honduras National
Lottery were not coincidences. It would be highly unlikely if Burke had not acted as a crucial
middleman and agent yet again for John A. Morris and his lottery’s operations in Honduras,
which continued to provide Bonilla’s administration with a significant source of revenue.75
The politics of late nineteenth-century Central America also points to how Burke and
Bonilla reached an agreement. Politics in the era were immensely fluid, often determined by
one’s social connections and economic calculations. Burke’s choice to support Vásquez
reflected how both of the aforementioned concerns often favored the incumbent. In an evershifting political environment, recently victorious partisans were often willing to forgive those
who backed their former opponents, particularly if they were wealthy, connected, invested in the
national economy, and from America or Europe. Ever the gambler, Burke possessed a four of a
kind. Coupled with his connections to Morris and the lottery, this proved enough of a winning
hand for Bonilla to allow Burke’s return. One Honduran involved in the political realignments
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after Bonilla established his authority summed up the situation: “The parties are personal, they
are isms, so that it is not unusual to see someone, now in one group, now in another, without
violence, without the need for explanations . . . it’s a question of economics, or better yet, of the
stomach.” In other words, Honduran politics were factional, not ideological.76
This situation was entrenched further by the replacement of Conservative oligarchies,
which dominated from the colonial era through the mid-nineteenth century, with Liberal
oligarchies. Marco Aurelio Soto, the first liberal president of Honduras, and his successor Luis
Bográn were Honduran liberals oriented towards Guatemala. Indeed, both were considered
protégés of Justo Rufino Barrios, whom Burke had dined with during the Barrios’ visit to New
Orleans in 1882. Moreover, Bográn was from the western department of Santa Barbara, and his
hacienda, Mongoy, was on the Guatemalan border. Bonilla, meanwhile, seized upon Nicaragua’s
ambitions to increase its stature within Central America and aligned with that country’s newly
inaugurated José Santos Zelaya.77 Firm political and ideological dividing lines between
Honduran leaders were difficult to distinguish amongst the country’s various liberal factions. In
Honduras, which was the poorest region of Central American well into the late-nineteenth
century, the relative historical absence of a landed planter aristocracy blurred distinctions beyond
personalismo among politicians more than any other republic in the region. The fratricide
amongst liberals created an oligarchy that became as “inbred and aristocratic as their
Conservative predecessors.”78 This was at times more than metaphorical in Honduras, because
Vásquez was Bonilla’s uncle.
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In addition, liberalism in Central America, or in Mexico during the Porfiriato for that
matter, was defined and practiced as an overwhelmingly economic endeavor. Electioneering and
fraud were as common in Honduras as they were in Louisiana. Supporters of the government
were known to employ conscription laws to suppress the returns. They would force opposition
voters to labor on public works projects on election day until after the polls had closed. “Only in
Costa Rica,” one Central American historian asserts, “did elections mean anything.” Throughout
the rest of the region, Bográn and Bonilla established “republican dictatorships” that operated
through political machines.79
In addition, Bonilla’s administration was typical of most Central American republics at
the time in that it depended on foreign support. The new president also made an immediate
priority of continuing Bográn’s efforts to modernize the Honduran economy and political
institutions. Shortly after Bonilla’s ascension to the presidency, one American capitalist
informed Burke, “What the government wants now is help, and such help as only men who are
both wise and rich can give.”80 Bonilla himself assured the managing director of the Central
American Commercial Company in the summer of 1894 that foreign interests were “respected,
even [the property] of Americans who took arms against the Liberal Party now in power.”
Likely alluding to Burke, Valentine, and Imboden, Bonilla observed that his former opponents
from America had “resumed their works and remain in the country unmolested.” With
Honduran debt to Britain alone at roughly ten million pounds, national leaders could not afford
to risk alienating foreign capital.81 How far Bonilla evolved from his initial threats of hostility
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toward foreigners was evident in the Honduran Constitution of 1894, Bonilla’s ultimate act of
cementing his legitimacy. Signed in October of that year, it ensured that the country would be a
“sacred asylum for all persons who take refuge” within its borders, even for fugitives from the
law.82
Acting U.S. Secretary of State Edwin F. Uhl astutely reflected in May of 1894 on the
reasons for Bonilla’s ultimate welcoming of foreign capitalists who had supported his opponent.
“The vicissitudes of government in [Central America], and the benefits accruing to the State
through the invited influx of foreign capital and enterprise,” Uhl wrote from Washington,
“counsel the avoidance of repellant treatment whereby such aids to national development may be
discouraged for the future.”83 Thus, American economic, diplomatic, and military pressure
significantly influenced Central American politics well before the administration of William
Howard Taft promoted “dollar diplomacy.”
In May 1894, American newspaper reports indicated that Burke, newly reconciled with
the Honduran government, was actively involved in establishing the lottery’s operations between
Honduras and the Gulf South. The New York Times reported that the major had arrived in
Tampa, Florida, aboard the Honduras National Lottery Company’s main steamer, the Clear
Water, from Puerto Cortés with “two prominent New Orleans men.”84 Indeed, despite the new
charter and new location, the owners and leadership remained the same. Paul Conrad, who
replaced Charles T. Howard and Dupree after their deaths, remained the company’s president.
The lottery held its monthly drawings at its chartered headquarters in Puerto Cortés but sold
tickets throughout the Gulf South. Since Florida’s lottery ban did not include foreign enterprises,
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Morris and his associates established a de facto headquarters in Tampa, where they received
payments through express services, not the U.S. post office. Taking advantage of the fluidity of
the circum-Caribbean, the lottery also funneled business and communications through New
Orleans and Mobile. The lottery’s presence in Puerto Cortés was particularly imposing. Richard
Harding Davis, who went to Honduras to investigate the “Golden Octopus” for Harper’s Weekly,
regarded it as “large mansion with broad verandas” and a “magnificent exterior” set in a lush
tropical garden that contained poles flying the Honduran and American flags.85
As it had in Louisiana, the lottery continued its strategy of ubiquitous advertisements
after its relocation to Central America. Programs in several of the most popular theatres in the
United States contained advertisements for the Honduras lottery. Lottery agents told prospective
Honduran customers in newspaper advertisements that the company was “reputed for twentyfive years of integrity in its drawing and prompt payment of prizes” during its “prosperous
operations in the state of Louisiana” as the previously known La Compañía de Lotería del
Estado de la Luisiana. According to advertisements, the transfer to Honduras was a welcomed
opportunity, not a forced relocation, which would add an “international character . . . instead of
being previously confined to America.” While tickets prices were in U.S. dollars, meaning
Latino customers suffered from an unfavorable exchange rate, winnings were paid in gold or
U.S. dollars. Presidents from the leading banks in New Orleans also vouched for lottery
payments. Lottery leaders undoubtedly thought Jubal Early was a well-known figure in Central
America, because advertisements frequently included his testimonial that the company was run
with “honesty and fidelity.” The former Confederate general also expressed regret that he could
not move with the lottery to Honduras since it “would not be prudent” to move to a “tropical
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region” given his “advanced age.” However, there was a deep pool of available Confederate
veterans willing to lend their name for an easy paycheck. General William Lewis Cabell, who
rose to prominence as an Arkansas lawyer and mayor of Dallas after the war, and Colonel C. J.
Villere, a Louisiana native who was Pierre G. T. Beauregard’s brother-in-law, presided over the
drawings in Puerto Cortés.86
Floridians expressed enough concern over the notorious lottery’s pernicious influence for
Democrat Wilkinson Call, a U.S. senator from the Sunshine State, to propose the creation of a
special committee to investigate the extent of the lottery’s operations in Florida and whether it
was attempting to “control the elections . . . legislature . . . members of Congress and the
executive officers of the State of Florida.” According to Call’s fellow senators, the proposed
special committee marked the first time in U.S. history that Congress debated investigating the
possible corruption of a state legislature or governor.87 Louisianans also attempted to pressure
the U. S. government against lottery operations in Central America. Veteran Reform Democrats
Francis T. Nicholls and Joseph Shakespeare led a petition signed by people who had “felt the
heavy hand of the corrupt and tyrannical corporation.” Evangelical reformers joined the chorus
of lottery critics. One religious newspaper called on national officials to use the country’s
claimed right as police power of the Americas to legislate morality abroad. They considered it a
“national duty to prevent . . . citizens from being plundered beyond . . . [U.S.] borders” and
insisted that the American government stop Honduras from “harboring criminals [who] openly
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engage[d] in the violation of . . . [U.S.] laws.” Such petitions met with some success in the
attempt to employ American diplomacy against the lottery. Longtime Assistant Secretary of
State Alvey A. Adee directed Chargé d’ Affaires Pringle to alert Honduras that the United States
was displeased with its decision to harbor the old Louisiana State Lottery Company. Yet the
Honduran government did not amend its relationship with the lottery.88
Burke’s reconciliation with Bonilla was necessary in the summer of 1895, when John A.
Morris died unexpectedly. Morris’s death in May 1895 of a stroke at the age of sixty-five at his
Texas ranch put Burke in a precarious position.89 For him to gain full title to concessions that
were legally held by Morris, he needed special governmental dispensations. In the months
following Morris’s death, Burke petitioned the Honduran government for legal recognition of his
power of attorney for Morris and thus of his rightful claim to the Olancho concessions. To help
his case, Burke ensured that both the foreign relations secretary and attorney general of
Honduras approved the paperwork. Even so, to get the Honduran government to reissue a
concession was not an easy task. National leaders had previously revoked mining concessions
when companies failed to carry out their obligations. To combat this, it was not uncommon for
foreign capitalists to pay cash for legislators to approve contracts through a special session of
Congress. Burke was much relieved then when, three months after Morris’s death, President
Bonilla recognized him as the ultimate director of the Jalan and Guayape concessions.90 A few
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years later, Burke made Bonilla a trustee in the execution of donations made in memory of his
“deceased friend, Mr. Morris, and in behalf of the Youth of Honduras.” Burke stipulated that
industrial schools in Olancho, Yuscuran, and Tegucigalpa would each receive five thousand
dollars in gold and fifty thousand dollars in capital shares in his various mining holdings. Burke
hoped his generosity would allow Honduras to “participate directly as well as indirectly” in the
results of his “aspirations.”91
Despite a successful return to Honduras, Burke never regained the level of success and
support of international capital he had achieved in his first six years in the country, but his
experience was the rule, not the exception. The rise and fall of speculative mining investments
made even Fritzgartner grow more sober by the fall of 1896. “More is necessary to command
success in mining,” experience had taught him, “besides a sample of rock, a rich assay, a
glowing prospectus and a pocketful of shares.” Promoters with “roseate schemes,” “multitude[s]
of ignorant Directors who never saw a mine or mill,” and managers who were either
inexperienced or “content with any situation, so long as salary was forthcoming” were the
primary culprits of unprofitable enterprises. Successful prospecting often made managers
impetuously purchase, transport, and install equipment before ensuring it was appropriate for the
precise topography and ore at hand.92 Another common pitfall was the false assurance of profit
caused by company script and paper stock without hard cash for operating expenses. According
to Fritzgartner, the “promoting and speculative stages” that occurred in the mining boom of the
previous fifteen years had “left their scars in foreign capitalistic circles, and strewn the Republic
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with the wrecks of ill formed and badly managed companies.”93
The speculative bubble that fed on Bográn’s policies caused a significant shift in
Policarpo Bonilla’s industrial policies. Bonilla lamented that concessions had previously been
“promiscuously” given to foreigners without “sufficient guarantee of good faith” and who
subsequently “did not make proper use of them.” While continuing to attract foreign capital and
extend expansive legal protections and privileges to foreign investors, the Bonilla administration
pledged to cease “indiscriminate grants,” require vetted guarantees on the part of foreign
industrialists, and stridently enforce contractual obligations. Such a policy was meant to
stabilize the Honduran economy, raise international confidence in Honduran claims, and ensure
that faulty mineral zones would “cease to be footballs of speculation and deception in foreign
markets.”94
The occasion for Fritzgartner’s remarks was a formal French tour and inspection of
Central American mines. In October of 1896, the French ministers of commerce and foreign
affairs subsidized a scientific commission to explore the Central American mineral districts in
Honduras and Nicaragua. The French had previously organized a syndicate to work Honduran
mines, particularly on the Pacific coast.95 Manuel Lemus and Henry G. Bourgeois spent thirtysix days in Burke’s concessions to view the works and collect over one hundred samples of ore
from his mines, outcroppings, and placers. Burke no doubt professed a familiarity with French
culture to his guests, based on his southern Louisiana political career. President Bonilla placed
enough importance on the French mission to grant the commissioners free expedited mail and
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telegraph services. French mineralogists echoed the orthodox opinion of Hondurans and Burke’s
previous surveyors, going so far as to exclaim that the Guayape and Jalan had the potential to
overcome the silver veins near Tegucigalpa as the richest region in the country and provide
enough profits to “liquidate the public debt of France.” However, the commission’s mission to
“secure the attention of financial people . . . , scientists, and . . . the Government of Honduras”
was self-serving. Its president, Alfred L. Pinart, was a shareholder in Honduran mines. The
commission was interested in Burke’s properties because the major was considering selling
portions of them to a French syndicate. The prospect was serious enough that Burke considered
a trip to France, even asking his nephews in Dallas, Texas, to update his will in the event of an
accident on the voyage.96
The French commission took special care to quell “the erroneous idea of the disastrous
effects of revolutions in Honduras and of the insecurity of the mining enterprises.” Lemus and
Bourgeois argued not only that the number of uprisings was grossly exaggerated and that foreign
enterprises had experienced only negligible effects, but also that foreign works had “the
sympathies of revolutionists and Government troops.” The French geologists offered a long list
of reasons that the mineral wealth of Honduras had not been realized. Political instability played
a major role, they said, which explained, in turn, Burke’s want of “competent and honest men” to
manage the mines. French engineers believed that Burke’s relatively “small or ill success”
stemmed from neglect and ignorance mixed with “the lack of aptitude . . . honesty and good
faith.” Inefficient and immoral polices the Spanish practiced on the indigenous population was
also a common refrain. The so-called “Black Legend” of Spanish colonialism persisted into the
nineteenth century, as the French cited “vicious proceedings” and “cruelties committed on the
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natives” that “rendered labor odious” and left Honduran precious metals dormant. The
commission’s report cited another longstanding view of the sociological effects of tropical
weather. The land and climate were so fruitful that Hondurans had a natural “indolence.” More
optimistically, the commission predicted that appropriate supervision and instruction from
American or European managers would correct the issue because local inhabitants sought mining
work and wished to “help the laborious and enterprising foreigner.”97
French boosters also optimistically echoed Fritzgartner’s views and pointed to the
dawning of a “new era” of progress in which Burke could be “proud of having been one of the
pioneers in the accomplishment.”98 French newspapers covered Alfred Pinart’s presentation of
its findings to the French Geographical Society in Paris, which also allowed society members to
examine gold samples from Burke’s holdings among those collected throughout Honduras and
Nicaragua. Lemus and Bourgeois compiled their reports into a brief pamphlet, which included
Burke among a list of eight individuals from the government and private sector who were the
country’s leading authorities on mines. As Burke was coming to realize, paper promises and
lofty rhetoric did not translate to profits. The “new era” of progress soon to come would be
fueled by a yellow Honduran product other than gold: bananas.99
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Epilogue
Unsurprisingly, the stipulation Bonilla’s government imposed on Burke that he no longer
interfere in the country’s political affairs did not last long. In April, 1897, three years after
Bonilla had taken power from Vásquez, Enrique Soto threatened to overthrow Bonilla. The
doctor found himself in a precarious position when Soto’s revolutionaries simultaneously
attacked La Esperanza in the southwest and Puerto Cortés in the northwest. With his presidency
in the balance, Bonilla abandoned concerns about the origin of his allies. Burke’s unwavering
support for Bonilla in the midst of defections to Enrique Soto did much to cement their personal
and political reconciliation following the dramatic schism during the civil war earlier in the
decade. During the attempted Soto coup, Burke considered Bonilla a “good friend” and
surmised, “[Bonilla] knows I am square and likes me better than the sneaks and turncoats.”1
With General Terencio Sierra leading the government’s military effort to turn back the
invaders, Burke offered his support. Burke argued that his economic interests and personal life
were inextricably bound to Honduras. As such, he claimed that it was “difficult to view
matters,” such as “the invasion of the state by armed bodies,” with “indifference that affect the
interests of the country so gravely.” The major expressed a sense of duty to defend the
constitutional government, while not in 1861, as he had against the Sanchez revolt in 1890 and
against Bonilla’s Nicaraguan-supported revolutionists in 1894. Ever the pragmatist, Burke
adroitly navigated the shoals of Honduran politics. In offering whatever aid Bonilla saw fit,
Burke told the president that he had a “great personal sympathy” for him and that Bonilla had
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served Honduras with “fidelity” as a guardian of “law, order, and the state.”2 The precise nature
of Burke’s role in suppressing the Soto coup is unknown, but Bonilla successfully retained
power. Burke and Bonilla’s friendship also grew. Bonilla gave Burke a copy of his photograph
in 1899, and the major was a guest at the wedding of Bonilla’s daughter in 1900.3
The dramatic environmental setbacks, risks of political instability, and a decline of
foreign investment in Central American mining made Burke retreat from his previous overly
ambitious efforts to exploit his holdings. The major increasingly rented out portions of his
mineral zones, including to the Imboden Placer Company, as a means of mitigating his risk and
capital outlay. “By leasing the placers on a royalty,” Burke explained to Bonilla, “my titles
remain safe. If the companies fail, I recover my property.”4 While maintaining his mining
interests in this way, Burke diversified and also invested in infrastructure projects, such as
Honduran railroads and real estate, including at least two homes on Boulevard Francisco
Morazán, Tegucigalpa’s central thoroughfare. He was also one of many Americans and
Europeans in Latin America who had investments in hotels, even serving at one time as manager
of the Hotel Palma in Puerto Cortés. Moreover, Burke continued his valuable role in service to
the Honduran economy by recruiting and advising prospective American investors. Honduran
presidents used Burke as a middleman and at time explicitly directed him to facilitate foreign
investment. Burke also continued his position as a central player in the tight-knit American
colony of investors, at one point suggesting the establishment of a society for American
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capitalists. When conflicts arose, Burke often mediated disputes between American investors
and the Honduran government. At one point writing to Bonilla that “a satisfactory settlement
can be arrived at between the government and [American] bondholders by a little diplomacy.”
Similarly, Honduran leaders often sought Burke’s knowledge of the American press when
concerned with unfavorable Central American coverage.5
As he had in the Vásquez administration, Burke also played a host of formal and informal
political roles in several Honduran administrations. Burke’s role in Honduran affairs was
strengthened when he gained sufficient command of the native language to begin corresponding
in Spanish by 1899. In 1903, for example, he played an active role in overseeing and advising
President Terencio Sierra in constructing a forty-five kilometer public highway connecting
Sabana Grande to Tegucigalpa. The major admitted that it would require hard work and skilled
engineering to incorporate the necessary system of sewers and drains, but he was optimistic that
for “Hondurans nothing [was] impossible” when “the people devote their intelligence and
energies to the labors of public utility.”6 However, Burke’s influence also fomented resentment
and animosity among people who sought inclusion in, or the overthrow of, a particular
administration. In 1911, for instance prospective revolutionaries described Burke as a canalla
(scoundrel) and an obstacle to their planned coup.7
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Burke’s advisory and administrative role within Honduran politics mirrored his
determination to, if not directly influence American affairs, keep abreast of developments. This
included utilizing former political ties, as when he tried to enlist the aid of former Democratic
governor of Ohio, George Hoadly, in settling a dispute over a mining title with another American
capitalist.8 The major’s decade of experience in regional and national U.S. affairs also made him
an important source for Honduran leaders seeking to understand events in El Norte. For
instance, Bonilla and Burke followed the 1896 U.S. presidential campaign closely enough for the
Honduran president to send Burke a telegram notifying him three days after election day that
William McKinley had defeated William Jennings Bryan.9
In letters to President McKinley and Policarpo Bonilla, Burke advocated a bold shift in
Central American and U.S. relations that revealed how political events and personal experiences
had changed his views since his arrival in Honduras. While a New South politician and editor of
the Times-Democrat in Louisiana, Burke had explicitly rejected calls for the conquest of Latin
America, and the idea of annexation seems never to have crossed his mind. Indeed, he once
candidly told Bonilla that his political and journalistic careers had always promoted “firm
friendly intercourse” on a “commercial and fraternal basis” that would “keep alive the doctrine
of Monroe [and] safeguard [Central American] countries against European aggression.” By
1897, however, Burke drew on the Monroe Doctrine to argue that the United States should use
economic and diplomatic soft power to induce Central American annexation. Ironically, Burke
told McKinley and Bonilla that his work as owner-editor of the Times-Democrat and director
general of the 1884 world’s fair had implicitly functioned to “prepare public thought” for the
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eventuality that “Mexico and all the Central American Republics would find their way
voluntarily, into the American Union,” which would, in so doing, build “New Orleans into a
great Commercial City.”10
Burke had changed his opinion because of what he perceived as new foreign threats to
Latin America. “Africa and China are being parceled out,” Burke warned, “will the veracity of
Europe be satisfied with that spoil?” The major divined that “secret plans” were in the works for
European powers to “obtain islands for coaling stations on the Atlantic . . . and . . . Pacific side”
of Central America. According to Burke, Porfirio Díaz had recognized the threat by 1897 and
was poised to seize the “reins” of the region and “unite Mexico and Central America in one great
republic.” Firm and concerted American efforts were needed to avoid these possibilities, Burke
contended, but not through direct intervention. Voluntary annexation was the only answer, with
Central Americans genuinely in favor of it. His reasoning reflected the intimate knowledge of
Latin American nationalism Burke had gained through a decade of observing and shaping
Central American politics. The United States needed to send “intelligent men of affairs” who
operated with “kindness, fairness and diplomacy” to ensure that the “Central American States
[would] swing into the Union,” he insisted. If Hondurans sensed a “spirit of territorial
acquisition,” their “Amour Propre” (self-respect) would compel them to reject the plan.11
Another reason for Burke’s full throated advocacy for annexation was consistent failure
of the region’s liberals to revive a Central American federation. Since the countries of Central
America had already demonstrated their ability to “lay aside the name of Republic when they
formed the Central American Pact,” Burke argued that leaders such as Bonilla should pivot their
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desire for enhanced security and prosperity that an enlarged country would bring and “enter the
federal union as equal independent states of the United States of America” (emphasis in
original).12
In an attempt to foster pan-American identity under the umbrella of the United States,
Burke revived rhetoric common to the 1884 New Orleans exposition. He spoke of the “people of
the United States,” rather than “Americans,” since, as he assured Bonilla, “we are all
Americans.” He also echoed a central theme of his Times-Democrat by insisting that “the open
Highway of the Sea . . . bind[s] North America and Central America, geographically and
commercially” through “a thousand trackways of commerce.” Surely, Burke argued annexation
would give Latin American liberals what they had long desired, including peace and political
stability, civil and political liberties, and the influx of capital and skilled labor needed to develop
infrastructure and natural resources. What was more, with the U.S. government assuming
Central American debt, Burke maintained, Honduras would be “set on firm progressive ground,
capable of marvelous development” as the “center of the trade links of the world.”13
Burke argued that he was “so profoundly interested in Central America,” and “bound up”
in his “sympathies and interests with Honduras” that “no son of the [Honduran] soil” would
charge him with partiality for his “native country.”14 Burke’s rationale for annexation revolved
around an orthodox definition of progress as material and industrial progress, which would
further enrich himself. Burke dreamed of the “hundred-thousand men and more than twenty
million dollars worth of machinery” that would come to his mineral zones on the Guayape alone
if Honduras became a part of the American republic. Yet Honduran annexation was in no small
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part contrary to Burke self-interest, as it would bring the major within the jurisdiction of his
previous indictments. As Katherine Unterman, an historian of high-profile American fugitives
abroad, asserts, Burke’s seeming contradictions and mixed loyalties were common among such
men.15
On the whole, Burke’s new embrace of American imperialism both reflected and
anticipated significant changes in U.S. foreign policy during the 1890s. From his vantage point
in Central America, Burke believed that the thrust of American imperialism should begin there,
not Cuba, which was the primary focus of U.S. interests at the time. Therefore, Burke’s views
foreshadowed America’s direct role in Central American development, and ultimately
annexation, with the Panama Canal. Nor was he opposed to military intervention under certain
circumstances. America “must whip the world,” Burke told President McKinley; “pour blood
and treasure to recover and safeguard” Central America if foreign powers threatened the region.
Importantly, Burke made no mention of race or assimilation in his plenary letters to McKinley
and Bonilla. In advocating the annexation of the states of Central America as “sisters of the
same tongue,” Burke’s experience in the region made him reject the racist and xenophobic views
common amongst anti-imperialists.16
Burke’s carefully crafted argument for annexation did not elicit a response from President
McKinley, who was concerned most with rising tensions in the Caribbean. Bonilla, meanwhile,
indulged Burke but curtly responded that annexation was “an impossibility” due to “our Latin
race.” Having peacefully transferred the presidency to his leading general, Terencio Sierra,
Bonilla revealed a deeper rationale for rejecting any annexation schemes, for he, like the
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majority of liberals in the region, continued to hope for a federation of Central American states.
As in his response to Burke, he also prioritized racial differences as an obstacle to annexation.
Such a scheme, he insisted, could only come to fruition “after intermixture” of the “Latin
American and the Anglo-Saxon” races. Still, Bonilla played astutely to American hopes for
annexation by suggesting that such a dramatic move might be considered more favorably “after
the establishment of American works and institutions” in Central America and if, as Burke
assured, Honduras and other countries “were allowed to come in as other States of the Union and
. . . [with] equal rights.”17
While Burke assuredly did not, as he boasted to President McKinley, own or control
“more property than any other individual American or group of Americans in Central America,”
he retained a high degree of international visibility and level of prominence within Honduras. In
addition to attracting frequent newspaper coverage, Burke continued to shape American popular
culture and perceptions of Latin America in other ways. In 1897, the same year that William
Sydney Porter fled to Honduras fleeing the law in Texas and New Orleans, one of America’s
most popular Gilded Age authors, Richard Harding Davis, published his most successful novel.
Both Davis and Porter, to be better known as O. Henry, wrote about U.S. fugitives from justice,
with Porter also coining the term “banana republic” in his Cabbages and Kings. However,
Davis’ Soldiers of Fortune was a colorful account of American exiles and investors who
advanced U.S. interests in the supposedly lawless lands of Latin America. His protagonist,
Robert Clay, was an American miner and mercenary who operated amid intrepid industrialists
and nefarious politicians and generalismos. While set in a fictional Latin American republic
named Olancho, one of the characters who helped bring order and riches out of political and
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economic disorder displays striking parallels to Burke. Named “Captain Burke,” he was a
middle-aged, bombastic, and pugnacious man, described as a “brave soldier and a citizen of
[America] or of any country, which happens to have the most sympathetic Consul-General.” It is
more than likely that Davis, a well-attuned journalist who had visited Honduras and wrote
extensively about the lottery, based the character of Captain Burke on the real life exploits and
persona of Major Burke.18
The major’s only child, Lindsay, also came to embrace his father’s audacity and
transnational worldview. In 1896, Lindsay left his father’s Honduran business ventures to join
Belgian King Leopold II’s Force Publique in the Congo. Leopold’s government was equal to the
most inhumane and exploitative imperial regimes of the nineteenth century, but young Burke
was one of dozens of adventure-seeking and profit-driven white foreigners who gained
commissions in his army in order to exploit the region’s rubber, ivory, and precious metals.
Commanding forces of conscripted African soldiers that were, in effect, slaves subjected to
brutal discipline, officers such as Burke dealt with frequent mutinies. In early 1897, when he
took part in suppressing a major revolt in the Kasai region of south-central Congo, Lieutenant
Burke and twenty-seven of his men were killed in an ambush.19
Around the time of Lindsay Burke’s commission in the Force Publique, the elder Burke
transferred his residency from Tegucigalpa to Puerto Cortés, where he lived only two doors from
the U.S consulate. The affable major either made friends with U.S. Consul W. M. Little or
bribed him, because Little, without permission from the American minister to Central America in
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Guatemala City, granted passports to Burke and his wife to travel to Europe and Africa in April,
1897. Hoping to learn the whereabouts of their only son, the couple were told in Africa that
Lindsay and his men had been “cut down and hacked to pieces” while fighting for Leopold.20
For the rest of his life, Burke blamed Belgian mining agents for recruiting his son to the Congo.
Some two decades later, the major happened upon a representative of the Belgian firm in a
Tegucigalpa hotel. Burke, despite being over seventy years old, confronted the younger man in a
rage, “whanged him with his walking stick,” and retrieved a shotgun to seek final retribution
before Burke’s friends restrained him.21
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Burke floated in and out of official positions
in the Honduran government, including assistant superintendent and auditor of the Honduras
Interoceanic Railway, of which he was investor.22 In spite of such posts, the major had cause for
concern. Progressives in the United States had finally induced the government to take decisive
action against La Compañía Nacional de Lotería de Honduras, which was estimated to
contribute one-hundred-thousand dollars a year to the Honduran government. More than fifty
arrests and three-hundred-thousand dollars in fines later, a series of U.S. Secret Service sting
operations against the lottery’s American printers and distributors brought its downfall in 1907.
After nearly forty years in operation, the last iteration of the insidious Louisiana lottery was
defeated.23
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Around the same time, the Honduran foreign ministry changed its policy of unquestioned
asylum for exiles and began to extradite American fugitives in order to gain favor with the U.S.
government, which had directly intervened in Honduras in 1903 and 1907. In 1908, for example,
Honduras handed over the wealthy former president of the State National Bank of New Orleans,
William Adler, whose institution had done business with the lottery.24 Negotiations for an
extradition treaty between Honduras and the U.S. began in 1909, an action welcomed by the
Hondurans as it became a means for them to assert their sovereignty and refute America’s
growing hegemony in the region. The treaty would not be finalized until three-and-a-half years
later, in no small part because Burke himself became a conduit for the debate.
At issue in the negotiations were the numerous fugitives in Honduras who constituted, as
Consul Albert W. Brickwood put it, a particularly large “class of immigration” of men “who
[were] prominent in the States.” Honduran diplomats wanted guarantees that the treaty would
apply only to people who had lived in the country for fewer than ten years. According to U.S.
officials in Washington, “the object of [the] restriction was to protect Edward A. Burke, twenty
years in Honduras.”25 Honduran ministers were capable of being even more blunt, at one point
requesting a provision to guarantee that the “Government of the United States . . . [would never]
request the Government of Honduras to surrender Major E. A. Burke for crimes . . . charged
against him in the state of Louisiana.” Ultimately, Honduran officials held up the treaty until the
U.S. government accepted loose retroactive stipulations on the understanding that such
stipulations remained informal. The compromise allowed Honduras to extradite American
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fugitives, even wealthy ones, while retaining the flexibility to protect the elite political and
economic tier of fugitives who had a long residency in the country. Unsurprisingly, Burke
enjoyed an informal special status and remained safe in Honduras.26
The major’s influence continued into the second decade of the twentieth century (See
Appendix I). During the Great War, he defended the American cause in Central America. In the
wake of the Zimmerman telegram and a strong German commercial presence in the region,
Burke used the war as an opportunity to malign German competitors, whom Burke described as
“silently but effectively making [their] way” in Latin America “under the nose” of the United
States. “All of us will have the chance to ‘do our bit’ before this world war ends,” Burke
explained to a friend in Louisiana in 1917; “do not fancy that [the United States] will not require
the help of sound Americans of experience in Central America and Mexico.” More actively, the
major sought a commission in the U.S. army for the intrepid soldier of fortune Lee Christmas, an
American citizen who had served as a general in the Honduran military. Burke’s home in Puerto
Cortés also demonstrated the major’s patriotism, as he hung a framed picture of Abraham
Lincoln next to one of George Washington.27
The rising prominence of the banana trade along the northern coast of Honduras at the
turn of the century meant a changing geopolitical landscape. Bananas became the country’s
most valuable export in 1902 and climbed to over ten times that of mineral exports in the
following three decades. The pull of work in the banana plantations on the Caribbean coast
likewise put a labor drain on mineral operations in the highlands of central Honduras.
Consequently, the economic and political center of Honduras shifted from Tegucigalpa to Puerto
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Cortés and La Ceiba. As Burke recognized this shift, he changed his residence to Puerto Cortés
and sought service with the government-led Ferrocarril Nacional de Honduras (National
Railroad of Honduras).28
Burke became actively involved with El Ferrocarril Nacional as early as 1908, when he
served as auditor. In February 1912, Burke rose to superintendent of the railroad. Apparently a
foreigner occupying the highest post caused discontent, as Burke was removed from the position
two months later. However, Honduran leaders recognized Burke’s “extensive experience . . . in
railway matters” and retained him as assistant superintendent and auditor. Working for the
railroad, Burke’s earliest vocation, meant his life had come full circle, albeit with over a
thousand of miles of separation. Living in Puerto Cortés but routinely traveling throughout the
country on various social and business trips as a railroad official, Burke was among a handful of
wealthy residents of Honduras who owned an automobile. By the late 1910s, Hondurans came
to know Burke’s Ford car and his driver, Lisandro Garay. The major held his posts at the
Ferrocarril Nacional until old age forced his retirement in 1926.29
Burke’s evolving influence was evident in other ways as well. In 1918, Burke’s friend
and business partner, James M. Lynch, was appointed U.S. vice-consul at Puerto Cortés.
Consulate offices were at times briefly overseen by private citizens when the assigned
representative was away. While it was uncommon for a citizen of another country, much less a
fugitive, to take temporary charge, Burke did just that on at least one occasion for the British
consulate at Puerto Cortés.30
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In 1926, Burke’s long-awaited exoneration from the charges of fraud and embezzlement
in Louisiana came to fruition. For years, Burke had steadfastly maintained his innocence. At
various times and according to various accounts, Burke claimed he was a scapegoat in a wider
conspiracy, that the alleged theft never occurred, and that the funds, while not properly
documented, went to support what the major considered his crowning achievement, the 1884
New Orleans exposition. Since it was uncommon for Gilded Age politicians, especially in
Louisiana, not to enrich oneself through officeholding, it is likely that the misuse of state bonds
was a machine tactic to fund kick-backs and patronage. The common Gilded Age practice of
assessments, in which partisan officeholders were expected to contribute to party coffers, also
points to others benefiting from the treasury scheme. The sheer size and longevity of the
scheme, involving five different bonds from 1882 to 1888, lends doubt to the claim that Burke
alone carried out or benefited from the theft. However, as a leading Democratic machine
operative and state treasurer, he was no doubt central to the operation. Although he was
immediately informed of the dismissal of charges, Burke decided to remain in Honduras, likely
due to increasingly chronic ill-health.31
Burke’s role in Colonel Charles Lindbergh’s famous world tour proved to be the final
dramatic act for a man with a knack for the spotlight. On January 3, 1928, Burke joined
President Miguel Paz Barahona in the lead government car to Toncontin Field to greet Lindbergh
on his arrival in Tegucigalpa during his good-will flight through Central America. With
hundreds of people making the ten mile round trip to the airfield on foot, at least two thousand
Hondurans flocked to the numerous government ceremonies to honor Lindbergh during his
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three-day stay in the capital. Young boys paraded with torches while crying “¡Viva Lindbergh!,”
local girls dressed in their finest to wait on his every move, and Barahona insisted that the aviator
sit in the presidential chair during a national banquet given in Lindbergh’s honor.32
The people able to meet Lindbergh, whom Hondurans called Don Carlos and “El Niño
Prodigio” (The Wonder Boy), represented a who’s who of the country’s political and social elite.
During one ceremony, Burke presented the famous bachelor with a gift for his mother. It was a
golden chest containing, as Burke described in a letter to Mrs. Lindbergh widely reprinted in
Honduran newspapers, gold nuggets harvested on his Olancho properties by “crude bateas and
indigenous methods.” Burke was also a part of the delegation that shook Lindbergh’s hand one
last time on the airfield before his departure. As over a thousand onlookers gave cheers of
“¡Viva!” to Lindbergh, the United States, and Honduras, President Barahona presented him with
a New Orleans-made gold medal set with a diamond. Shortly thereafter, the Spirit of St. Louis
departed for Managua with Burke’s gift safely stowed.33
Burke’s visible role in one of Honduras’ most popular public ceremonies in decades
also elevated the major’s stature and likeability among the populace. It was a fitting capstone for
a man who was socially, as well as economically and politically, prominent. Burke moved
around this same time from Puerto Cortés back to Tegucigalpa, in no small part due to failing
health and the better medical care the capital afforded. In the last years of his life, Burke made
his home in the Ritz Hotel, and his niece moved to Honduras to help care for the aging major.34
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Given his long illness, residents of the capital were not surprised to hear of Burke’s death on
September 23, 1928. Nor were U.S. consulate officers, with whom Burke had arranged to secure
his private papers and belongings from both Tegucigalpa and Puerto Cortés upon his passing.
The major knew that his long residency and diverse activities in Central America, not to mention
his political career in the United States, had engendered jealous enemies or, as Burke described
them, “many hungry” and “voracious” “sharks [that] await my passing.” However, the response
of Hondurans, from official acts of government to the rank and file, demonstrate how they
perceived Burke.35
To Hondurans, as early as 1890, Burke’s efforts to develop the country outweighed his
checkered past in Louisiana. The Honduran press regarded him as “thoroughly honest” and “a
public benefactor,” and wished that there were “more such men.”36 El Demócrata, in
Tegucigalpa, remembered the major as a “charming, enterprising and generous American who
made Honduras his segunda patria (second homeland) to which he demonstrated at all times his
sincere affection.” While noting his various business interests in Honduras, the newspaper
emphasized that he had previously served the Ferrocarril Nacional with “honesty and success . . .
lending his cooperation for everything that meant progress and a good name for the country.”37
A correspondent from Yuscaran, where Burke held mining interests, reported that the major’s
passing led locals to conclude that Honduras had lost “the best of foreigners.”38 Another
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editorial in El Demócrata boldly proclaimed, “We Hondurans will hold on to his memory as the
greatest foreigner who has ever pitched his tent on our promised land.” No wonder, then, that
Burke’s thirty-nine year residence in the country made his passing a notable event. Honduran
newspapers reported an “influx of people” from Tegucigalpa and surrounding areas soon grew to
an “enormous” crowd around the Ritz Hotel.39
The Honduran government joined the public display with an official Acuerdo to honor
Burke’s passing. It was issued despite the rarity of someone outside the highest level of
government receiving an official notice of death in the national newspaper. President Miguel
Paz Barahona’s decree asserted that Burke had “dedicated himself to work for the good and
prosperity of the country” in a long career that made “manifest his love” for Honduras. As such,
Honduran officials deemed it “a duty of the Government to pay homage” to such a noteworthy
individual. The Acuerdo made provisions to give Burke a state funeral equivalent to those at the
rank of brigadier general, but a state funeral in Tegucigalpa was contested by Yuscaran locals
who demanded that Burke be buried near their city.40 Ultimately, locals from Yuscaran won out,
in no small part aided by the major’s own will, which included stipulations as early as 1897 that
he be buried near his mining operations. A procession of Yuscaran’s Honduran and indigenous
population carried the body from Tegucigalpa some ninety miles on their shoulders to the
outskirts of Yuscaran for burial. “We deplore the death of the honorable Mayor Burke,” El
Demócrata lamented, “and we wish that the roses he loved . . . to adorn the button hole of his
jacket always grow on his grave.” Back in the United States, the value Americans placed on
profitable overseas trade and influence by the late 1920s meant that Burke was remembered quite
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fondly. The Associated Press excused Burke’s embezzlement of funds as wholly tied to his
stewardship of the 1884 New Orleans exposition, which “brought him world-wide prestige, but
cost him his health and fortune.”41
Burke was to Honduras what John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie were to the
United States, a benevolent robber baron who extolled a “gospel of wealth.” They exploited the
country, the government, and the people, but were astute enough to court good will through
public acts of charity. While the original stipulations of his mining concessions required the
support of Honduran society, Burke voluntarily continued the process throughout his residency
in Honduras. When entering negotiations to sell or acquire companies, Burke often justified his
actions as an obligation to bring about “justice to my family and the country” of Honduras. This
desire remained dear even in death. Half of his estate passed to the descendants of his wife’s
first marriage. The other portion was bequeathed to the Honduran government as a means to
support “the youth of Honduras” through public education. This probably included Burke’s
extensive collection of books, which was reported to constitute the best private library in
Honduras. The amount of wealth Burke held during his time in Honduras cannot be discerned,
but he had definitely achieved enough to be counted among the elite.42
On the whole, Burke’s experiences and actions represent the dynamic and fluid nature of
transnational forces in the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries.43 From his childhood in
“Notas de Duelo,” Tegucigalpa El Demócrata, Sept. 24, 1928. Burke expressed the wish to “find a resting place in
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Kentucky, Confederate service dealing with Mexican trade, import-export business at a primary
Gulf South port, editorialship of a leading newspaper, oversight of an international exposition,
capitalist venture in Latin America, ties to British investors, and familial connections to Africa,
Burke epitomized the Atlantic World as much as any one person. Yet his New South vision
while in Louisiana and his dealing in Honduras, both of which included the Pacific world,
demonstrate that, as historian Moon-Ho Jung as shown, postbellum southerners thought about
and acted in a truly global worldview.44
Burke himself, and the Louisiana lottery as an institution, represent significant continuity
between the Civil War era and the first decades of the twentieth century. As Edward Haas and
other historians have demonstrated, the elements of Regular versus Reform Democrats and their
respective strategies and constituents began in the postbellum period of which Burke was active
and formed the contours of Louisiana politics through the era of Huey P. Long and beyond. It
was a common campaign tactic well into the twentieth century to resurrect the specter of Burke
and Ring rule, but often the candidates who employed that tactic, such as Benjamin F. Jonas, had
strong ties to machine Democrats. On the whole, the shifting nature of Louisiana politics
allowed conservative machine politicians to present themselves as reformers while reformers
often furthered conservative ends.45
Despite the dubious electioneering methods, systematic fraud, and coordinated violence
that machine politicians such as Burke condoned, their transnational, New South platform
demonstrates that postbellum Democrats, as much as their more studied Republican counterparts,
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had viable and legitimate policy goals to attract voters. Close studies of Louisiana, and
specifically New Orleans, also show that the postbellum South had significant commonalities
with the immigration, machine politics, labor struggles, and global trade that was characteristic
of the Gilded Age North.
Burke at times expressed regret that the abrupt end to his political career in the United
States meant he was unable to build his own “monument in acts of public good.”46 During such
moments of reflection, he thought most fondly of his journalistic achievements and leadership of
the 1884 New Orleans exposition. Indeed, the New Orleans World’s Industrial and Cotton
Centennial represented a demonstrable moment in which many Americans no longer saw
Louisiana as the periphery of an east coast dominated trade system, or the Gulf and Caribbean as
backwaters to a teeming North Atlantic. And thanks to the precedent, the 1884 exposition would
not be the last time Louisianans used a fair to project the state as the center of world trade and
progress. New Orleans businessmen and the leaders of the Choctaw Club, an early twentiethcentury political machine akin to the Ring, initiated a drive in 1910 to host an international fair
celebrating the opening of the Panama Canal. Ties to the previous New Orleans fair in the mid1880s were extensive.
Louisiana politicians who got their start in the 1880s, such as Mayor Martin Behrman,
take an active part in mobilizing support. The assistant secretary of the Mexican commission to
the 1884 fair, who subsequently worked for United Fruit, took part in recruiting Latin American
support for New Orleans to host the Panama exposition. The rationale of such men in the early
1910s was nearly identical to Burke’s postbellum New South vision, mainly that New Orleans
had extensive ties to Latin America, was geographically suited for Central American commerce,
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and was connected by the Mississippi River to the heartland of America. When San Francisco
challenged New Orleans for the right to host the exposition, civic boosters in each city trading
insults through widely disseminated propaganda. One issue that advocates for the California site
repeatedly raised was the unpaid congressional loan that Burke and Louisiana had secured in
1884. Ultimately, New Orleans lost its bid to San Francisco, which hosted the Panama-Pacific
International Exposition in 1915. However, a hundred years after the World’s Industrial and
Cotton Centennial, New Orleans hosted the 1984 Louisiana World Exposition. Sadly, despite
over seven million visitors, it too, like Burke’s exposition, was a financial failure.47
During his residency in Central America, Burke contributed significantly to Honduran
politics, economy, and society. Operating one of the largest mineral concessions ever given to
an individual, Burke’s mining corporations represented an influx of cash and credit that worked
its way through all sectors of the Honduran economy.48 Still lagging behind most Central
American countries, the economy of Honduras was at least more productive than British
Honduras for most of the period. Nonetheless, its emphasis on exports and liberal concessions to
attract investors did not provide the silver bullet needed to defeat the nation’s economic woes.
Instead, Honduras was indicative of the persistent problems that plagued the entire region. The
economic growth inspired by mining was not enough to stimulate a substantial domestic market
or to attract the amount of skilled labor and wage increases necessary to create such a market.
Instead, an elite group of Latinos and foreigners funneled their profits outside the country by
purchasing manufactured imports. However, Honduran liberals such as Reinholt Fritzgartner
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and Luis Bográn were not wholly in error. A robust silver and gold mining sector could have
helped Honduras escape the common Central American characteristic of a monocultural
economy. When this did not occur, and banana exports began to overtake the mineral sector, the
geopolitical landscape of Honduras shifted from mining-oriented Tegucigalpa in the central
highlands to the banana entrepôts of Puerto Cortés and La Ceiba.49
Ties established between Louisiana and Honduras in the late nineteenth century would
continue into the twenty first century. As such historians as Lester Langley, Thomas
Schoonover, and Darío A. Euraque have shown, Central America has been exceptional within
Latin America for its relationship with the United States, a relationship shaped by the large
number of American capitalists attracted to the region, the amount of wealth invested and
procured there, and the frequency of U.S. interventions in those countries. Consequently, the
status of Central America as a satellite, or informal empire, for the United States, as formulated
between the 1880s and 1910s, has cast a long shadow over the region for a large part of the
twentieth century, with tangible legacies in the humanitarian crises of the 1980s.50
Cold War violence and immigration patterns beginning in the 1990s built upon the
established links between Honduras and Louisiana. As of 2009, Hondurans comprise the largest
Latino population living in the New Orleans metropolitan area, with over eleven thousand people
born in Honduras and thousands of others being second and third generation Americans.
Traditions are maintained through foodways, music, and dance, often celebrated at Honduran
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holidays. The annual February 3 feast and mass honoring the patron saint of Honduras, Our
Lady of Suyapa, is the largest Honduran community event celebrated in New Orleans churches,
such as Immaculate Conception Church and St. Theresa of Avila. On September 15, Hondurans
join other Latinos in celebrating Latin American Independence Day with punta dances sponsored
by the New Orleans Hispano America Dance Group, which specializes in traditional Honduran
folk dancing.51
To conclude, examining the indomitable Major Edward Austin Burke provides a muchneeded analysis of an individual who embodied the South’s postbellum transnational links as
much as any one individual. As a contemporary observer realized in the 1920s, “no story of
Honduras,” or the United States in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, “is complete
without mention of the Major.”52
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Appendix

A: Edward Austin Burke c. 18751

1

Napier Bartlett, Military Record of Louisiana: Including Biographical and Historical Papers Relating to the
Military Organizations of the State (New Orleans: L. Graham & Co., 1875), 21.
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B: New Orleans 1st District2
Canal to Julia, Mississippi River to Rampart

Elisha Robinson and Roger H. Pidgeon, Robinson’s Atlas of the City of New Orleans, Louisiana (New York: E.
Robinson, 1883). Compiled for the use of insurance companies from surveys by New Orleans city surveyor and
architect John F. Braun during the late 1870s. The maps indicate existing lots, buildings, and geographic landmarks.
The color pink represents brick buildings, and yellow signifies wooden structures. Printed street names are
contemporaneous to publication; hand-written name changes were added at a later undetermined date. Street
addresses predate the current system, which was adopted by New Orleans in the early 1890s.
2
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Delord to Felicity, Mississippi River to Magazine
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Julia to Felicity; Magazine to Rampart
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Canal to Thalia, Rampart to Claiborne
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Canal to Julia, Claiborne to S. Gayoso
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3

C: Map of Major Cotton and Sugar Producing Parishes of Louisiana, 1880

3

Donna A. Barnes, The Louisiana Populist Movement, 1881-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2011), 35.
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D: Advertisement for the Louisiana State Lottery Company
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Louisiana State Lottery Company ticket
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E: “Our Press,” New Orleans Mascot, May 27, 1882.
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F: New Orleans Mascot, February 28, 1885.
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G: “Only a Cock and Bull Story (about the new rebellion),” New York Harper’s Weekly, Dec. 6,
1884.
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H: Policarpo Bonilla, c. 1890s (Photo courtesy of Eric Schwimmer, used with permission).
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I: Edward A. Burke, 1914.4

4

Tegucigalpa Boletín de la Secretaria de Fomento, Obras Publicas, y Agricultura, May 31, 1914.
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